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Note on Terminology 
As ever in the Northern Ireland context, disputes on terminology can arise. Our focus 
is on providing accessible legal and policy analysis on the current NIO consultation 
and related work. As such, we have sought to use clear and unambiguous terms to 
help readers make up their own mind on these complex and sensitive matters from a 
position of maximum knowledge and information. 
The ‘draft Bill’ referred to herein is the Draft Northern Ireland (Stormont House 
Agreement) Bill. 
The conflict, sometimes referred to as the Troubles, refers to actions concerning the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland by republican paramilitaries, loyalist 
paramilitaries, the security forces (in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) 
and others from 1966 onwards. 
At various points, we discuss terrorism and counter-terrorism. Terrorism in this 
context refers to ‘the use of violence for political ends’ (Emergency Provisions Act 
1973, 28 (1) as subsequently amended) and counter-terrorism refers to the actions 
of the state to prevent, interrupt, and respond to such politically motivated violence. 
Dealing with the past or dealing with the legacy of the past is a broad term that refers 
to efforts to address the specific rights and needs of victims, survivors and 
communities, and initiatives designed to help individuals and broader society to 
come to terms with the effects of past conflict-related abuses. Usually such efforts 
include a focus on such themes as truth, justice, reparations, storytelling, 
acknowledgement, memorialisation, and reconciliation. 
The term victims and survivors referred to in this report are as defined in the Victims 
and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order (2006). 
At different junctures, in particular with regard to the debate on a statute of 
limitations, we refer to state actors and non-state actors. These terms have a 
particular meaning in international human rights and international humanitarian law. 
For current purposes, the term state actors refers to the British Army, Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, MI5 and others involved in counter-terrorist activities during the 
conflict. The term non-state actors refers to loyalist and republican paramilitaries. 
As is discussed in the report itself, there have been significant legal and political 
wrangles concerning the definition of collusion and indeed, we believe that this 
legislation offers the opportunity to introduce some legal clarity to these debates. For 
current purposes, collusion refers to activities involving state actors in relation to 
loyalist or republican paramilitaries that may include state actors committing or 
conspiring to commit particular acts or being involved in omissions or failures to act 
on something that they ought morally, legally or officially to oppose. 
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Introduction 
If there is consensus on anything in Northern Ireland today, it is that the current 
approach to ‘dealing with the past’ is not working. In particular, it is failing to deliver 
for victims and survivors, some of whom have been waiting forty years and more for 
truth, justice, reparations, and other needs to be addressed. The failure to address 
the past is placing huge pressure on the criminal justice system, is a constant source 
of tension on political relationships, and is undermining efforts to build reconciliation 
within and between communities. In short, the past needs to be addressed and the 
Stormont House Agreement (SHA) legacy mechanisms discussed herein are 
realistically the last holist effort that is likely to be made towards that end. To quote 
one veteran victims’ advocate who spoke at one of our recent consultation events, 
the Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill represents ‘the last chance 
saloon’ for many victims and their families. If this overarching effort is not delivered 
upon, victims and survivors will have been cruelly failed again. Such an outcome 
would be unconscionable and a moral blight on our politics. 
The Northern Ireland Office consultation that was launched in May 2018 provides 
detail on the proposed legislation designed to enact the series of mechanisms that 
were included in the Stormont House Agreement of December 2014. That 
Agreement was itself the culmination of lengthy negotiations by the five largest 
Northern Ireland political parties and the British and Irish governments. It retains 
many of the key features of preceding attempts to deal with the past. Although it is 
far from perfect, it represents what we believe to be the best possible opportunity to 
finally address the past. 
Background to the Model Bill Process 
The Stormont House Agreement proposed to establish four key mechanisms for 
dealing with the past: 
 A Historical Investigations Unit (HIU) 
 An Independent Commission for Information Retrieval (ICIR) 
 An Oral History Archive (OHA) 
 An Implementation and Reconciliation Group (IRG) 
In the subsequent Queen’s speech, the UK government pledged to introduce 
legislation at Westminster to enact these commitments.1 Given that the Agreement 
contained only ‘heads of agreement’, it was clear that much work remained to be 
done in order to create the necessary legislative framework. Drawing on the 
experience of previous rounds of negotiations, it was also clear that the ‘devil would 
be in the detail’. 
                                       
1
 ‘Legislation will be Taken Forward Giving Effect to the Stormont House Agreement in Northern 
Ireland’, see Cabinet Office, ‘Queen’s Speech 2015’ (27 May 2015) 
http://gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015 accessed 14 August 2018. 
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In was in this context that a Model Bill team was established in 2014.2 It comprised: 
Professor Kieran McEvoy and Dr Anna Bryson (Queen’s University Belfast), 
Professor Louise Mallinder (Ulster University), Brian Gormally, Daniel Holder and 
Gemma McKeown (the Committee on the Administration of Justice). They were 
assisted by Jeremy Hill, a former Foreign and Commonwealth Office lawyer and 
advisor to the Consultative Group on the Past, and Daniel Greenberg, a senior 
barrister and experienced parliamentary draftsperson.3 
The agreed aims and objectives were to help ensure that: 
 The debate on dealing with the past in Northern Ireland is informed by technically 
sound but accessible legal and policy commentary in order to help people make 
their own assessments from as informed a position as possible. 
 Public discussions on legacy issues are informed by relevant international and 
comparative experiences, whilst seeking bespoke solutions appropriate to the 
local context. 
 The proposed legislation is fully compliant with the UK’s international obligations, 
particularly Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR ‘right to life’ and prohibition on torture). 
 The proposed legislation remains faithful to the SHA, including its guiding 
principles. 
 The proposed mechanisms are primed to deliver meaningful results for victims, 
survivors, and broader society harmed by the conflict. 
 The overall end result is significantly better than the existing piecemeal approach 
to dealing with the past. 
In order to highlight the full range of issues arising, the team set about developing a 
Model Bill. This included detailed clauses and explanatory notes that would, if 
implemented, give effect to the SHA legacy mechanisms. Throughout 2015, 
developing drafts were discussed with victims and survivors, politicians from across 
the political spectrum, a wide range of local civil society and NGO organisations, and 
British and Irish officials. 
Once completed, the Model Bill was formally launched in October 2015 at an event 
at the House of Lords sponsored by former Northern Ireland Office Minister Lord 
                                       
2
 All of the team have been working on Northern Ireland legacy issues for some years. The 
Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) has a long-standing interest in this field culminating 
in the publication of The Apparatus of Impunity in 2015. Kieran McEvoy began working with 
colleagues at Healing Through Remembering (HTR) on legacy related issues in 2004. He authored 
their report Making Peace with the Past: Options for Dealing with the Past in and about Northern 
Ireland (Healing Through Remembering 2006). Together with Louise Mallinder, McEvoy established 
an AHRC funded project which explored the intersection between amnesties, prosecutions and truth 
recovery which produced several technical reports that fed into the work of the Consultative Group on 
the Past (2007-2009), Haass-O’Sullivan talks (2013) and Stormont House Agreement (2014) and 
subsequent debates. See further http://amnesties-prosecution-public-interest.co.uk accessed 20 
August 2018. In 2014 Bryson, a historian who was previously involved in a number of major peace 
process related oral history projects joined the staff of QUB law. She also joined the Model Bill team 
to lead on the Oral History Archive. 
3
 The legal services engaged were funded by the Queen’s University Business Alliance fund. 
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Dubs and addressed by the then Shadow Northern Ireland Secretary of State, 
Vernon Coaker, amongst others. 
Our approach throughout was to be pragmatic, constructive and to work within the 
realm of what we considered legally and politically viable. We adhered closely to the 
text of the SHA and endeavoured to write each substantive clause in a manner that 
was consistent with both UK domestic law and the relevant international human 
rights standards. We also adhered to the guiding principles set out in the Stormont 
House Agreement. To recap these are: 
 Promoting reconciliation; 
 Upholding the rule of law; 
 Acknowledging and addressing the suffering of victims and survivors; 
 Facilitating the pursuit of justice and information recovery; 
 Human rights compliance; and 
 To be balanced, proportionate, transparent, fair and equitable. 
As our work progressed, the Legacy Gender Integration Group developed a set of 
principles to better integrate gender into SHA legislation and implementation.4 These 
have also informed our work. 
In the hope that our work might be of some practical and meaningful benefit to those 
most directly affected by past harms, we offered to provide accessible legal and 
policy advice (free of charge) to any civil society group interested in dealing with the 
legacy of the past. 
The Current Consultation 
Progress on legacy matters has been painfully slow. Further negotiations in 2015 
broke down in large part because of a failure to agree an effective way to balance 
national security considerations on the part of the state and the right to information 
being sought by those family members who had lost loved ones during the conflict 
(discussed further below). The Fresh Start Agreement of November 20155 failed to 
reach consensus on the legislative framework for dealing with the past but efforts 
continued (albeit on a stop-start basis) through 2016 and 2017. Finally the long-
awaited public consultation was launched by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in 
May 2018. 
In this public consultation exercise, the NIO produced the following key documents: 
                                       
4
 Legacy Gender Integration Group, Workshops Report: Developing Gender Principles for Dealing 
with the Legacy of the Past, Belfast, November 2015 
https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/74070/Legacy-Gender-Integration-
Group_Workshops-Report_Developing-Gender-Principles-for-Dealing-with-the-Legacy-of-the-
Past_18-11-2015.pdf accessed 12 August 2018. 
5
 See A Fresh Start: the Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland accessed 12 August 2018. 
MODEL BILL TEAM RESPONSE TO NIO LEGACY CONSULTATION 
vii 
 ‘Consultation Paper’ with an introduction by the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland 
 Draft Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill 
 Explanatory notes for the draft Bill 
 Paper on the role and function of the independent academic report to be 
commissioned by the IRG 
 Equality screening exercise 
These were published alongside summary documents and the original Stormont 
House Agreement.6 
Shortly after the launch of this consultation, five members of the original Model Bill 
team set about preparing this detailed response to these documents. They are: 
 Professor Kieran McEvoy (QUB) 
 Dr Anna Bryson (QUB) 
 Professor Louise Mallinder (UU, now QUB) 
 Mr Daniel Holder (CAJ) 
 Mr Brian Gormally (CAJ) 
This group offered a preliminary response to the NIO documents at a seminar held at 
QUB on 16 May 2018. At this event (attended by the NIO legacy team) some key 
concerns and potential ‘sticking points’ were identified. In the weeks that followed the 
team set about addressing those challenges and developed the following detailed 
response. Our efforts have continued to be guided by the principles above. 
We have tried to be as constructive as possible - highlighting strengths and points 
that we welcome. For each weakness that we identify (breaches of human rights 
standards, elements that run contrary to the Stormont House Agreement, or 
proposals that we believe to be unworkable) we endeavour to offer a remedy. 
We have included almost 50 substantive recommendations for changes that we 
believe are essential if this initiative to ‘deal with the past’ is to succeed. This may 
seem overwhelming but it is our firm belief that all of these obstacles can be 
overcome with legal imagination, political will and a moral commitment to deliver for 
victims and survivors. Standing back from the detail, it seems clear that if each of the 
mechanisms is: 
 Placed on a suitably independent footing; 
 given the necessary resources, powers and clarity of mandate; 
 Staffed by the right people, who are appointed in line with clear and transparent 
criteria; and 
 Protected from political interference 
                                       
6
 For the full range of documents see Northern Ireland Office, ‘Open Consultation, Addressing the 
Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past’ (11 May 2018) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-irelands-past 
accessed 12 August 2018. 
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the net result would be a significant advance on the prevailing fragmentary, under-
resourced, and piecemeal approach to the past. 
The format of this report is as follows. We begin with a comprehensive Executive 
Summary that summarises the strengths and weaknesses in each of the 
mechanisms and sets out our key recommendations. We then address some 
crosscutting challenges that underscore the entire legacy process. These include 
issues that we believe ought to be included in the Stormont House Agreement Bill (a 
pension for the severely injured) and those that should not (a statute of limitations for 
former members of the security forces). Given its central importance to public 
confidence in the SHA mechanisms as a whole, we also offer some very clear 
recommendations on the issue of information redaction on the grounds of national 
security. 
In the main body of the report, we deal in turn with the Historical Investigations Unit, 
the Independent Commission on Information Retrieval, the Oral History Archive, and 
the Implementation and Reconciliation Group. 
We include in an Appendix our proposed model for dealing with information 
redaction in light of national security concerns that was published in 2017, elements 
of which are summarised in the main text. 
This public consultation is a vitally important element of the legacy process. 
However, it is also important thereafter that all concerned remain vigilant as the 
legislation passes through the Houses of Parliament, as the mechanisms are 
established, and as they commence their work. 
In the aftermath of this consultation, we will continue to do what we can to help 
ensure that the legislation that transpires is human rights compliant and likely to 
deliver for victims and survivors. We remain open to providing briefings and advice to 
any interested parties and encourage you to get in touch if there are questions with 
which you think we may be able to assist. We hope that you will find this report 
helpful and encourage you to disseminate it amongst your networks. 
Professor Kieran McEvoy k.mcevoy@qub.ac.uk 
Professor Louise Mallinder l.mallinder@qub.ac.uk 
Dr Anna Bryson a.bryson@qub.ac.uk 
Mr Daniel Holder daniel@caj.org.uk 
Mr Brian Gormally brian@caj.org.uk 
 
30 August 2018 
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Executive Summary 
This report constitutes the response of the QUB/UU/CAJ Model Bill team to the 
Northern Ireland Office’s consultation on ‘Dealing with the Legacy of the Past’ that 
opened on 11 May 2018. We welcome this long awaited consultation and hope that 
this report may help to ensure that the legacy mechanisms can proceed on a footing 
that is a) likely to garner the confidence and support of victims and survivors and b) 
human rights compliant. 
Our response builds on more than a decade of work on legacy issues by some team 
members but we take as our starting point the 2014 Stormont House Agreement 
(SHA). In particular, we are guided by the commitment included in the SHA that the 
approach to dealing with the past will be consistent with the following principles: 
 Promoting reconciliation; 
 Upholding the rule of law; 
 Acknowledging and addressing the suffering of victims and survivors; 
 Facilitating the pursuit of justice and information recovery; 
 Human rights compliance; and 
 To be balanced, proportionate, transparent, fair and equitable. 
In practice, adherence to these principles necessitates that all of the mechanisms 
are set up in such a way as to be, and be perceived to be, impartial and independent 
by all potential contributors and beneficiaries. 
The commitments included in the SHA do not always chime with our preferred 
approach but, as with our deliberations on the Model Bill (the draft implementation 
legacy Bill that we published in September 2015), we have confined ourselves to 
recommendations that we believe to be legally and politically viable. 
In the document that follows, we discuss some key issues that have come to light 
since the Stormont House Agreement, namely the provision of a pension for the 
severely injured, the prospect of a national security veto on information provided to 
families by the legacy mechanisms, and the calls for a statute of limitations for 
current and former members of the security forces. 
This Executive Summary primarily focuses on the provisions contained with the 2018 
draft Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill and related documentation 
(including the draft Treaty that would give effect to the Independent Commission on 
Information Retrieval). These are critiqued in detail in the main body of the report but 
here we summarise what we consider the key strengths and weaknesses of the 
proposals on: the Historical Investigations Unit (HIU); the Independent Commission 
on Information Retrieval (ICIR); the Oral History Archive (OHA); and the 
Implementation and Reconciliation Group. In keeping with our commitment to be 
pragmatic and constructive, we seek throughout to identify workable solutions. At the 
end of this Executive Summary, we set out some overarching recommendations that 
are relevant to all of the mechanisms. 
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The Historical Investigations Unit 
The Stormont House Agreement provided for the creation of a Historical 
Investigations Unit (HIU) specifying that: ‘Legislation will establish a new 
independent body to take forward investigations into outstanding Troubles-related 
deaths.’ The HIU would be an independent body conducting police-type 
investigations and producing a family report in each case. Detailed provision is made 
for the HIU in the 2018 draft Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill 
(hereinafter ‘the draft Bill’). 
Key Strengths in the Draft Bill 
Statutory Basis 
 The draft Bill would establish the HIU in statute as an independent body. The HIU 
Director would have a degree of operational discretion. 
Content of HIU Reports 
 The draft Bill includes detailed provisions regarding the reports the HIU would 
produce in relation to its investigations. It proposes that family reports ‘must be as 
comprehensive as possible’ and that (with some safeguards over content) these 
could be provided to persons injured in the same incident. It is also suggested 
that the reports include a statement about the cooperation of Irish authorities in 
disclosure to the HIU. 
 The HIU could publish other reports but it is proposed to include a duty to consult 
with families prior to publication. Related to this, there is provision to remove 
information that could cause distress to victims. 
Sequencing of Work 
 The HIU would examine cases in chronological order but it would have discretion 
to vary this. This would help the HIU take into account family needs and could 
also assist with linked cases. 
Compliance with European Convention on Human Rights 
 The HIU would have to issue a formal statement on how its investigatory 
functions would comply with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Conflict of Interest 
 There are welcome provisions regarding the need for HIU officers to avoid 
conflicts of interest. 
Consultation with and Support to Families 
 There are provisions requiring the HIU Director to consult families and to provide 
support and assistance to family members of persons whose deaths the HIU is 
investigating. 
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Powers of HIU Officers 
 The HIU officers would be able to exercise police powers in criminal 
investigations. 
Disclosure by Public Authorities 
 The draft Bill provides for full disclosure of records by relevant public authorities 
to the HIU. 
Code of Ethics 
 The proposals include provision for the Policing Board to issue a Code of Ethics 
relating to the standards and conduct of HIU officers and note the need to make 
officers aware of the relevant human rights and equality obligations. 
Oversight 
 There is provision for oversight and inspection arrangements to the Police 
Ombudsman, Policing Board, and others. 
Key Weaknesses in the Draft Bill and Related Recommendations 
There are a number of provisions in the draft Bill that are not ECHR compliant and 
that we believe should be amended or - where required - entirely withdrawn. We also 
have a number of other recommendations and requests for clarification. 
HIU Caseload 
Caseload ‘Duplication’ of Previous Investigations and Operational Independence 
 The draft Bill proposes that the HIU Director would have to ensure that the HIU 
does not ‘duplicate’ any aspect of a previous investigation, unless the HIU 
Director considered such duplication necessary. There is a risk that this provision 
could be harnessed to seek to preclude re-investigations by the HIU of matters 
which have been subject to previous investigations that were not ECHR Article 2 
compliant. 
 The draft Bill proposes that cases that fall within the HIU remit are the only cases 
that the HIU would be permitted to investigate. The HIU remit as specified does 
not include completed HET cases, unless a number of criteria are met relating to 
new evidence and state involvement. Since the HET work was suspended, it has 
transpired that significant amounts of evidence were withheld from the HET and 
other legacy processes. Under these provisions, families might nonetheless face 
difficulties in establishing that such cases fall within the HIU’s remit. 
Recommendations: The provisions in the draft Bill constraining the operational 
independence of the HIU as regards which cases it investigates should be amended 
to afford greater discretion. 
Explicit provision should be made for the inclusion of cases in the HIU remit where a 
previous investigation was not ECHR Article 2 compliant, including where evidence 
was withheld from the HET or the HET review was not effective. 
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Caseload Where Collusion is Suspected 
 The draft Bill contains a provision allowing the PSNI to determine which cases 
previously reviewed by the HET should be reopened on grounds of potential 
collusion. Depending on interpretation, the definition of collusion proposed in the 
draft Bill risks excluding all cases where informants acted under the authorisation 
of a handler, even if the actions of the informant constituted human rights 
violations. There is also a potential conflict in vesting the decision-making power 
in the PSNI who retain legal liability for actions taken by the RUC. 
Recommendations: The PSNI should not make decisions on cases involving 
potential collusion; instead, there should be an independent decision maker. 
The definition of collusion should remove or strictly codify any circumstances where 
facilitating an offence or the avoidance of justice would not be ‘collusion’. As a first 
step, government should clarify the circumstances whereby it considers facilitating a 
criminal offence or the avoidance of justice relating to a murder should be 
considered ‘lawful’ and ‘proper’. In particular, it should be clarified whether there is 
an official government position that all acts by informants that were authorised by 
handlers are deemed ‘lawful’. 
As a list of ‘collusion’ cases is required within 14 days of the HIU’s establishment, it 
should also be clarified whether or not such an exercise has yet been conducted. 
Attempted Murder, Torture and Serious Injury: Gaps in Compliance with the UK’s 
Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
 The SHA remit of the HIU – and by extension the provisions included in the draft 
Bill - is restricted to conflict-related deaths and does not include other matters 
such as attempted murders, torture, or serious injuries. However, Articles 2 and 3 
ECHR create duties to ensure that such matters are effectively and 
independently investigated. 
Recommendation: Whilst these investigations would not necessarily have to be 
undertaken by the HIU, the current situation leaves a significant gap in such cases. 
The government should clarify how it intends to discharge its obligations in this area. 
Technical issues with the Inclusion of Cases in the HIU Remit 
 There are a number of technical questions regarding whether certain cases will 
fall within the HIU remit. 
Recommendations: Clarification should be given as to whether the list of certified 
HET cases the PSNI would provide to the HIU would include information on whether 
the investigations were commenced. 
Clarification should be given on whether families can still challenge HET reports, with 
which they are dissatisfied. 
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Clarification should be provided as to whether the 49 cases of RUC shootings that 
have not been re-examined by the HET or Ombudsman remain on their list and 
whether they fall within the HIU Remit. If not, amendment should be made to the 
draft Bill to include them. 
Clarification should be given as to why the definition in the draft Bill of conflict-related 
incident differs from that in the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, 
and as to whether or not this is likely to have any practical impact in the selection of 
cases. 
Retention of Cases by the PSNI 
 The PSNI would retain some cases; this may engage independence 
requirements under ECHR Article 2. 
Recommendation: Regarding the retention of cases by the PSNI, further provision 
should be made to ensure compatibility with the independence requirements of 
ECHR Article 2. 
Investigating Misconduct 
 At present only police but not military/security service misconduct can be 
investigated. 
Recommendation: The provisions on investigating potential misconduct should be 
extended to include all agencies rather than just applying to the police. 
Role of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
 Clause 1(5) of Schedule 6 obliges the Director of Public Prosecutions to take into 
account the SHA general principles on ‘balance’ and ‘proportionality’ when 
determining whether to refer a relevant death to the HIU based on new evidence. 
Recommendations: Referrals by the DPP are a quasi-judicial function that should 
not be subjected to quotas for particular types of case. This provision should be 
amended as it could operate to prevent eligible cases being reinvestigated even 
where new evidence is available. 
Clarification should be given as to whether the Director of Public Prosecutions could 
refer a case back to the HIU based on new evidence if the HIU has previously dealt 
with the case (and the DPP is not precluded by the technicality of the death already 
being in the HIU remit). 
Disclosure Powers of the HIU 
 The powers of disclosure to the HIU have no sanction for noncompliance. It is 
also not clear why the range of public authorities is restricted. 
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Recommendations: A sanction for non-compliance should be added to the HIU’s 
powers to compel disclosure of records. Clarification should be given that the 
existing provisions would set aside all other obligations including those under the 
Official Secrets Act. 
Clarification should be given as to the proposed powers of disclosure in relation to 
records in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland and other public authorities. 
Findings in HIU Reports 
 The ability of the Police Ombudsman to make findings in reports is currently 
under challenge, and there are a number of other matters about the content of 
reports that could be clarified. 
Recommendations: Consideration should be given as to whether explicit statutory 
powers on the HIU to make findings in its reports (which already must be as 
comprehensive as possible) are required to guard against any challenge that the HIU 
cannot make findings in its reports. 
The stipulations for content in family reports should be reviewed to ensure 
compliance with the full range of matters that can be required by the ECHR, for 
example, including reference to sectarian motivation. 
Clarification should be given as to the application of the ‘Maxwellisation’ process 
whereby an individual who may be criticised in the report (but not necessarily 
named) is given a prior right of reply, in relation to persons who are deceased or who 
cannot be located. It should also be clarified whether or not ‘preventing or 
investigating’ a death includes prosecutorial decisions. 
Appointments, Staffing and Governance 
Employment of Former Members of the Northern Ireland Security Forces as HIU 
Detectives 
 The draft Bill would codify a HET-type structure within the HIU. This departs 
significantly from existing practice (and the previous leaked 2015 Bill) in that it 
includes provisions that would have the purpose and effect of, not just permitting, 
but requiring a quota of former RUC officers to work within the HIU. As well as 
engaging the independence requirements of ECHR Article 2, the lack of objective 
justification for such a measure engages requirements under anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
Recommendations: The provision with the purpose or effect of requiring former 
RUC officers in the HIU is neither justifiable nor ECHR compliant. It should be 
removed and replaced with provisions to ensure Article 2 compliant staffing 
excluding those with past work-related conflicts of interest. 
Consideration should be given to a process of seeking to train an additional pool of 
HIU detectives now. 
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Maximising the Independence of the HIU 
 The HIU Appointments Panel currently has no international involvement. The HIU 
is also to be established as a multi-member commission. 
Recommendations: The provisions for the Appointments Panel for the HIU Director 
should be amended to strengthen the independence of the process through the 
inclusion of international panel member(s) appointed through the UN or Council of 
Europe human rights mechanisms. Such international involvement in key 
appointments has been commonplace throughout the peace process. 
Consideration should be given as to whether a ‘corporation sole’ model (whereby all 
power is vested in the HIU Director) would be a more appropriate means of 
maximising independence rather than the proposed multi-member commission 
model. 
Funding 
 Despite commitments in the SHA and the ECHR duties incumbent on the UK 
government, the draft Bill provides that the HIU would be funded from the 
Department of Justice’s budget without any provision for additional monies. This 
risks a replication of the existing problems of legacy inquests where further 
funding has been unlawfully blocked. 
Recommendation: Payment should be made from the Consolidated Fund through 
the UK Treasury (as suggested in our Model Bill). 
Extending the Timeframe 
 Independent investigations into legacy deaths are an ECHR obligation, and any 
decision to end the HIUs work must comply with such obligations. 
Recommendation: The powers to extend the timeframe of the HIU should be 
structured to ensure that the decision maker complies with the UK’s obligations 
under ECHR Article 2 and 3, should such obligations require the continuation of an 
independent mechanism.  
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The Independent Commission on Information Retrieval 
The Stormont House Agreement (2014) called for the creation of an Independent 
Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) ‘to enable family members to seek and 
privately receive information about the Troubles-related deaths of their relatives’ as 
part of the proposed set of mechanisms to deal with the legacy of the past. Unlike 
the other parts of this package, the ICIR would be created by a treaty between the 
British and Irish governments.7 The two governments agreed the draft Treaty on 15 
October 2015 but it has not yet entered force.8 The establishment of the ICIR would 
also necessitate legislation at Westminster and as such, the NIO draft Bill includes a 
range of provisions on this mechanism. In general, we welcome the proposals on the 
ICIR, as we believe that information retrieval will offer families the possibility to 
receive information that is not available from other sources. To assist the 
consultation we set out below some specific strengths and weaknesses in the 
proposals and suggest a number of recommendations that we believe would help to 
garner trust and support for the ICIR and ensure that it complies with international 
human rights standards. 
Key Strengths in the Draft Bill and Draft Treaty 
Voluntary Basis for Victim Engagement 
 All engagement with the Commission by bereaved families would be voluntary. 
This would mean that the Commission would only proactively seek to retrieve 
information following a family request. 
Information Remit 
 In addition to proactively seeking to recover information through voluntary 
contributions, the ICIR would able to receive and hold unsolicited information. 
Credibility of the Information 
 There would be a process to test the credibility of information before it is included 
in family reports. Clearly, the absence of such a process could have posed 
substantial risks for the Commission’s capacity to build legitimacy and trust 
among victims and the wider community. It is further positive that the ICIR 
proposals stipulate that all commissioners should have experience of handling 
sensitive information and making judgements about the credibility of information. 
Incentives to Participation 
 Multiple protections are built into the proposals to ensure confidentiality and 
encourage potential information providers to engage with the Commission. These 
protections include precluding the ICIR from naming anyone who provides 
                                       
7
 Legislation would be required in both jurisdictions to give effect to the treaty. 
8
 Agreement establishing the Independent Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) 
http://opac.oireachtas.ie/AWData/Library3/FATRdoclaid210116_100026.pdf accessed 22 May 2018 
and http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2016-
0057/Agreement_establishing_the_ICIR.pdf accessed 22 May 2018 (‘draft Treaty’). 
MODEL BILL TEAM RESPONSE TO NIO LEGACY CONSULTATION 
xvii 
information and persons alleged by contributors to be responsible for a death and 
from disclosing information to law enforcement or intelligence agencies, with 
penalties for ICIR personnel who make unauthorised disclosures. They also 
include a stipulation that information provided to the ICIR would be inadmissible 
in criminal, civil and inquest proceedings. 
Report on Redactions 
 The draft Bill requires that each annual report produced by the ICIR would state 
the number of notifications relating to disclosure of information that could pose a 
risk to life or national security that the Secretary of State has given to the 
Commission in the previous financial year. This is a welcome addition, as it would 
make public how often the Secretary of State uses these powers. 
Timeframe 
 The draft Bill includes provisions allowing the ICIR’s term to be extended beyond 
five years. We anticipate that the ICIR would need to extend its operations 
beyond five years as the experience of the Independent Commission on the 
Location of Victims’ Remains (ICLVR) indicates that it would take time for the 
ICIR to gain the confidence of families and information providers. In addition, 
where a family’s case is eligible for review by the HIU and the family chooses to 
let that process run its course before requesting an information retrieval process, 
families could risk losing the opportunity for information retrieval, if the ICIR were 
to close after five years. 
Key Weaknesses in the Draft Bill and Draft Treaty and Related Recommendations 
To ensure the Commission’s human rights compliance, practicability, and credibility 
among victims and information providers, several amendments to the draft Bill and 
Treaty are necessary. 
Obligation to Conduct Outreach Activities 
 The experience of the ICLVR indicates that its capacity to build trust with victims 
and information providers was pivotal to its success in developing productive 
relationships with those groups and over time being able to uncover the remains 
of some disappeared persons.9 
Recommendation: Drawing on the ICLVR model, the functions of the ICIR set out in 
the draft Treaty and draft Bill should be expanded to require it to undertake outreach 
and other activities designed to publicise its work and give individuals and 
organisations the necessary confidence to approach the Commission to provide 
information or to request it. These outreach activities should begin during the 
preparatory phase and continue throughout the life of the Commission. 
                                       
9
 See Lauren Dempster, ‘The “Disappeared”, the ICLVR, and “Dealing with the Past” in Northern 
Ireland’ (April 2018) 
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/knowledge_exchange/briefing_papers/se
ries7/dempster180418.pdf accessed 22 August 2018. 
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Handling of Unsolicited Information 
 We welcome the ability of the ICIR to receive and hold unsolicited information. 
However, the proposals do not specify whether the credibility of unsolicited 
information is to be subject to any level of testing in the absence of or prior to a 
family request. 
 The draft Bill further does not specify whether unsolicited information could inform 
the identification of themes and patterns on which the ICIR is required to report to 
the Implementation and Reconciliation Group upon completion of its work. 
Recommendation: While we believe that the Commission should only proactively 
seek to retrieve information and to produce family reports following a request from a 
bereaved family, we do not believe that the respecting the voluntary nature of victim 
engagement should preclude the ICIR from testing the credibility of unsolicited 
information. To enable such testing to take place would mean that, if a family 
decided towards the end of the ICIR’s five-year period of operations to request 
information retrieval in relation to an incident for which unsolicited information had 
already been received, previous credibility testing of information could facilitate the 
Commission producing a family report more rapidly before its period of operations 
expires. In addition, credibility testing of unsolicited information could lead to the 
discovery of information that is relevant to incidents for which there has been a 
family request. It would also make the inclusion of unsolicited information in the 
identification of themes and patterns more reliable. We therefore recommend that 
the draft Bill be amended to specify that the ICIR would test the credibility of both 
solicited and unsolicited information. 
Capacity of the Commission to Evaluate the Credibility of Information and 
Identify Themes and Patterns 
 It is positive that the proposals include a provision to require the ICIR to evaluate 
the credibility of information that is to be included in reports to families but further 
information is necessary to ensure that the Commission has the capacity to 
conduct this process in a robust and rigorous manner. 
Recommendations: 
To enable the Commission to adequately test the credibility of information received 
and to identify themes and patterns, Article 6 of the draft Treaty should be amended 
to state that the staff of the Commission should include a multi-disciplinary research 
team. 
The Annex to the draft Treaty should be amended to strengthen the powers of the 
Commission to compel public authorities in the UK and Ireland to disclose 
information to it. This power should also be inserted into the draft Bill. Language 
similar to Article 25 relating to the Full Disclosure to the HIU would be appropriate. 
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Preparatory Period 
 The draft Treaty allows for a preparatory period before the Commission begins its 
work but this is not mentioned in the draft Bill. 
 A preparatory period in which the Commission would seek to recruit staff and 
occupy premises before beginning its operations in earnest is essential given that 
under the current proposals the ICIR is intended to operate only for five years. 
Recommendations: 
The draft Bill should be amended to include provision for the preparatory period that 
is specified in the draft Treaty. 
In addition, the Bill should be amended to make clear that references to obligations 
arising at the end of five years (ie to end the ICIR’s operations and submit a report 
on themes and patterns to the IRG), should be based on five years from the end of 
the preparatory period (rather than five years from the entry into effect of the 
legislation). 
Preservation of the ICIR Archive 
 The draft Bill proposes that, on completion of its work, the ICIR would destroy the 
raw material and operating files that it holds relating to deaths within its remit. 
While we believe that confidentiality protections are essential for the ICIR to be 
able to fulfil its functions effectively, we consider that confidentiality can be 
ensured without destroying the archives after the ICIR ceases to operate. 
Recommendation: We recommend that the archives are maintained and held 
confidentially for 50 years, and that law enforcement, intelligence agencies or other 
persons be precluded from accessing them during this period. This approach would 
balance the need to protect confidentiality and with the imperative to safeguard 
important material that may be useful for understanding Northern Ireland’s history for 
generations to come. 
Relationship between the ICIR and the HIU 
 A major concern with the ICIR proposals emerged during the consultation 
process in relation to an observation in the Explanatory Notes. The relevant 
explanatory note suggests that, even though information provided to the ICIR 
would be inadmissible in legal proceedings, this would not prevent policing 
authorities or a coroner pursuing lines of inquiry based on information provided to 
families by the Commission. Where such inquiries, generated new evidence, the 
new evidence could be admissible. This observation highlights the possibility that 
where an individual provides information to the Commission, they could run the 
risk of providing information about their own actions or the actions of others that 
indirectly aids the work of criminal investigators and prosecutors. We believe that 
the risk of prosecutions resulting indirectly from information provided to the ICIR 
is extremely low, particularly since (former) paramilitaries may opt to engage with 
the Commission through interlocutors. Furthermore, if any such prosecutions 
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were undertaken, they could be met with abuse of process applications from 
defence lawyers that would challenge the admissibility of evidence that was 
uncovered because of information produced by the ICIR. However, we recognise 
that it may create a disincentive for information providers to engage with the 
Commission. 
Recommendation: To address this challenge, we propose a multifaceted approach 
that could bolster the existing safeguards in the ICIR proposals: 
Clause 3 of the Northern Ireland (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 could 
provide a model for amending Article 9 of the draft Treaty. An amended version 
could read: 
(1) The following shall not be admissible in evidence in any legal proceedings 
(including proceedings before a Coroner)— 
(a) any information received by the Commission about deaths within its remit; and 
(b) any evidence obtained (directly or indirectly) as a result of such information being 
so provided. 
To reflect the above changes to the draft Treaty, Clause 45(3) of the Draft Bill could 
be amended to state: 
The information received by the Commission about deaths within its remit or any 
evidence obtained (directly or indirectly) as a result of such information being so 
provided is not admissible in any legal proceedings. 
The Explanatory Notes for Clause 45 of the draft Bill should make clear that private 
prosecutions are covered by the inadmissibility provisions (similar to the Explanatory 
Notes accompanying Clause 3 of the Northern Ireland (Location of Victims’ 
Remains) Act 1999). 
Clause 3(2) of the Northern Ireland (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 states 
that the provisions on inadmissibility ‘shall not apply to the admission of evidence 
adduced in criminal proceedings on behalf of the accused.’ It may be useful to 
explore whether a similar provision should be added to the draft Bill. 
Clause 42(2) of the draft Bill could be amended to place an obligation on the 
Independent Commission on Information Retrieval to seek to ensure that information 
is not disclosed in family reports that could expose information providers to risk of 
prosecution. Similar language could be added to Article 3(2) of the draft Treaty. 
Article 3(1)(b) of the draft Treaty should be amended to create an obligation to 
ensure that families who request the opening of an information retrieval process do 
so on the basis of fully informed consent that includes discussion of the legal 
consequences of the information retrieval process. 
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Support to Families 
The draft Treaty and draft Bill would commit the ICIR to keeping the families who 
have requested information retrieval informed about the progress in their process.10 
However, the proposals do not contain any further provisions relating to engaging 
with families or providing them with support. We believe that the ICIR could do more 
to provide support to families and that the draft Treaty and draft Bill be amended to 
require this. 
Recommendation: Our model treaty proposals stated that the functions of the 
Commission should include doing outreach with families, and organisations 
representing their interests, from the start of the Commission’s work. Ideally, this 
would include enabling victims to inform the development of the Commission’s 
procedures where relevant.11 The model treaty also stipulated that the ICIR’s 
functions should include providing appropriate support for those who engage with the 
Commission. Our proposals also contained commitments that in engaging with 
families, the Commission shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that victims and 
survivors understand that (1) their engagement is voluntary and that they may 
withdraw from the process at any time, and (2) that they appreciate in advance the 
potential legal consequences of engagement with the Commission. We further 
recommended that the support provided by the ICIR to families should occur both 
during the information retrieval process and in helping them to deal with the 
consequences of the process. 
Appointment of Commissioners 
 Given that safeguarding the independence of the Commission would be pivotal 
to its ability to carry out its functions, we feel that the draft Bill should be more 
specific about the measures that would be taken to maximise public confidence in 
the appointed Commissioners. 
Recommendation: We recommend that the language on the appointment of 
Commissioners be amended to state that all Commissioners have no conflicts of 
interest. We further recommend that more detailed provisions be included relating to 
the security of tenure of the commissioners and the circumstances in which they 
could be replaced. The Model Bill sets out how this could be done. 
  
                                       
10
 Draft Treaty, art 3(1)(b) and draft Bill, cl 41(2). 
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 Draft Treaty, art 7(3)(a) gives the Commission the power to determine its own procedures. 
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The Oral History Archive 
The Stormont House Agreement (2014) states that: 
The Executive will, by 2016, establish an Oral History Archive to 
provide a central place for people from all backgrounds (and from 
throughout the UK and Ireland) to share experiences and narratives 
related to the Troubles. As well as collecting new material, this archive 
will attempt to draw together and work with existing oral history 
projects.12 
We welcome the inclusion of an Oral History Archive (OHA) as one of the core 
legacy mechanisms and set out in some detail in the main body of this report the 
valuable contribution that we believe it could make to dealing with the legacy of the 
past. 
Key Strengths in the draft Bill proposals 
Geographic Reach of the Archive 
 It would be possible for individuals across the UK and Ireland to contribute to the 
OHA. 
Creation of a Steering Group 
 The importance of appointing and drawing upon the expertise of a Steering 
Group who have (between them) experience of obtaining oral history records is 
acknowledged. 
Inclusion of Ancillary Records 
 It is recognised that oral history records may include ‘other relevant records’ and 
that these should be preserved alongside the primary interviews. 
Inclusion of Existing Oral History Records 
 The draft Bill specifies that arrangements must be made to identify other 
organisations that have made, or make, oral history records, and to inform them 
about the possibility of being included in the Archive. 
Inclusion of Confidential Oral History Records 
 Provision is made for the preservation of oral history records that are not suitable 
for immediate publication but which may be of significant value to future 
generations. 
Timeframe 
 One of the greatest strengths of the OHA is that (funding permitting) it is not time-
bound. Archives are designed to last and the fact that accounts could be 
contributed for years to come facilitates important intergenerational work. More 
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importantly, it means that victims and survivors could come forward to tell their 
story in full and in context, at a time and place that best suits their needs. It 
should also be possible to revisit their stories in light of changing circumstances 
and perspectives. 
Key Weaknesses in the draft Bill Proposals and Related Recommendations 
In order to ensure that the OHA garners the trust and co-operation of victims and 
survivors right across our society and that it functions optimally we believe that a 
number of fundamental weaknesses must be addressed. The key issues are 
summarised below. 
Lack of Detail 
 The NIO Consultation Paper proposes that those responding to the public 
consultation exercise consider the following two questions in relation to the OHA: 
Do you think that the Oral History Archive proposals provide an 
appropriate method for people from all backgrounds to share their 
experiences of the Troubles in order to create a valuable resource for 
future generations? Yes/No 
What steps could be taken to ensure that people who want to share 
their experiences of the Troubles know about the Archive and are 
encouraged to record their stories?13 
 Attention is thus focused on the appropriateness of oral history as a methodology 
and the steps that might be taken to publicise the OHA. These questions sidestep 
a more fundamental issue which is whether or not the model being proposed for 
the Archive (whereby it is under the charge and superintendence of the Deputy 
Keeper of the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland) is an appropriate means 
of enabling people from all backgrounds to record and share their stories. They 
also gloss over the fact that very little detail has been offered as to how the 
proposed model would work in practice. 
Recommendation: To adequately inform this consultation, the NIO should publish a 
detailed paper setting out how it envisages the OHA working in practice. This should 
include specific detail on: how individual interviews or stories would be selected and 
prioritised (specific criteria for inclusion and outreach and engagement policy); how 
interviewers would be appointed; a draft code of conduct; the policies and 
procedures governing access; whether or not there would be a ‘central’ space for 
members of the general public to visit; and how they propose to honour the SHA 
commitment to ‘draw together and work with existing oral history projects’. 
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 Northern Ireland Office (NIO), Consultation Paper: Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s 
Past (2018), para 9.3 (‘NIO Consultation Paper’). 
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Independence 
 The Stormont House Agreement clearly stipulates that: ‘The Archive will be 
independent and free from political interference.’ The importance of this 
guiding principle has since been underlined by the Northern Ireland Victims 
Commissioner.14 In our view, the model proposed for the OHA is fundamentally 
flawed, as it is not sufficiently ‘independent and free from political interference’. 
 Although it was not mentioned in the SHA, the draft Bill, as noted, proposes to 
give the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI) the function of 
organising the OHA. PRONI is a division of the Department for Communities and 
its Director (the Deputy Keeper) is a career civil servant, accountable to the 
Minister of that Department. 
 The draft Bill provisions propose to address the issue of independence by placing 
the OHA under the ‘charge and superintendence’ of the Deputy Keeper of PRONI 
and ensuring that he/she has a degree of operational independence from the 
Minister for Communities in relation to ‘OHA duties’. These proposals would grant 
a senior civil servant at least five different means of controlling the flow of 
information into and out of the OHA. He or she would: 
o Determine the criteria for inclusion of oral history records in the Archive. 
o Identify (based on rules regarding consent set down by his/her Minister) those 
records that can be admitted and those that must be destroyed. 
o Adjudge which parts of records admitted to the OHA are suitable for 
publication and which should remain confidential. 
o Establish policies regarding the conditions and context in which records may 
be handed over to the authorities for legal or other reasons. 
o Review the records that have been accepted for publication and from these 
compile a report on patterns and themes for the Implementation and 
Reconciliation Group. 
We consider that what is being proposed amounts to a ‘fig-leaf’ of independence 
and suggest that, at any rate, the key to establishing the independence of the 
OHA is not to increase the powers of the Deputy Keeper of PRONI. 
Recommendation: It is essential that the OHA is placed on a suitably independent 
footing. We accept that there is now a degree of political consensus around the 
location of the OHA in PRONI but real and meaningful checks and balances must be 
placed on the powers of the Deputy Keeper if the OHA is to have any chance of 
securing widespread cross-community support. 
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 In the course of a presentation at a public debate titled ‘Stuck in the Past’ at St Mary’s College 
Belfast on 7 August 2018 (organised by Féile an Phobail), the Commissioner for Victims and 
Survivors, Judith Thompson, outlined a set of principles that have been agreed by members of the 
Victims and Survivors Forum. Central to these is the stipulation that all of the legacy mechanisms 
should be independent and impartial, and that they should have ‘no political friends’. 
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Role of the Steering Group 
 We welcome the proposal to establish a Steering Group but the draft Bill 
provisions stop short of granting it any real or meaningful powers. 
 Granting extensive discretionary powers to the Deputy Keeper - with the proviso 
that he or she merely consults a steering group before taking key decisions - is 
not in our view the answer to securing the independence of the OHA and 
maximising public confidence in its work. 
Recommendation: We propose to invert the proposed governance model so that 
the Steering Group takes ‘charge and superintendence’ of the OHA, making (by 
majority vote if necessary) key decisions. These would include: mapping out a vision 
for the Archive; establishing a comprehensive code of conduct and an interviewer 
training programme; agreeing the acquisitions and access policy; establishing a 
strategy of outreach and engagement to existing oral history organisations, archives 
and networks; building cross-community trust and support; and compiling a report on 
patterns and themes. Such a model we believe could succeed in curbing both 
potential political interference in the design and conduct of the archive and the 
bureaucratic impulses of a ‘top-down’ civil service model. 
Appointments to the Steering Group 
 The NIO draft Bill proposes that the Deputy Keeper 
must make arrangements to appoint a group of at least five persons 
(‘the steering group’) who, in the Deputy Keeper’s view, have (between 
them) experience of obtaining oral history records in Northern Ireland 
and experience of obtaining oral history records outside Northern 
Ireland. 
The proposals also state that it is for the Deputy Keeper to decide who has the 
necessary ‘experience of obtaining oral history records’ and thus qualified to 
serve on the Group.15 
Recommendations: We propose to give the Steering Group more wide ranging and 
specific powers than proposed in the draft Bill and as such recognise the importance 
of ensuring that suitably qualified individuals are appointed to it. We see in the 
Steering Group an important opportunity to ensure representation from existing 
community oral history initiatives and networks and to bring to the fore relevant 
professional, practical, technical, and legal expertise. It is thus important that the 
criteria for appointments are clear, specific, and transparent. As with the appointment 
of academics to the IRG, it is vital to ensure that the OHA Steering Group is 
‘recognised as being independent, rigorous and in line with best practice’ and we 
thus suggest that either the ESRC or its sister body – the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council – could be drawn upon to help establish and apply criteria for 
appointments to it. We accept that PRONI could provide the shell for the Archive and 
as such propose to give the Deputy Keeper an ex officio seat on the Steering Group. 
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Working With and Through Existing Groups 
 The Stormont House Agreement states that the Oral History Archive ‘will attempt 
to draw together and work with existing oral history projects’.16 In the draft Bill, the 
nature of this cooperation is reduced to a commitment by PRONI to facilitate the 
inclusion of existing oral history records i.e. a commitment that the OHA may 
include existing oral history records ‘which have been made, or are, made (at any 
time) by other persons (whether received by the archive from the person who 
made them or from another person)’.17 A further section proposes that the Deputy 
Keeper must arrange for the Public Record Office ‘to identify other organisations 
which have made, or make, oral history records, and to inform those other 
organisations of the possibility of the oral history records made by them being 
included in the archive’. 
Recommendation: Given the central importance of working with and through 
existing groups and thus building on the good work that has already been done, this 
approach is unduly passive. No organisation or group should be compelled to 
cooperate with the OHA but a concerted effort should be made to facilitate and 
enable the long-term preservation of existing collections. This necessitates updating 
and aggregating existing inventories of oral history collections, reaching out to 
archivists and project leaders (many of whom have retired or moved on to other 
projects), proposing sensible and workable accommodations with regard to the legal 
requirements for the deposit of collections at PRONI, and working in a spirit of 
partnership with existing groups to provide viable solutions for the digitisation and 
long-term preservation of their collections. 
We see in the creation of the Steering Group an opportunity to enlist the support of 
existing oral history networks and organisations – to gain from their experience and 
expertise and to help garner widespread support for the archive. As noted in the 
Explanatory Notes to our Model Bill we believe that the relationship between the 
OHA and existing projects could be mutually beneficial. The OHA could, for example, 
provide the resources necessary to digitise and safeguard vulnerable collections into 
the future. 
Policy for Inclusion of Records in the OHA 
 The draft Bill simply states that the function of organising the OHA would include 
‘inviting the contribution of oral history records, making oral history records of 
experiences recounted by other persons, and otherwise receiving oral history 
records and other relevant records’. 
 Further clauses specify that the OHA would relate to ‘events that have the 
required connection with Northern Ireland and occurred in Northern Ireland or 
Ireland during the period beginning with 1 January 1966 and ending with 10 April 
1998’ and ‘other significant events that have the required connection with 
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Northern Ireland’.18 The ‘required connection with Northern Ireland’ is defined as 
relating to ‘the constitutional status of Northern Ireland or sectarian or political 
hostility between persons in Northern Ireland’.19 
 The NIO draft Bill proposals also define an ‘oral history archive’ as ‘a collection of 
records which recount personal experiences (“oral history records”) and which 
are of a lasting historical significance.’ 
 Whilst this acquisitions policy is in theory suitably broad, it would be in the gift of 
the Deputy Keeper to decide whether or not a given record had the ‘required 
connection’ and was likely to be of ‘lasting historical significance’. 
 It would also be for the Deputy Keeper to decide whether or not ‘catalogues and 
indexes, and records which would or might be regarded in other contexts as 
ephemera’ are deemed ‘ancillary to oral history records in the archive’ and likely 
to ‘assist the orderly preservation of, and access to, the archive’ and can thus be 
included. 
 There is no reference in the draft Bill provisions to the steps that would be taken 
to ensure that the OHA enlists the support of a broad range of contributors and 
can thus be considered a credible collective representation of accounts of the 
conflict. Instead, what seems to be proposed is an entirely passive policy 
whereby individuals are simply invited to come forward. Oral historians have long 
since cautioned about the dangers of a ‘lazy reliance’ on ‘voluntary self-
selection’.20 This tends to attract the ‘middle-groups’ in society and perpetuates 
the exclusion of marginalised groups and individuals. 
 We welcome the fact that it would be possible for individuals right across the UK 
and Ireland to contribute to the OHA but note that the explanatory notes to the 
draft Bill state that ‘The majority of the provisions in the Bill extend to the whole of 
the UK, with the exception of Part 4 (the Oral History Archive)… which extend to 
Northern Ireland only.’21 
 Whilst participation in the OHA is obviously voluntary, we feel that difficult and 
challenging questions concerning where efforts and resources are channelled 
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 Ibid cl 51(12). 
19
 This differs from the definition offered in the draft Bill in relation to the work of the Historical 
Investigations Unit where ‘the required connection with Northern Ireland’ relates to a) the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland or to political or sectarian hostilities between persons there, or 
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 See e.g. Paul Thompson, ‘The Voice of the Past: Oral History’ in Alistair Thomson and Robert 
Perks (eds), The Oral History Reader (Routledge, 1988) 26. 
21
 Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill Explanatory Notes (2018) (‘draft Explanatory 
Notes’), para 10. 
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Recommendations: 
There should be an open and transparent articulation of the aims and objectives of 
the OHA, and a corresponding five-year strategy for the prioritisation and acquisition 
of new and existing material. Again, this should be determined by a strong and 
diverse Steering Group, rather than the Deputy Keeper of PRONI. 
It is vitally important that the OHA be poised to be outward facing and that all 
necessary steps are taken to facilitate contributions from victims and survivors right 
across the UK and Ireland. The NIO should explain why it is proposed that provisions 
on the OHA ‘extend to Northern Ireland only’. It should also clarify whether or not it is 
proposed to limit the remit of the OHA to ‘events that occurred in Northern Ireland or 
Ireland’. 
Policy for Redaction and Destruction of Records 
 It is curious that, although the draft Bill proposals contain hardly any detail about 
how individual contributors and existing oral history groups might be persuaded 
to engage with the Archive, there are no fewer than ten sub-sections on the 
procedure for disposing of records (by destruction or otherwise). It is notable that, 
although the Deputy Keeper is obliged to inform the Minister for Communities and 
politicians in the Northern Ireland Assembly about proposals to destroy records, 
there is no mention of any obligation to inform the individual human beings to 
whom the records relate, or to give them any say in what happens to their 
records. Whatever the specific detail of the proposals to destroy records, this type 
of approach tends to feed accusations of a ‘state-centric’ model that is more 
concerned with protecting the institution than the individuals it is designed to help. 
 The proposed procedures to allow the Deputy Keeper to decide what records 
meet the criteria for inclusion in the Archive, and to empower the Department for 
Communities to make rules about the nature of consent required to admit records 
to the OHA, highlights the importance of balancing legal obligations with 
creativity, imagination, and common sense. It goes without saying that both 
archivists and oral history practitioners must be ever vigilant to matters of legal 
and ethical probity but there is currently a very lively and important debate in oral 
circles about the competing dangers of 
a) insufficient regard for the letter of the law and 
b) a disproportionately risk-averse and legalistic approach to the 
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Recommendation: Important and challenging deliberations about what to collect, 
how to collect it, who should access it and what should be redacted, withheld or 
destroyed should in our view be taken by a Steering Group comprising individuals 
with the necessary legal, practitioner and curatorial expertise rather than by the 
Deputy Keeper of PRONI and the Department for Communities.22 
Individual contributors should also have more of a say in what happens to their 
records. In the Model Bill, we included a series of clauses acknowledging the right of 
contributors to make requests regarding the publication of their story (or parts 
thereof) and to be consulted and fully informed regarding any decision taken to 
redact, withhold, or destroy their story. 
Legal Liabilities 
 At no stage has any form of amnesty or immunity from prosecution been part of 
the proposals for the OHA. It is thus clear in the draft Bill proposals that 
information provided to the OHA could be admissible in criminal, civil and inquest 
proceedings. The draft Bill also specifically addresses the issue of defamation, 
and proposes that, in relation to work carried out for the OHA, the Department, its 
staff, and agents would have limited protection from defamation claims in the 
courts. A further section stipulates that the Deputy Keeper would reserve the 
power to waive this immunity (in whole or to any extent) on any person.23 
Recommendation: Whilst we think it understandable for PRONI to seek to protect 
its staff against defamation and other claims with regard to the Archive, it is equally 
important to consider the rights and vulnerabilities of contributors. All interviewers 
should be fully trained on the relevant legal liabilities and these should be clearly 
explained to interviewees. Decisions regarding the disclosure of information 
contained within individual records or the need to exclude records (or parts thereof) 
from the Archive on legal grounds should be taken by the Steering Group in light of 
clear and transparent criteria. As noted above (and as stipulated in the Model Bill) 
the original contributor should also be granted the opportunity to make 
representations and should be fully informed about decisions affecting their story.24 
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 In para 20 of the 2013-14 PRONI Annual Report the Deputy Keeper stated that ‘PRONI is risk-
averse in its preservation of the archive’. See Department of Arts, Culture and Leisure, Public Record 
Office of Northern Ireland: Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Records 2013-14, http:// communities-
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Appointment of OHA Staff 
 The NIO draft Bill proposes that the Deputy Keeper must superintend the persons 
employed in the Public Record Office in keeping the Archive and further notes 
that persons appointed under section 2(3) of the Public Records Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1923 are to assist in exercising the function of organising the Archive 
under the superintendence of the Deputy Keeper. The section of the Public 
Records Act referred to simply highlights the fact that such staff are appointed by 
and answerable to the Minister: ‘the persons so appointed shall assist in 
executing this Act under the superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the 
Records of Northern Ireland in such manner as the Minister [of Finance] may 
direct.’ This does nothing to allay fears about the independence of the proposed 
model or to address the core challenge of securing the trust of those who may 
consider sharing their personal and private recollections with the OHA. 
Recommendation: As in our Model Bill, we propose that a dedicated secretariat 
provide research, archival, interviewing, and other professional and administrative 
support to the OHA. Staff should have between them experience and knowledge of 
a) the potential for memory to provoke trauma b) gender sensitivity c) handling 
sensitive information and making judgments about it suitability for public release. 
Where relevant, the criteria for appointments to the Steering Group should be cross-
referenced (e.g. the need to be impartial and to avoid conflicts of interest). 
Appointment of Interviewers 
 There is no detail in the draft Bill provisions about how interviewers would be 
appointed to collect oral history records for the OHA. Instead, we are invited to 
trust that the Deputy Keeper of PRONI would draw up appropriate policies. Given 
that PRONI is a division within a Department of State, we are concerned about 
the prospect of a business model that would seek to collect interviews based on 
tenders for set targets. 
Recommendation: In our Model Bill, we included provision for a non-statutory Code 
of Practice and set out in some detail how the OHA might work in practice.25 With 
regard to the appointment of interviewers to carry out the oral history interviews, we 
proposed a partnership model that was designed to work with and through existing 
oral history networks, organisations, and projects. This included a flexible ‘train the 
trainers’ scheme. The rationale for the latter was fourfold: a) many individuals only 
feel comfortable conducting an interview with a known and trusted interviewer b) it is 
nonetheless imperative that all interviews adhere to core ethical, technical and legal 
standards c) interviewees must be made fully aware of procedures regarding long-
term access and storage to ensure that they are not lulled into a ‘false sense of 
security’ d) this scheme enables existing practitioners to secure a ‘license’ to point 
their collections in the direction of PRONI and provides them with the resources 
necessary to up-skill other members of their host organisation. This is proposed as a 
cost-effective means of maximising the reach and workability of the OHA. 
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Protections for Vulnerable and Traumatised Interviewees 
 There is no information in the draft Bill and accompanying papers about the ways 
in which the Oral History Archive would work with and through existing 
organisations that represent victims and survivors such as the Victims and 
Survivors Service. 
Recommendation: We propose that individuals with direct experience of working 
with victims be included on the Steering Group and that efforts are made via the 
‘train the trainers’ model to capitalise on the knowledge and expertise of those who 
have specific experience of interviewing and supporting vulnerable and traumatised 
individuals. We further propose that an individual with professional training in trauma 
is included on the Steering Group and that every effort is made to ensure cross 
learning between oral historians and other professionals with relevant practical, 
academic, and legal training. In our Model Bill, we proposed that this should be 
reflected both in the interviewer training programme and in a comprehensive code of 
practice that includes a range of measures to facilitate contributions from victims and 
survivors. 
Co-operation with Other Legacy Bodies 
 The draft Bill states that the Deputy Keeper of PRONI must produce and publish 
an annual report on the exercise of the function of organising the Archive and that 
a copy must be given to the Historical Investigations Unit, the Independent 
Commission on Information Retrieval, and the Implementation and Reconciliation 
Group. It is, however, unclear how this report might influence the work of these 
bodies. For example, if gender-based violence were to emerge as a major theme, 
could this in any way affect the prioritisation of cases by the other mechanisms? 
Recommendation: It is important to avoid fragmentation and to ensure that all of the 
legacy mechanisms are harnessed to pull together. As such, we suggest that the 
annual report relating to the OHA should include consideration as to how the 
patterns and themes emerging might inform wider legacy work. 
Role of the Proposed Statistical Timeline 
 The Stormont House Agreement included a paragraph which proposed that ‘A 
research project will be established as part of the Archive, led by academics to 
produce a factual historical timeline and statistical analysis of the Troubles, to 
report within 12 months.’26 The draft Bill curiously does not include reference to 
this timeline in the section on the OHA, but it is referenced in a later section on 
‘Reports to the IRG’ which refers to ‘a report provided to the IRG by any research 
project established as part of the oral history archive (see paragraph 25 of the 
Stormont House Agreement)’.27 It is also referred to in the NIO’s Consultation 
Paper and summary documents. Here it is stated that, in addition to recording 
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new stories and gathering information about existing projects, the OHA would 
‘make a historical timeline of the Troubles’. 
 This issue was addressed by a team of historians and social scientists from 
Northern Ireland, Ireland and Britain at a workshop on ‘Historians and the 
Stormont House Agreement’ led by Professor Ian McBride at Hertford College, 
Oxford, in October 2016. In their joint report, they noted that ‘the purpose of “a 
factual historical timeline” is unclear’. They note the existence of a plethora of 
excellent detailed chronologies and caution that greater clarity about the purpose 
of this timeline is necessary in order to avoid the ‘risk of creating 
misunderstandings among the wider public about the nature of academic 
research.’ The report goes on to acknowledge the need to get beyond ‘polemical 
arguments over “who fired the first shot” and instead to engage with more 
complex questions of causation and responsibility’.28As noted above, the purpose 
of this Archive in our view is indeed to get beyond the dehumanising and 
reductionist approach of a statistical timeline and instead to give space to 
individuals to tell their story in full, in context, and in all of its broader complexity. 
Recommendation: Before asking members of the general public to comment on 
whether or not ‘the Oral History Archive proposals provide an appropriate method for 
people from all backgrounds to share their experiences of the Troubles’, it is 
imperative that more detail is provided on those proposals, including the role and 
function of the proposed historical timeline and any related ‘research projects’. In 
particular, the NIO should articulate clearly how and to what extent the timeline (and 
any related ‘research projects’) might influence the criteria for inclusion of stories to 
the OHA and the subsequent report on patterns and themes. 
Report on Patterns and Themes 
 There has been some debate about the procedures by which academics might 
be appointed to work on a report on patterns and themes for the Implementation 
and Reconciliation Group. Concerns have also been raised about the sources 
that the academics might draw upon to compile that report. Less attention has 
been paid to the processes by which evidence will accrue to the Oral History 
Archive. We regard this as a significant oversight because, regardless the other 
sources that the IRG appointed academics may or may not consult, the reports 
from the ICIR, HIU and OHA are clearly flagged as ‘the principal reports’.29 
 As currently crafted, the draft NIO bill proposes to give the Deputy Keeper the 
power to decide which stories meet the criteria for inclusion in the OHA. It 
furthermore proposes that: ‘The Deputy Keeper must provide the Implementation 
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and Reconciliation Group with a report on patterns and themes the Deputy 
Keeper has identified from the exercise of the function of organising the 
archive’.30 
 The draft NIO bill proposes this report must be provided to the Implementation 
and Reconciliation Group exactly five years after the Northern Ireland (Stormont 
House Agreement) Bill comes into force. 
 It is totally unacceptable, in our view, to grant a senior civil servant, accountable 
to the Minister for Communities, sole discretion to determine which stories can be 
admitted to the OHA, which should be redacted, withheld or destroyed, and which 
sections of the publicly available accounts should inform a report on patterns and 
themes. 
Recommendation: The work on patterns and themes is a cornerstone of the legacy 
programme and as such, it is imperative that it should be guided and directed by an 
independent, diverse, and representative Steering Group. 
Funding 
 The OHA section in the NIO draft Bill does not have a specific section on 
‘funding’. However, the explanatory notes suggest under ‘Financial Implications 
of the Bill’ that it is to be funded out of the £150 million (£30 million per annum for 
5 years) to be contributed by the UK Government. Given that the Public Record 
Office, which is a division of the NI Department for Communities, is assigned the 
function of organising it, we presume that the NIO is proposing that the 
Department of Communities should decide the amount necessary to set up and 
run the OHA and to duly pay the expenses via PRONI. The OHA would thus be 
paid from the Department for Communities budget and there would be no 
obligation on the UK centrally to resource it. 
Recommendation: In our Model Bill, we proposed payment from the Consolidated 
Fund through the UK Treasury. We also noted in our explanatory notes to the Model 
Bill the vital importance of ensuring funding beyond the five-year window proposed 
for the other mechanisms.31 
Timeframe 
 Unlike the Historical Investigations Unit and the Independent Commission on 
Information Retrieval, the work of the Oral History Archive (subject to available 
funding) is not time-bound. As noted above, we consider this one of its greatest 
strengths. 
 The read across to the work of the Implementation and Reconciliation Group 
does, however, introduce an important caveat with regard to the proposed 
timeframe. As noted below the stories admitted to the OHA are destined to be a 
central source of information for the identification of patterns and themes. This 
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work is due to commence five years after the mechanisms get up and running. As 
things stand, it is unclear whether stories that are admitted to the OHA after this 
period can be considered. 
Recommendation: The NIO should clarify that funding would be provided for the 
OHA beyond the initial five-year period, and that stories admitted after this period 
can be considered for the IRG report on patterns and themes.  
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The Implementation and Reconciliation Group 
The Stormont House Agreement also provided for the creation of an Implementation 
and Reconciliation Group (IRG). The purpose of this mechanism would be to 
oversee themes, archives, and information retrieval. Paragraph 51 of the SHA 
provides that, after five years of the operation of the other legacy mechanisms, a 
report on such themes should be commissioned by the IRG from ‘independent 
academic experts’. It also stipulates that ‘any potential evidence base for patterns 
and themes should be referred to the IRG from any of the legacy mechanisms, who 
may comment on the level of cooperation received’. Finally, it declares that ‘this 
process should be conducted with sensitivity and rigorous intellectual integrity, 
devoid of any political interference’. Paragraph 52 states ‘Promoting reconciliation 
will underlie all of the work of the IRG. It will encourage and support other initiatives 
that contribute to reconciliation, better understanding of the past and reducing 
sectarianism.’ Paragraph 54 deals with the make-up of the IRG. It states that the IRG 
will consist of political appointees (DUP 3, Sinn Féin 2, one each from SDLP, UUP, 
Alliance, UK, and Irish government). 
The leaked version of the 2015 Stormont House Agreement Bill did not contain any 
provisions relating to the IRG. However, the 2018 draft Bill and related consultation 
documents contain provisions on the functions of the IRG - how it would operate, 
how its members would be appointed and the proposed governance structures with 
regard to the work of the academics involved in the preparation of the report on 
themes and patterns. 
Key Strengths in the Draft Bill 
Statutory Basis 
 We welcome the inclusion of the IRG in the draft Bill. As noted in the Explanatory 
Notes to our Model Bill, we believe that a statutory footing is required to ensure 
that the IRG fulfils its mandate both in terms of its work on themes and patterns, 
which emerge from the other mechanisms, and as a central vehicle for the 
promotion of reconciliation.32 
Establishment as a Body Corporate 
 The draft Bill stipulates (as did our Model Bill) that the IRG should be established 
as a body corporate, similar to the HIU and ICIR. Again, this is to be broadly 
welcomed as a required step to better protect the independence of the IRG. 
Nature of Political Appointments to IRG 
 The draft Bill makes it clear that while those appointed to the IRG are political 
appointees, they cannot simultaneously hold a relevant public elected position. 
Relevant public elected positions include being a member of the Northern Ireland 
Legislative Assembly, a councillor, a Member of Parliament, a member of the 
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House of Lord, a member of Dáil Éireann, a member of Seanad Éireann, or a 
member of the European Parliament from any member state. 
Independence of Academic Experts Appointed to IRG 
 An NIO Consultation paper that accompanies the draft Bill stresses that ‘it would 
be vital that the work of the academics is recognised as being independent, 
rigorous and in line with best practice’. It also suggests that it may be valuable for 
the academic report to use a multi-disciplinary approach and to work with 
organisations such as the Economic and Social Research Council. As is 
discussed further below, the importance of protecting the independence of the 
academics involved in this work as well as ensuring that this work is conducted 
with due rigour and professionalism is indeed essential and such an emphasis is 
again to be welcomed. 
Process for Appointments to IRG 
 The draft Bill proposes that the IRG would be chaired by a person ‘of international 
standing’ to be appointed by the First and deputy First Minister. As noted above, 
the SHA stipulates that one member would by appointed by the UK government, 
the other by the Irish government and the remainder nominated by the five 
largest political parties in Northern Ireland according to the formula agreed in the 
Stormont House Agreement. The draft Bill lays out the process for nomination to 
these positions. 
Key Weaknesses in the Draft Bill and Related Recommendations 
Dismissal of IRG Members for Failure to ‘Take the Party Line’ 
 Schedule 17 the draft Bill contains details of the process for dismissal of an IRG 
member if the IRG is satisfied that the member has disclosed the contents of any 
relevant report without the permission of the Chair or before the academic report 
has been produced. There are quite serious implications for the workability of the 
IRG contained within these provisions. Clause 2(2) of Schedule 17 states that the 
relevant ‘appointing authority’ may remove a member of the IRG from office 
simply by giving him or her ‘written notice of removal’. This would appear to 
present the obvious risk that once nominated onto the IRG, unless a person 
rigidly followed the positions of the different political parties (or indeed the two 
governments), they could be summarily removed from the IRG and presumably 
be replaced by someone more pliant who would not deviate from party political 
positions. For the IRG to function properly and fulfil its mandate with regard to 
promoting reconciliation it would require those appointed to act in the public 
interest and to do so without fear that they could be summarily removed for party 
political reasons. 
Recommendation: The solution to the risk of IRG members being dismissed for 
party political reasons could be found in Schedule 17, Clause 2(6) of the draft Bill. It 
provides that IRG members would hold office subject to the terms and conditions to 
be determined by the First and deputy First Minister and that any additional provision 
for their removal from office could be contained therein. The current carte blanche 
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provisions in Schedule 17, Clause 2(2) of the draft Bill should be removed and 
replaced by an agreed protocol from the FM/DFM detailing the responsibilities of the 
IRG members as office holders. This protocol could include how they are to abide by 
the principles outlined in the SHA and Clause 1 of the draft Bill and stipulate the 
precise grounds by which any IRG member could be removed by the IRG itself 
rather than by the nominating parties. Removal for party political reasons should not 
be one of those grounds. These grounds, including those relating to confidentiality, 
should also make clear how the terms of appointment of IRG members would square 
with current protections for whistle-blowers who become aware of human rights 
abuses or other illegal activities. 
Potential for a Unionist Veto Regarding any ‘Decision’ of the IRG 
 With regards its practical working arrangements, Schedule 17 makes clear that 
for the IRG to be quorate 7 members must be present including the Chair, the UK 
Government nominee, and the Government of Ireland nominee. 
 It also stipulates that decisions must be agreed by at least two-thirds of members 
participating.33 This requirement, which is not contained in the Stormont House 
Agreement, in effect offers the combined voting of the Democratic Unionist Party 
(3 nominees) and the Ulster Unionist Party (1 nominee) a de facto veto over any 
decision made by the IRG. The two nationalist parties (Sinn Féin, 2 nominees 
and SDLP 1 nominee) could not exercise any such veto without the support of 
the Irish government or the Alliance Party (which have 1 nominee each). As 
above, if the current formula were retained, the combined votes of the DUP and 
UUP would not require the support of the British government to exercise any 
such veto. The key issue in judging the impact of that veto is what are the 
‘decisions’ which are likely to be made by the IRG which could be blocked by any 
such veto? 
 Other decisions to be made by the IRG would include those related to the 
promotion of reconciliation (Clause 60(1)) and the role of the IRG in reviewing 
and assessing implementation of the other legacy mechanisms of the Stormont 
House Agreement (Clause 60(3)). In addition, it is the latter function of the IRG 
which will inform the commitment contained in the Stormont House Agreement 
(SHA para 53) that the UK and Irish Governments will consider ‘statements of 
acknowledgement’ and would expect others to do the same (discussed further 
below). 
Recommendation: To avoid the risk of the credibility of the IRG being undermined 
by the appearance that the political representatives of one section of the community 
could operate a de facto blocking veto over the decision-making process with the 
IRG, a simple majority of 6 from 11 (or equivalent if fewer members are present) 
should be adopted. 
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Political Configuration of the IRG 
 The other obvious point to make with regard to the proposed nomination formula 
for the IRG is that it reflects the political configuration in 2014 when the Stormont 
House Agreement was concluded. Presumably, those negotiating this formula in 
the SHA assumed that the enabling legislation would be introduced either in 
2015, or at least before the next Assembly elections. However, this did not 
happen. The work of the IRG would be largely determined by the reports 
emerging from the other mechanisms envisaged in the Stormont House 
Agreement. 
Recommendation: Regardless the political arithmetic, given the long delay, the 
configuration of political nominees to the IRG should be based on the most recent 
Northern Ireland Assembly election results prior to the IRG’s establishment rather 
than ‘frozen’ in 2014. The legislation should be amended accordingly.34 
Ensuring the Independence, Professionalism and Rigour of the Academic 
Work 
 Given that the IRG would be made up of political appointees, we believe that the 
independence, professionalism, and integrity of the work of the academic report 
on themes and patterns will be central to the credibility of the work of the IRG and 
indeed the SHA legacy mechanisms in general. In the absence of such a report 
on themes and patterns, the work of the OHA, HIU, and ICIR would be, by nature 
largely individualistic and ‘case by case’ focused. The IRG, through the academic 
report, would produce an account that assesses the themes and patterns or 
‘bigger picture of the conflict.’ This work would in turn be central to the efforts of 
the IRG to challenge sectarianism and promote reconciliation. 
 Clause 62(4) of the draft Bill proposes that ‘the academic experts must be 
independent, free from political influence and act in way which can secure public 
confidence’. An NIO paper on commissioning the independent academic report, 
which accompanies the consultation documents, considers how the academic 
expert work could be commissioned, ‘taking into account issues of independence 
and impartiality; good governance and ethics; and ownership of research’.35 That 
report refers to existing mechanisms, which fund high quality research and 
provide an architecture for the commissioning, governance, peer review, 
independence and ethics of that research. The paper refers specifically to the 
Economic and Social Research Council (which governs social science research 
including sociology, politics, law, elements of psychology etc.), the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (which governs arts subjects such as history, 
languages, religious studies, aspects of law etc.). The paper also refers to the 
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DUP secured 38 seats, Sinn Féin 28 seats, the UUP 18 seats, SDLP 14 seats, and Alliance secured 
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Irish Research Council which covers both social science and arts subjects and 
provides a similar architecture for research governance, independence and 
rigour. It correctly notes the strong emphasis on multi-disciplinary research 
across all of these bodies and that the ESRC (and AHRC) regularly ‘provide 
advice and support’ to those seeking to benefit from their expertise and 
connections to academic networks. The NIO paper thus states that ‘A research 
council approach could be adopted by the IRG in the way that it commissions 
research’. 
Recommendations: 
The ESRC and AHRC should be engaged explicitly to commission the academic 
work on patterns and themes to ensure independence, impartiality, and best practice 
in the academic research. The reason for engaging both the ESRC and AHRC (who 
work collaboratively on a regular basis) is to ensure that those involved in preparing 
the academic report encompass both social science and arts disciplines. Placing the 
ESRC and AHRC at centre of this process, rather than simply advising the political 
appointees who make up the IRG is a fundamental prerequisite to the credibility of 
this work. 
In addition, a new provision should be inserted into the relevant clause of the 
legislation making it clear that any attempt by any member of the IRG to unduly 
influence or otherwise interfere with the work of the independent academics involved 
in producing the academic report may be viewed as a breach of duty and that 
individual may be excluded from the IRG. If the power to suspend a nominating 
authority’s ability to replace someone who has been so excluded (either a political 
party or one of the two governments) for up to six months is retained in the final 
version of the legislation as a sanction for breach of the duty on the IRG, interference 
with the work of the academics involved in producing the academic reports should be 
one of the specified grounds for such a sanction. 
Sources that will inform the Work of the Independent Academic Experts 
 It is clear from the NIO draft Bill and Explanatory Notes that the academics’ report 
would not be commissioned until the IRG has received what are referred to as 
‘the four principal reports’ from the HIU, ICIR, OHA, and the Coroners’ Courts of 
Northern Ireland. 
 To assist the academic experts in writing their report on the patterns and themes, 
the draft Bill further specifies in Clause 62(2)(a) that the academic experts may 
(to the extent, if any, that the academic experts think it appropriate to do so) take 
account of information from a range of specified sources providing these have 
been lawfully made available to them. Clause 62(2)(b) states academic experts 
may not take account of such information unless it has lawfully been made 
available in the way referred to in subclause (3). 
 The sources referred to in subclause 3: 
o HIU reports; 
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o HET reports that are publicly available or made available to the academic 
experts by the family concerned; 
o ICIR reports that are publicly available or made available to the academic 
experts by the family concerned; 
o ICIR Annual reports; 
o Police Ombudsman reports that are publicly available, or in the case of family 
reports that are made available to the academic experts by the family 
concerned; 
o OHA records that are publicly available; 
o OHA reports that are produced by the Deputy Keeper (annual reports relating 
to the oral history archive); 
o Criminal Court Decisions in the United Kingdom and Ireland; 
o Judgments of civil courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom and Ireland that 
are made publicly available; 
o Coroner Court proceedings in the UK and Ireland; 
o Inquiries under the Inquiries into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2015, that are made publicly available. 
 The NIO Consultation Paper that accompanies the legislation appears in 
paragraph 10.3 more explicitly to limit the information that the academics could 
access to the four ‘principal reports’ and ‘other specified sources’ (emphasis 
added). 
 The Stormont House Agreement states that ‘any potential evidence base for 
patterns and themes should be referred to the IRG from any of the legacy 
mechanisms’.36 As noted above, it further states that ‘this process should be 
conducted with sensitivity and rigorous intellectual integrity, devoid of political 
interference.’ This makes clear that the evidence base for the examination of 
themes and patterns should emerge from the other SHA mechanisms. However 
once a possible theme or pattern emerges from those mechanisms, it is difficult 
to see how the academics appointed could assess the validity of any such 
potential theme or pattern with the required level of ‘sensitivity and rigorous 
intellectual integrity’ by only researching its merits from the list of sources in 
subclause 3. The word ‘may’ in Clause 62(2)(a) would seem to suggest that the 
academics may give whatever weight they wish to the information provided by 
the list of sources detailed in subclause 3. However, it does not provide the 
independent academic experts with an express freedom to consult sources 
beyond this list and weigh up the relevance or otherwise of those other sources in 
assessing the veracity of any suggested theme or pattern. Common sense would 
suggest that they should have such authority but that authority is not express in 
the legislation. 
 If the independent academic experts were not to be permitted to read beyond the 
list of sources in subclause 3, they would not (for example) be able to consult the 
widely used CAIN website,37 the extensive Linenhall Library Northern Ireland 
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Political Collection,38 the numerous official reports into key events in Northern 
Ireland39 or authoritative academic or historical reference points such as the Lost 
Lives book.40 
 This would seem a perverse act of anti-intellectualism and run contrary to the 
statutory obligation placed upon the independent academic experts for ‘rigorous 
intellectual integrity’ and operating ‘in such a way as to secure public confidence 
in the reports’. Moreover, it would run contrary to the professional standards that 
govern academic research across all social science and arts disciplines and 
would almost certainly mean that academics with the required professional profile 
would not be willing to undertake the work. 
 In 2016, a group of distinguished academics led by Professor Ian McBride 
(Foster Professor of Irish History at Oxford) held a workshop at the University of 
Oxford on the role of historians with regard to the implementation of the Stormont 
House Agree mechanisms.41 Although it is envisaged that the independent 
academic experts working with the IRG on themes and patterns would be drawn 
from a range of backgrounds (not just history), their conclusions have obvious 
read-across for other disciplines. They argued that the academics involved in 
work associated with the IRG ‘should have access to a wider range of archival 
sources’ beyond those available in the UK national archives and the Public 
Records Office of Northern Ireland (p.10). They argued that the SHA should 
result in greater access amongst the academics appointed to relevant records 
held by the Northern Ireland Office, Ministry of Defence, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Cabinet Office archives – all of which ‘hold thousands 
of files relevant to the writing of the thematic reports’ (p.11). They further argue 
that 
The opening up of government records will not inevitably lead to one-
sided accounts concentrating exclusively on the security forces. Official 
records also contain extensive information on paramilitary organisation 
and activities, because they were a central focus for the state. 
They also suggested that the records of various churches, peace campaigners, 
political parties, and international organisations such as Amnesty International 
could be drawn upon when the thematic reports are being written. 
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Recommendation: The power of the independent academic experts to review, 
evaluate and determine the relevance of all open access materials in assessing 
themes and patterns emerging from the SHA legacy mechanisms should be made 
explicit in the legislation. Moreover, as recommended by Professor McBride and his 
colleagues, with regard to archives that are not currently available, compromises 
must be reached on releasing as much material as possible to aid understanding 
without endangering people’s lives. 
Publication of the Academic Report 
 A key concern for academics involved in the writing of the report on themes and 
patterns would be to ensure that once all necessary legal and quality controls 
have been written, the report would actually be published. Clause 62(6) of the 
draft Bill stipulates that the IRG must give copies of any academic report that is 
produced to (a) the First Minister and deputy First Minister; (b) the Secretary of 
State, and (c) the Government of Ireland at the same time. Since the term used is 
‘must’, it would appear that there is no ‘decision’ on the part of the IRG regarding 
the passing on of the academic reports. 
 Clause 62(8) states that the First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly 
must (a) lay the copy of the academic report given to them before the Northern 
Ireland Assembly, and (b) publish that copy of the report in the manner that the 
First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly consider appropriate. Again, 
this appears to be a straightforward statutory obligation to lay the academic 
report before the Assembly and to publish it. 
 The obligation to lay a copy of the academic report before the Assembly appears 
absolute and, if the report is laid before the Assembly, it is to all intents and 
purposes in the public domain. Given past experiences with regard to legacy 
related matters, however, concerns have been expressed to us during the 
consultation that the requirement to ‘act jointly’ in publishing the report ‘in a 
manner that the OFM/DFM jointly consider appropriate’ could be used to 
unreasonably delay publication. 
Recommendation: To allay fears about the prospect of publication being unduly 
delayed, additional wording could be added to Clause 62(8) stating that that the 
requirement to act jointly could not be utilised to unreasonably delay the publication 
of the academic report on themes and patterns or in laying it before the Assembly. In 
the event of the FM/DFM failing to agree an appropriate format for the publication of 
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Statements of Acknowledgment 
 The Stormont House Agreement states that ‘In the context of the work of the IRG, 
the UK and Irish Governments will consider statements of acknowledgement and 
would expect others to do the same.’42 However, in the draft Bill, the link between 
the work of the IRG and these proposed statements of acknowledgement are not 
mentioned. In order to assist the two governments in the preparing their 
statements of acknowledgement, either the IRG or the independent academic 
experts could be tasked with preparatory work as part of their broader focus on 
reconciliation, the work of the other SHA mechanisms and the report on themes 
and patterns. 
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to the placing a statutory duty on 
the IRG to conduct such work as it deems necessary in preparing materials that 
would be useful for two governments and others to considering the issuing of 
statements of acknowledgement as mandated in the Stormont House Agreement.  
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Defining ‘Keeping People Safe and Security’ 
Recommendation: Our preferred option is that the term national security be 
removed and replaced with the language of the SHA ‘keeping people safe and 
secure.’ ‘Keeping people safe and secure’ should be defined for the purposes of 
decisions on information redaction with regard to the SHA mechanisms. It would 
require the decision maker to determine that information redaction was necessary 
and proportionate and consistent with human rights principles with due regard to: 
(a) Duty to Protect Life (Article 2, ECHR) No ‘sensitive information’ shall be 
provided which might present a real and immediate threat to the life of an identified 
individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party 
(b) Duty to Prevent Harm to Individuals (Article 3, ECHR) No ‘sensitive 
information’ shall be provided which might present a real and immediate risk of harm 
to an identified individual or individuals, not a class of persons. There must be a 
direct, foreseeable, and describable link between the proposed disclosure and the 
anticipated harm. This means that the risk must be imminent or in the foreseeable 
future and wholly created or materially enhanced by the proposed disclosure 
(c) The source of the threat – There must be an identifiable threat to carry out harm 
as defined above through criminal acts. 
(d) Protection of operational counter-terrorist methodologies and effectiveness 
which are in current use and which are lawful - i.e. obsolete or ‘arguably 
illegitimate’43 methods cannot be concealed by restrictions on disclosure. Information 
about contemporary, legitimate, operational methods already in the public domain 
must not qualify for redaction. In general, the reasons for restricting disclosure under 
this criterion must be, as the courts have held, ‘particularly convincing and weighty’.44 
Nature of Legal Proceedings on Information Redaction 
 As is detailed further in the Appendix, we also provided further detailed provisions 
on the nature of the legal proceedings in which any appeal on an information 
redaction would take place, the ways in which the rights of the families and others 
would be protected in such hearings (including in any closed proceedings) and 
guidance on the extent of the proposed disclosure. 
Recommendation: If the term national security is to be retained in the Bill, it should 
be made clear (e.g. in Clause 39 regarding interpretation) that it refers to current or 
contemporary rather than historical national security concerns. It should also be 
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specified that information could not be redacted for historical national security 
concerns. 
National Security and the HIU 
National Security Veto over Disclosure 
 The provisions in the draft Bill to identify ‘sensitive’ information and to bestow 
ministerial power to redact reports on national security grounds are neither ECHR 
nor SHA compliant. 
Recommendation: The proposals should be amended to ensure the HIU Director is 
the decision maker on redactions and that these decisions are based on clearly 
defined and legitimate criteria, as set out in the Appendix. The proposed ten-day 
prohibition on HIU disclosure to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Chief 
Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland or Coroners, for which there is no 
explanation, should also be addressed. 
National Security Veto over ‘Any Action’ of HIU 
 The draft Bill would place an overarching duty on the HIU to ‘not do anything’ that 
might ‘prejudice’ the undefined ‘national security interests of the United Kingdom’. 
Recommendation: This unnecessary provision should be removed. The UK 
government has a long track record of stretching the concept of national security 
beyond credible interpretation in Northern Ireland legacy cases and as such there is 
a legitimate concern that the provision could be used to conceal evidence of human 
rights violations. 
Role of the Irish Government in restricting Disclosure to the HIU 
Recommendation: The Irish authorities should set out explicit grounds on which 
they will restrict disclosure, and adopt clearly defined criteria (similar to what the 
Model Bill group have previously detailed in the Appendix with regard to redactions 
based on national security). As above, this should also detail the relevant appeal 
process for any information redactions determined in the Republic of Ireland. 
The Principles and Rules to be Applied in any Appeal on Information 
Redaction 
Recommendation: The appeal mechanism on information redaction on the grounds 
of national security should also apply to the ICIR and OHA. In addition, Clause 21(5) 
should make clear that the appeal mechanism would take into account all relevant 
human rights considerations in line with current judicial review decision making. 
Thus, the phrase ‘including all relevant human rights principles’ should be added to 
the end of the current Clause 21(5). This should now read ‘In determining an appeal 
under this section, the court must apply the principles applicable on an application 
for judicial review including all relevant human rights principles.’ In addition, given the 
public importance of the proposed appeal mechanism, the legislation should 
stipulate that a no fee process will be applied and provision to preclude adverse 
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costs being awarded against families or the SHA mechanism that instigates the 
appeal. Finally, as is detailed in Appendix 1 of this report, the government should 
make clear its proposed arrangements for ensuring that families’ interests are 
represented by lawyers whom families trust and have confidence in during any 
closed element of the appeal mechanism. 
The Remedy Available Should Be that the Information Not be Redacted 
Recommendation: Clause 21(6) provides that the court would have the power to 
quash the Secretary of State’s decision and that if it does so it must direct that the 
Secretary of State should remake the decision within 60 days or a reasonable longer 
period which the court specifies. This provision should be amended. Instead, this 
provision should state that the court should direct that the relevant information 
should not be redacted. The Secretary of State would of course have the right to 
appeal that determination under Clause 21(8) if the relevant threshold for appeals 
was reached. 
Policing Board 
 Under Schedule 15, Clause 11 of the draft Bill, which deals with the oversight of 
the work of the Historical Investigations Unit, the Policing Board would have the 
power to establish an Inquiry on any matter disclosed in a HIU report due to the 
gravity of matter or exceptional circumstances. However, in the draft Bill, 
Schedule 15, Clause 11(3), the Secretary of State may overrule the Policing 
Board if he/she determines that an inquiry should not be held in the interests of 
national security. 
Recommendation: This proposed National Security constraint on the role of the 
Policing Board is not provided for in the SHA and should be removed. 
National Security and the ICIR 
 Clause 43(2)(a) of the draft Bill provides that the ICIR must not do anything which 
would prejudice the national security interests of Ireland or the United Kingdom. 
Clause 46 would require that the Secretary of State be given a draft of all ICIR 
reports before they are given to a family and it would give the Secretary of State 
the power to (1) identify elements of a report that could prejudice the national 
security interests of the UK and (2) require that they be excluded. These are 
deeply concerning provisions that could undermine the legitimacy of the 
institutions in the eyes of families and would risk the ICIR not being Article 2 
compliant. 
Recommendations: Given its likely ‘chill factor’ on those who have information 
which might be of use to families, this provision needs to be re-examined and 
assessed in terms of its effect on the workability of the ICIR and alternatives 
explored that might address legitimate national security concerns on the part of the 
two governments. One solution might be to place the responsibility for determining 
national security concerns on the ICIR itself with an agreed protocol on consulting 
with either of the relevant governments if national security issues were ‘flagged’ - 
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rather than have every single ICIR family report read and approved by the UK and 
Irish government before it is released. 
At the very least, in keeping with our previously published model for information 
redaction, we recommend that the ICIR Chair or family members have the power to 
appeal any proposed redaction by the Secretary of State to an independent judicial 
authority. 
As above, any family member or the ICIR Chair who wishes to challenge information 
being redacted from an ICIR report on the grounds of national security should be 
able to appeal that decision through the agreed appeal mechanism. If accepted, this 
would require the establishment of an analogous appeal process in the Republic of 
Ireland. 
National Security and the Oral History Archive 
 The Oral History Archive is not designed to attract information about unlawful 
activity or secrets of the state but it is nonetheless possible that information 
included in an individual testimony could be deemed harmful to national security 
and, on that account, redacted or destroyed. 
Recommendations: We propose that decisions on redaction and closure should be 
taken by the Steering Group in line with clear and transparent criteria. 
In the (albeit unlikely) event that it is proposed to redact or destroy an account 
because the information contained within it is deemed harmful to national security, 
we recommend that the individual who contributed the information should (if they are 
unhappy with the decision of the Steering Group) have recourse to the agreed 
appeal mechanism for national security redactions arising in the context of the HIU 
and the ICIR. 
Restrictions on Legacy Inquests 
 Despite the SHA explicitly stating that ‘Legacy inquests will continue as a 
separate process to the HIU’ and the requirement and commitment to discharge 
ECHR Article 2 obligations, the draft Bill would prevent a Coroner from holding a 
legacy inquest until the HIU has completed a HIU investigation into the death (or 
until the HIU closes) and would only then allow the inquest to proceed if there are 
‘compelling reasons’. 
 The ‘section 14’ powers of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland to reopen 
legacy inquests would also be suspended entirely whilst the HIU is running and 
permanently unless there are ‘compelling reasons’ (the current threshold is where 
it is ‘advisable’). 
Recommendation: The NIO proposals should honour the Stormont House 
Agreement by explicitly stating that legacy inquests will continue as a separate 
process to the HIU. 
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Principle of Complying with Human Rights 
The SHA set out a number of general principles to govern the work of the legacy 
institutions. Clause 1 of the draft Bill replicates this list. The General Principles 
include the principle that ‘human rights obligations be complied with’. Clause 67 
(interpretation) states that human rights obligations should be interpreted as referring 
to the ‘obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998’. Whilst the Human Rights Act 
(HRA) gives further effect to ECHR rights in domestic law, there have also been 
domestic judicial decisions that limit the temporal jurisdiction and scope of the Act. 
As a result, under this interpretation, the obligation on the legacy institutions to 
comply with human rights could be deemed to apply only to with respect to issues 
that arose after the HRA came into effect. This could constitute a significant limitation 
in the interpretation of the HIU’s human rights obligations. 
The restriction of human rights obligations to the HRA in any case limits the scope of 
this principle to the rights contained in this instrument and excludes other human 
rights obligations, for example, UN human rights standards relating to eliminating 
discrimination against women and other standards relating to peace building. 
Recommendation: This should be amended to explicitly reference the ECHR and 
other international human rights standards in the UN and Council of Europe systems. 
The Secretary of State’s Power to Make Regulations 
Clause 65 of the draft Bill vests powers to make ‘incidental, supplementary or 
consequential provision by regulations’ in the Secretary of State and Northern 
Ireland departments. The Secretary of State’s powers are explicitly qualified under 
Clause 65(3), as far as they relate to devolved matters, to requiring the consent of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly. This places the ‘Sewel’ convention45 on a statutory 
basis for NI, albeit only for secondary regulations and without stipulating the consent 
process (i.e. whether this would require a formal Legislative Consent Motion- LCM) 
or merely a straight vote on a motion. 
Recommendation: The Secretary of States powers to make regulations should be 
scrutinised and qualified to preclude any provisions that may impinge on the HIU’s 
independence. 
Changes to the Early Release Scheme 
The 2018 draft Bill would amend the legislation for the Early Release Scheme (the 
Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, which provides for a maximum of two years 
in prison for conflict-related offences committed before the Good Friday Agreement). 
The Act would be amended to treat conflict-related offences committed between 
1968 and 1973 as qualifying offences for the early release scheme. Such cases are 
currently excluded due to the technicality of ‘scheduled offences’ on which the Act 
                                       
45
 The convention whereby Westminster will not normally legislate on devolved matters without the 
consent of the respective devolved institution.  
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relies not existing until 1973. The timeframe and formulation is different to the 
definition of a conflict-related incident in the 2006 Victims and Survivors (Northern 
Ireland) Order.46 The cut-off date for the scheme remains the time of the Good 
Friday Agreement in April 1998. As in the existing Act, this provision would apply 
retrospectively – i.e. if sentences were passed now for offences that were committed 
pre-1973 provision is made for accelerated release. 
Recommendation: The changes should be implemented to remove the anomalies 
of the early release scheme.
                                       
46
 Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, Art 2 (Interpretation): ‘“conflict-related 
incident” means an incident appearing to the [Victims and Survivors Commission] to be a violent 
incident occurring in or after 1966 in connection with the affairs of Northern Ireland’. 
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I. Key Challenges 
Challenge 1: Pension for the Severely Injured 
A key omission from the current consultation relates to the question of a pension for 
the severely injured. Paragraph 28 of the Stormont House Agreement states that 
‘Further work will be undertaken to seek an acceptable way forward on the proposal 
for a pension for severely physically injured victims in Northern Ireland’. Although 
further work has been done, this issue remains unresolved. 
There is a widely acknowledged moral compulsion to resolve this issue. A pension 
for those who were severely injured would return some dignity to a group of people 
who have been poorly treated, who often received derisory compensation in the 
past, and who have ongoing health-related needs which remain unmet by their 
current welfare provision. 
While the government have continued to insist that ‘this is a devolved matter’, this is 
no longer an acceptable response to the needs of the injured. 
Recommendations: 
We believe that the Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill is an 
appropriate vehicle to resolve the political standoff on the issue of a pension for the 
severely injured. The legislation should include provision for the issuance of a 
pension and related care packages for all of those severely injured as a result of the 
conflict based on an objective assessment of the needs of the injured and their 
carers. 
If this requires bespoke mechanisms to address the needs of civilians, former 
paramilitaries and part-time members of the security forces, then such a solution can 
and should be incorporated into the legislation. 
Challenge 2: National Security 
Given the importance of this challenge, we have provided below: 
a) Some historical context on the issue in terms of the Stormont House 
Agreement; 
b) An overview of the relevant clauses in the current draft Bill as well as some 
comparative illustrations of its potential effects using previous reports by the 
Office of the Police Ombudsman; 
c) An overview of the proposed appeal mechanism in the draft Bill; 
d) A discussion on how to resolve the competing priorities regarding information 
redaction drawing upon elements of a previous model developed by the 
authors and others (provided in Appendix 1) as well as detailed 
recommendations designed to improve the current draft Bill. 
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Onward Disclosure, Redaction and National Security in the 2015 Leaked Bill 
In 2015, following resumed political negotiations, which culminated in the Fresh Start 
Agreement, the local political parties and the two governments failed to reach 
agreement on implementing the legacy component of the Stormont House 
Agreement. That failure was due in large part to the introduction of a provision 
allowing a UK government minister to redact, on national security grounds, 
information being passed from SHA mechanisms (particularly the Historical 
Investigations Unit)47 onwards to families – a process referred to as ‘onward 
disclosure’. 
The SHA did not refer to national security. Instead, paragraph 37 of the SHA states: 
The UK Government makes clear that it will make full disclosure to the 
HIU. In order to ensure that no individuals are put at risk, and that the 
Government’s duty to keep people safe and secure is upheld, 
Westminster legislation will provide for equivalent measures to those 
that currently apply to existing bodies so as to prevent any damaging 
onward disclosure of information by the HIU. 
During the negotiations in 2015, a leaked version of the government’s draft 
legislation on the legacy mechanisms came into the public arena. Amongst the most 
notable elements of that leaked draft were the provisions relating to onward 
disclosure and the HIU. While the powers of disclosure of information including 
intelligence to the HIU to assist it in conducting investigations were stronger, the 
HIU’s ability to provide ‘onward disclosure’ of such information to families was 
significantly curtailed by numerous references to powers that the Secretary of State 
could exercise to redact information on ‘the grounds of national security’. 
Sinn Féin, the SDLP, the Irish government, the Alliance Party as well as human 
rights groups and victims’ organisations affected by state violence and collusion in 
particular were all highly critical of the British government for attempting to use a 
‘national security veto’ to undermine the truth recovery functions of the HIU.48 In 
                                       
47
 The impact of national security considerations on the Independent Commission on Information 
Retrieval and the Oral History Archive are discussed below.  
48
 ‘Sinn Féin Criticise Leaked Draft Westminster Bill Dealing With Legacy of The Troubles’ BBC News 
(6 October 2015) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-34460936 accessed 23 August 
2018; Eamon Sweeney, ‘Stormont House Agreement: SDLP State Opposition to Victims Bill’ Derry 
Journal (14 October 2015) https://www.derryjournal.com/news/stormont-house-agreement-sdlp-state-
opposition-to-victims-legislation-1-7002475 accessed 23 August 2018; John Manley ‘Charlie 
Flanagan Critical of National Security “Smothering Blanket”’, Irish News (27 November 2015) 
http://www.irishnews.com/news/2015/11/27/news/flanagan-critical-of-national-security-smothering-
blanket--334991/ accessed 23 August 2018. The former Alliance Party leader and Justice Minister 
David Ford is quoted as ‘sharing the concerns of nationalist and the Irish government’ over the 
national security clauses in the leaked bill. He told the Irish News, ‘Clearly every government has 
national security issues but the concerns we expressed on seeing the draft Bill was that there seemed 
to be about four layers of that – which gave an indication of an unwillingness to be opened. If I 
thought there was an overlaying of national security it’s not surprising other people rejected it 
completely’ in ‘David Ford Upbeat for Alliance Ahead of Stormont Election’ Irish News (4 March 2016) 
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addition, Pablo de Greiff, former UN Special Rapporteur on Transitional Justice 
referred to the ‘over-use of national security exemptions to avoid disclosure’ by the 
UK government in Northern Ireland and that ‘appeals to the ambiguous concept of 
national security invoked as a blanket term becoming a means to shield individuals 
or practices against open scrutiny, fuel mistrust and suspicion’ – a perception which 
is aggravated by ‘the fact that national security has no statutory definition in British 
law’ and by the fear that national security will be used to redact information that is 
politically embarrassing.49 
National Security and the HIU in the 2018 Draft Bill 
In the current draft Bill, the power is vested in the Secretary of State to redact 
information from family reports on grounds of an undefined risk to the national 
security of the UK. The draft Bill also places duties on a range of security bodies to 
designate such information as ‘sensitive’ information. This concept of ‘sensitive 
information’ encompasses two categories of information, namely: 
 Information which if disclosed generally ‘might’ prejudice the ‘national security’ 
interests of the UK 
 Information originally ‘supplied by’ MI5, MI6, GCHQ, any intelligence unit of the 
Police or armed forces (i.e. including RUC Special Branch, or Force Research 
Unit-FRU) 
There is also an overarching duty on the HIU to ‘not do anything’ that might 
‘prejudice the national security interests of the United Kingdom’. National security is 
not defined in the draft Bill nor elsewhere in legislation. The Secretary of State may 
provide guidance as to the interpretation of this provision.50 Any such guidance 
however may be varied or revoked by further guidance and may make different 
provisions for different cases.51 
The second limb of the definition of ‘sensitive’ information (defined by the source of 
the information) therefore places all information regarding matters such as 
informants and covert operations within this category. The grounds on which the 
Secretary of State can direct redaction of such information are slightly narrower, 
being information that, in her view, would, or would be likely to, prejudice the national 
security interests of the UK. 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.irishnews.com/paywall/tsb/irishnews/irishnews/irishnews//news/politicalnews/2016/03/04/n
ews/david-ford-upbeat-for-alliance-ahead-of-stormont-election-438605/content.html accessed 23 
August 2018. The position taken by the DUP and the Ulster Unionist Party was broadly that the issue 
of national security was one to be resolved between nationalists and the British government. 
49
 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence on his mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (17 November 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/34/62/Add.1 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/58b9583b4.html accessed 23 August 2018. 
50
 Draft Bill, cl 34(2). 
51
 Ibid, cl 34(5). 
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There is also a new provision whereby any disclosure by the HIU of ‘sensitive’ 
information to other criminal justice agencies  (i.e. the PSNI, Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Coroner, Inspectorate of Constabulary or Chief Inspector of Criminal 
Justice) can only be made if the Secretary of State is given ten working days’ notice. 
There is no explanation as to why this provision has been added. 
By way of illustration, it is notable that much of the contents of reports such as the 
Police Ombudsman’s investigation into the Loughinisland massacre or the Operation 
Ballast report into the circumstances surrounding the murder of Raymond McCord 
Junior would consist of ‘sensitive’ information.52 Had the Secretary of State had the 
powers now proposed for the HIU, such reports could have been redacted beyond 
recognition before publication. 
Again, by way of illustration, in the two pages below we have shown what the 2016 
Police Ombudsman’s report into the Loughinisland massacre might have looked like 
if ‘sensitive information’ had been excluded. Bearing in mind that a fundamental 
starting point for all the SHA mechanisms is that they are designed to provide a 
better product than the existing legacy facing mechanisms for victims and survivors 
(including the Police Ombudsman’s Office), the risk of national security redactions 
representing a backward step in the disclosure of information remains. 
  
                                       
52
 Office of the Police Ombudsman (2016) The Murder at the Heights Bar, Loughinisland 18 June 
1994. This latter report was amended slightly in March 2018 to make it clear that the determination of 
collusion did not apply to the former RUC Commander of its Downpatrick subdivision Ronald 
Hawthorne. A judicial review of the findings of this report taken by the Northern Ireland Retired Police 
Officers Association is ongoing at the time of writing. Office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern 
Ireland (2007) Operation Ballast: Investigation into the Circumstances surrounding the murder of 
Raymond McCord Jr. 
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Figure 2: Illustrative Example of OPONI report on Loughinisland if Sensitive Information had been 
Redacted 
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The concern regarding the provisions in the current draft Bill is that they provide a 
vehicle for the UK government to conceal and prevent exposure of and 
accountability for human rights violations, particularly in the area of covert policing 
and intelligence. Whilst there are existing non-disclosure duties on other office 
holders such as the Police Ombudsman and Chief Constable, a key difference in the 
current draft Bill is that the Secretary of State herself is the decision-maker rather 
than the HIU Director. 
The proposals in the draft Bill therefore depart from the SHA commitment that the 
UK government ‘will provide for equivalent measures to those that currently apply to 
existing bodies so as to prevent any damaging onward disclosure of information by 
the HIU’.53 
The Proposed Appeal Mechanism in Draft Bill Regarding Information Redacted on 
National Security Grounds 
The draft Bill contains an appeal mechanism by way of an appeal to the High Court 
with regard to information redacted by the Secretary of State. This appeal 
mechanism could be activated by either the HIU Director or a family member in the 
relevant case where the Secretary of State has redacted information from a report 
which the family would otherwise have received from the HIU. 
Of course, the right to seek a judicial review of a Secretary of State decision to 
redact information from a HIU report would have been open to family members or 
indeed the Director of the HIU regardless. However, according to the NIO 
consultation document, the fact that this appeal mechanism is now included in the 
draft Bill means that the family or HIU director would be able to skip the preliminary 
‘leave to appeal’ stage.54 
Other important features of this appeal process include: 
 Clause 21(4) makes clear that the function of the court under this appeal 
mechanism is to review the Secretary of State’s decision not to permit disclosure. 
 Clause 21(5) stipulates that the ‘court must apply the principles applicable on an 
application for judicial review’. 
 If the appeal is successful, the court has the power to quash the Secretary of 
State’s decision and if it does, it must direct that the Secretary of State retakes 
the decision within 60 days or a longer period if specified by the court.55 
 There are also provisions for a further appeal against the determination of the 
court with the leave of the High Court or Court of Appeal if the proposed appeal 
                                       
53
 SHA, para 37. 
54
 The normal requirement to seek ‘leave to appeal’ in a judicial review is ‘to eliminate at an early 
stage claims which are hopeless, frivolous, vexatious and to ensure that a claim only proceeds to a 
substantive hearing if the court is satisfied that there is a case fit for further consideration.’ R. v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners Ex p. National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
[1982] A.C. 617 at p.642 per Lord Diplock). 
55
 Draft Bill, cl 25(6). 
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‘would raise some important point of principle or practice’ or there is ‘some other 
compelling reason’ (Clause 25(8) and (9)). 
How Can the Provisions on National Security Redactions in the Current Draft Bill be 
Improved? 
As noted above, the issue of information redaction on the grounds of national 
security is the prime reason for the collapse of the 2015 talks on legacy and the 
matter has remained unresolved ever since. It is a touchstone issue for public 
confidence in the investigative functions of the HIU in particular and the SHA more 
broadly. This is particularly true in cases that involve deaths at the hands of the state 
or cases involving allegations of state collusion with paramilitary organisations – 
since these are the cases where information redaction would seem more likely to 
occur - rather than in paramilitary cases with no state involvement. It is therefore 
crucial that the competing interests of the right of families to know the truth and the 
state’s responsibilities to keep people safe and secure are resolved satisfactorily. 
Our recommendations below are designed to assist in that objective and come in two 
forms. 
First, the authors have previously worked with other NGOs and spent considerable 
time and energy developing a model that we believe offers a way to take seriously 
the rights of families and the responsibilities of state organisations to keep people 
safe and secure.56 That model was made public in 2017. We remain convinced that it 
represents the best way to meet the concerns of all parties on this issue. Some of its 
key elements are summarised below and it is outlined in full in Appendix One. 
Second, as with the rest of this response to the draft Bill, we have also engaged in 
providing detailed commentary and recommendations designed to improve the 
existing draft provisions. Needless to say, even if our proposed model was not 
adopted in whole, elements of it would certainly strengthen the current draft Bill 
provisions as detailed below. 
Our Model for Information Redaction 
Key elements of the proposed model for information redaction were as follows: 
 As in the current draft Bill, we proposed that any decision to redact information 
could be reviewed by a judicial figure of at least high court level. 
 However, we proposed that the legislation should either define the term national 
security ‘for the purposes of the SHA legacy mechanisms on dealing with the 
legacy of the conflict in Northern Ireland’ (to avoid read across concerns for other 
aspects of UK public law) or excise the term national security, and instead 
include the actual criteria for information redaction in the draft Bill and use the 
                                       
56
 See K. McEvoy et al, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland: A Proposed Model for Information 
Redaction under the Stormont House Agreement (QUB Human Rights Centre 2017). 
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term ‘keeping people safe and secure’ as a short hand for the relevant duties 
concerned – the term which is used in the SHA. 
 We proposed that the relevant criteria for the redaction of information should be 
specified in the legislation as follows: 
o Duty to Protect Life (Article 2, ECHR) No ‘sensitive information’ shall be 
provided in a HIU report to a family which might present a real and immediate 
threat to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts 
of a third party. 
o Duty to Prevent Harm to Individuals (Article 3, ECHR) No ‘sensitive 
information’ shall be provided in a HIU report to a family which might present 
a real and immediate risk of harm to an identified individual or individuals, not 
a class of persons. The harm to be prevented includes physical or specific 
psychological injury or harassment or intimidation likely to reach the threshold 
of inhuman or degrading treatment. There must be a direct, foreseeable, and 
describable link between the proposed disclosure and the anticipated harm. 
That means that the risk must be imminent or in the foreseeable future and 
wholly created or materially enhanced by the proposed disclosure. 
o The source of the threat: The threat must be to carry out harm as defined 
above through criminal acts. The source of the threat must be either an 
identified individual or individuals or a clearly definable group that in either 
case has demonstrated the willingness and capability to carry out threats as 
described to either the individual(s) concerned or to a defined class of 
persons to which the individual(s) arguably at risk belong. 
o Protection of Operation Counter-Terrorist Methodologies and 
Effectiveness On the basis that under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR it may be 
necessary and proportionate, some information may be redacted from HIU 
reports to protect the effectiveness of operational methods of the police and 
other security services which are in current use and which are lawful - i.e. 
obsolete or ‘arguably illegitimate’57 methods cannot be concealed by 
restrictions on disclosure. Information about contemporary, legitimate 
operational methods must not already be in the public domain to qualify for 
redaction. It must also be demonstrated that the proposed disclosure would, 
in fact, in the foreseeable future, damage the operational effectiveness of the 
method in question in such a way as to place a person or persons at a real 
and immediate risk of serious harm. In general, the reasons for restricting 
disclosure under this criterion must be ‘particularly convincing and weighty’.58 
As is detailed further in the Appendix, we also provided further detailed provisions 
on the nature of the legal proceedings in which these hearing would take place, 
the ways in which the rights of the families and others would be protected in such 
hearings (including in any closed proceedings) and guidance on the extent of the 
proposed disclosure. 
                                       
57
 Dil and Others v Commissioner of Police [2014] EWHC 2184 (QB), para 42 
58
 Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 
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Detailed Recommendations on the Current Draft Bill Provisions on National Security 
Define and restrict to Contemporary, Forward-facing not Historical National 
Security 
Recommendation: If the term national security is to be retained in the Bill, it should 
be tightly defined (see below) and make clear (e.g. in Clause 39 regarding 
interpretation) that national security refers to current or contemporary national 
security rather than historical national security concerns. If necessary, this 
interpretative clause could also include the term future. Information cannot be 
redacted for historical national security concerns 
National Security veto over disclosure 
 The provisions in the draft Bill to identify ‘sensitive’ information and to bestow 
ministerial power to redact reports on national security grounds are neither ECHR 
nor SHA compliant. 
Recommendation: The proposals should be amended to ensure the HIU Director is 
the decision maker on redactions and that these decisions are based on clearly 
defined criteria, as set out in Appendix 1. The ten-day prohibition on HIU disclosure 
to the DPP, PSNI Chief Constable, or Coroners, for which there is no explanation, 
should also be addressed. 
National Security veto over ‘any action’ of HIU 
 The draft Bill would place an overarching duty on the HIU to ‘not do anything’ that 
might ‘prejudice’ the undefined ‘national security interests of the United Kingdom’. 
Recommendation: This unnecessary provision should be removed. The UK 
government has a long track record of stretching the concept of national security 
beyond credible interpretation in Northern Ireland legacy cases and as such there is 
a legitimate concern that the provision could be used to conceal evidence of human 
rights violations. 
The Principles and Rules to be Applied in any Appeal on Information 
Redaction 
 The draft legislation generally provides for the appeal mechanism, but further 
clarification is needed as to whether the mechanism would take into account all 
relevant human rights considerations, as well as rules on practical issues such as 
costs. The process of Closed Material Procedures (CMPs) has also been heavily 
criticised on due process grounds. Thus, particular attention will have to be paid 
to ensure that the interests of families are properly represented and that the 
families have full confidence in the lawyers representing their interests in any 
element of such appeals that are held in Closed Material Proceedings format. 
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Recommendation: Clause 21(5) should make clear that the appeal mechanism 
would take into account all relevant human rights considerations in line with current 
judicial review decision making. Thus, add the phrase ‘including all relevant human 
rights principles’ to the end of the current Clause 21(5). This should now read ‘In 
determining an appeal under this section, the court must apply the principles 
applicable on an application for judicial review including all relevant human rights 
principles.’ In addition, given the public importance of the proposed appeal 
mechanism, the legislation should stipulate that a no fee process would be applied 
and provision to preclude adverse costs being awarded against families or the HIU 
who take appeals. Finally, as detailed in Appendix 1 of this report, the government 
should make clear its proposed arrangements for ensuring that the interests of 
families are represented by lawyers in whom families have trust and confidence in 
any closed element of the appeal mechanism. 
The Remedy Available Should Be the Information not be Redacted 
 As noted above, Clause 21(6) provides that the court would have the power to 
quash the Secretary of State’s decision and that if it does so it must direct that 
the Secretary of State should remake the decision within 60 days or a reasonable 
longer period specified by the court. 
Recommendation: This provision should be amended. Instead, this provision 
should state that the court would direct that the relevant information would not be 
redacted. The Secretary of State would of course have the right to appeal that 
determination under Clause 21(8) if the relevant threshold for appeals was reached. 
Power to compel that a Policing Board Inquiry not be Established on the 
Grounds of National Security 
 Under Schedule 15, Clause 11 of the draft Bill, which deals with the oversight of 
the work of the Historical Investigations Unit, the Policing Board would have the 
power to establish an Inquiry on any matter disclosed in a HIU report due to the 
gravity of matter or exceptional circumstances. However, in the draft Bill, 
Schedule 15, Clause 11(3), the Secretary of State may overrule the Policing 
Board if he/she determines that an inquiry should not be held in the interests of 
national security. 
Recommendation: The ability of the Policing Board to establish an inquiry on 
matters of gravity revealed or exceptional matters revealed in a HIU report should 
not be capable of being over-ruled by the Secretary of State based on national 
security. This clause should be deleted. 
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Ability of the Secretary of State to redact information from an ICIR report on 
the grounds of National Security 
 Clause 43(2)(a) of the draft Bill provides that the ICIR must not do anything which 
would prejudice the national security interests of Ireland or the United Kingdom. 
Clause 46 would require that the Secretary of State be given a draft of all ICIR 
reports before they are given to a family and it would give the Secretary of State 
the power to identify elements of a report that could prejudice the national 
security interests of the UK and require that they be excluded. These are deeply 
concerning provisions for a couple of reasons. 
 First, the knowledge that all information given to the ICIR would be channelled 
through the UK (and Irish) government before it reaches family members is likely 
to be a significant disincentive for some of those with relevant information coming 
forward in the first place. Second, in effect, this provision allows government 
representatives to control the flow of information in cases concerning not only 
paramilitaries but also suspected crimes and violations committed by members of 
the security forces (or by paramilitaries suspected of colluding with the state). 
Such a measure could undermine the legitimacy of the institutions in the eyes of 
families and would risk not being Article 2 compliant. 
Recommendation: Given its likely ‘chill factor’ on those who have information which 
might be of use to families, this provision needs to be re-examined and assessed in 
terms of its effect on the workability of the ICIR and alternatives explored that might 
address legitimate national security concerns on the part of the two governments. 
One solution might be to place the responsibility for determining national security 
concerns on the ICIR itself with an agreed protocol on consulting with either of the 
relevant governments if national security issues were ‘flagged’ - rather than have 
every single ICIR family report read and approved by the UK government before it is 
released. At the very least, the appeal mechanism agreed for information redaction 
on the grounds of national security should also be available to family members 
affected in ICIR reports and the ICIR Chair. An equivalent appeal mechanism, using 
the same criteria, should be created in the Republic of Ireland. 
National Security and the Oral History Archive 
 The Oral History Archive is not designed to attract information about unlawful 
activity or state secrets. Nonetheless, it is possible that some of the information 
included in individual testimonies could be deemed harmful to national security 
and closed on this account. 
Recommendation: In the rare circumstances where in an Oral History Account is 
closed on the basis of national security, the person who deposited that account 
should also be able to avail of the proposed judicial appeal mechanism to handle 
such disputes if no alternative resolution of that dispute can be found. 
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Challenge 3: Statute of Limitations 
One welcome omission from the draft Bill is a statute of limitations for members of 
the armed forces. Despite that omission, Question 14 of the NIO consultation paper 
asks the public ‘Do you have any views on different ways to address the legacy of 
Northern Ireland’s past not outlined in this consultation paper?’ Given the 
prominence of the issue of statute of limitations, the fact that some members of the 
public are likely to advocate for it in this consultation and our past work on the issue, 
the Model Bill team considered it important to discuss the issue in this response. 
Neither the five local political parties nor the British or Irish governments argued in 
favour of a statute of limitations during negotiations that led to the Stormont House 
Agreement and no such measure is included in its provisions. 
The suggestion emerged in particular from a House of Commons Defence 
Committee report in 2017.59 Members of the Model Bill team made a detailed 
submission to that Committee and Professor Kieran McEvoy gave evidence in 
person. The Defence Select Committee recommended that a statute of limitations be 
enacted for former members of the Armed Forces to cover ‘all Troubles-related 
incidents, up to the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement’. It also recommended 
that this measure should be accompanied with ‘the continuation and development of 
a truth recovery mechanism’.60 When asked in a subsequent media interview, if such 
a statute of limitations for armed forces could result in de facto amnesty for 
paramilitaries as well, the Chair of the Select Committee Dr Julian Lewis said ‘if the 
price of protecting our soldiers who are all that stood between Northern Ireland and 
complete bloody chaos’ is that paramilitaries go unpunished, ‘my personal view is we 
it owe it to our soldiers to pay that price’. He added ‘I’d hope the families would be 
big-hearted enough to accept this is something they could agree to’.61 
While the Defence Committee’s 2017 report related to an inquiry focused on 
Northern Ireland, the report referred to the prospect of British soldiers being held 
accountable for actions committed elsewhere and the wider commentary calling for a 
statute of limitations has increasingly called for it to apply to the actions of British 
soldiers in all theatres of conflict. This would, for example, include allegations of war 
crimes committed by British personnel in Iraq, which are currently the subject of a 
preliminary examination by the International Criminal Court. This broader approach 
is reflect in the Defence Committee’s second statute of limitations inquiry, which was 
launched on 12 June 2018 and has yet to report. 
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 House of Commons Defence Committee, Investigations into Fatalities in Northern Ireland Involving 
British Military Personnel (2017). 7th Report of Session 2016-17. The issue has also been the subject 
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Armed Forces Statute of Limitations Bill 2017-2019, https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-
19/armedforcesstatuteoflimitations.html accessed 22 August 2018. 
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 Defence Committee (n 59) 17. 
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 ‘Top Tory Call for End to Troubles Prosecutions “Gross Naivety”’, Newsletter (15 May 2017) 
https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/crime/top-tory-s-call-for-end-to-troubles-prosecutions-gross-
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While the Defence Committee did not provide any detail on what their proposed 
statute of limitations would look like, a cross-party private members’ bill sets out one 
potential, albeit deeply problematic, model. The text of this bill, published on 13 June 
2018, takes a wider approach by calling for the introduction of a statute of limitations 
to prevent legal proceedings being brought against current and former armed forces 
personnel accused of murder, manslaughter, or culpable homicide where ten years 
have elapsed since the alleged offence. These proposals would apply to any 
instance where UK troops were involved in an ‘armed conflict or peacekeeping 
operation’. Where the alleged offence took place in the UK, the proposals require 
that alleged offences must have been subject to police or coronial investigation 
before a statute of limitations could apply. This is regardless as to whether the 
original investigation was Article 2 ECHR compliant or not. 
If a proposal similar to the private members’ bill were enacted, it would effectively 
prevent any further legal proceedings for Troubles-related killings in which armed 
forces personnel are allegedly involved. It would also prevent legal proceedings 
relating to allegations of war crimes and torture of detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
which took place over ten years ago. These proposals would therefore in effect be 
an amnesty for these past offences. However, unlike most amnesties, this statute of 
limitations would not be an ‘exceptional’ measure addressing only past crimes. 
Instead, it would become an unprecedented and permanent part of the criminal 
justice system and could result in future impunity for serious offences in which UK 
armed forces personnel are implicated. As such, there are a number of fundamental 
legal and policy problems with the proposals for a statute of limitations, which the 
remainder of this section sets out. 
Potential Breach of the United Kingdom’s International Legal Obligations 
Statutes of limitations are prohibited under international law for ‘war crimes’ and 
‘crimes against humanity’. In the case of Northern Ireland, it is commonly accepted 
that international crimes reaching this high threshold did not take place. In our 
context, the question is whether a possible statute of limitations could legally apply to 
unlawful killings or other serious offences for which UK armed forces personnel are 
allegedly responsible. As members of the Model Bill team have argued elsewhere,62 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, amnesties may be permissible 
for violations of the right to life provided that they 
 Do not interfere with the state’s fulfilment of its duty to investigate; 
 Are enacted as part of a genuine process of conflict resolution and reconciliation, 
particularly where it delivers reparations to victims; and 
 Are necessary and proportionate. 
                                       
62
 See further Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace 
and Justice Divide (Hart Publishing 2009); Louise Mallinder, Luke Moffett, Kieran McEvoy and Gordon 
Anthony, Investigations, Prosecutions and Amnesties under Article 2 & 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (2015) https://amnesties-prosecution-public-interest.co.uk/output-type/project-
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In addition, the European Court of Human Rights case law to date suggests that it 
will look more restrictively on amnesties for torture or unlawful killings by state 
agents. 
Any attempt to use a statute of limitations to interfere with the rights of victims to an 
effective investigation of what happened to their loved ones under Article 2 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights would almost certainly fail a legal challenge. 
Concerns posed by any statute of limitations regarding the UK’s international human 
rights obligations would appear to be shared by the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland. In a recent letter to the Defence Select Committee Ms Karen Bradley stated: 
it is my understanding that there may be considerable legal difficulties 
associated with pursuing a statute of limitations that would apply only 
to the prosecution of members of the armed forces. I know that your 
committee heard evidence that a statute of limitations applying only to 
members of the armed forces would be inconsistent with the UK’s 
obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights and with 
other international obligations.63 
Ms Bradley’s view is correct. 
In addition to the legal obligations related to combatting impunity, the proposed 
statute of limitations could raise other legal difficulties. For example, a fundamental 
principle of the rule of law is equality before the law. Article 14 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights – which is binding in UK law – also contains a similar 
non-discrimination provision. A statute of limitations that sought to prevent 
prosecutions of one category of suspects (armed forces) while continuing to 
prosecute others (paramilitary suspects) would obviously be vulnerable to a legal 
challenge on the grounds of discrimination. These are discussed further below. 
Potential Damage to the United Kingdom’s International Reputation 
As noted above, the statute of limitations proposed by the Defence Committee would 
in effect be an amnesty. Amnesties for international crimes and serious violations are 
usually viewed under the international human rights framework as efforts to secure 
impunity.64 Impunity is defined by the United Nations as the impossibility of bringing 
the alleged perpetrators of human rights violations to account ‘since they are not 
subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if 
found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties’.65 States have a legal obligation to 
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‘combat such impunity’.66 Previous governments, which have introduced amnesties 
to cover serious violations committed by state actors, have included the military junta 
in Argentina, the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Robert Mugabe’s 
Zanu PF government in Zimbabwe. 
The UK government has long been a firm supporter of combatting impunity. As 
former NIO Minister Hugo Swire, told the UN Human Rights Council in 2014, ‘The 
UK strongly believes there should be no impunity for human rights violators’.67 In 
2011, the UK government representative was party to the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe’s decision, which adopted the ‘Guidelines on Eradicating 
Impunity for Serious Human Rights Violations’.68 The latter states that 
impunity is caused or facilitated notably by the lack of diligent reaction 
of institutions or state agents to serious human rights violations… 
States are to combat impunity as a matter of justice for the victims, as 
a deterrent with respect to future human rights violations and in order 
to uphold the rule of law and public trust in the justice system. 
Any mismatch between the established view of the UK government with regard to 
impunity in its foreign policy and the way in which it treats security force personnel 
accused of serious human rights abuses in Northern Ireland and elsewhere would be 
likely to be viewed with suspicion as an act of political expediency rather than any 
effort to promote reconciliation. 
A Statute of Limitations for the Armed Forces would Ultimately Apply to 
Paramilitaries 
The view of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on this issue again chimes 
with our own. In the same letter to the Defence Select Committee, Ms Bradley notes: 
Within Northern Ireland, there is a specific concern that a statute of 
limitations for members of the armed forces would inevitably be 
extended to terrorists. In other words, it would become in effect a 
general amnesty for Troubles-related incidents.69 
The domestic legal reasons why a state actor only amnesty would ‘inevitably’ extend 
to paramilitary suspects are as follows. 
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Abuse of Process 
The basic legal position in the UK is that it is for the prosecutorial authorities to 
determine when a prosecution should be commenced and if commenced whether it 
should continue. However, the courts have an overriding duty to promote justice and 
prevent injustice. From this duty arises an inherent power to stop a prosecution if the 
court is of the opinion that to allow the prosecution to continue would amount to an 
abuse of the process of the court. Abuse of process has been defined as something 
‘so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor 
to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case’.70 Abuse 
of process arguments would undoubtedly be raised by the defence in any attempt to 
prosecute a paramilitary suspect. It would of course be for the courts to decide 
whether a decision to prosecute someone for a particular offence based upon their 
employment status (i.e. whether or they were employed by the state) represented an 
abuse of process that was unfair and wrong. 
Collusion 
A further complication would arise in cases involving collusion between the State and 
Loyalists or Republicans. For example, we know that a small number of UDR and 
RUC personnel were members of loyalist paramilitary organisations or acted in 
tandem with such groups. Would an amnesty apply to such activities? Another 
illustration of the messiness of such a process is illustrated by the Stakeknife case. 
Chief Constable Jon Boutcher is currently heading up the investigation into the 
activities of the alleged former agent and senior member of the IRA internal security 
unit.71 Mr Boutcher’s investigation explicitly includes members of the IRA, British 
Army, Security Services, and other Government agencies. One assumes that 
logically the statute of limitations applied to members of the British Army implicated 
in this case would also hamper efforts to prosecute former RUC and MI5 officers. If 
such an amnesty is introduced, any evidence amassed by Mr Boutcher could not be 
used in prosecutions against members of the armed forces and possible 
representatives of other agencies. Would it also extend to IRA members who were 
also British agents? Moreover, if Mr Boutcher produces evidence against former IRA 
members, their lawyers are likely to argue that the statute of limitations (which would 
inevitably obscure the involvement of agent handlers) would represent an abuse of 
process against their clients. In short, a statute of limitations for the security forces 
would mean that any collusive element to cases such as Kingsmill, Claudy, or 
Loughinisland would make prosecutions of the paramilitaries involved extremely 
difficult if not impossible. 
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The Flimsiness of the Statute of Limitations as the ‘Redressing the Balance’ 
Arguments 
Proponents of the statute of limitations have suggested that one of the reasons why 
they view an armed forces amnesty as necessary is to redress a perceived 
imbalance between the treatment of state actors and paramilitary prisoners or 
suspects after the Good Friday Agreement. However, the flimsiness of those 
arguments would inevitably be exposed in a court hearing to decide on whether a 
discriminatory prosecution policy was justifiable. This section reviews some of the 
problems with these arguments. 
Unfairness of current investigations and prosecutions against the state 
In May 2018, Prime Minister Teresa May told the House of Commons that the 
situation in Northern Ireland was ‘patently unfair’ in ‘we have a … situation at the 
moment … that the only people being investigated for these issues that happened in 
the past are those in our armed forces or those who served in law enforcement in 
Northern Ireland’.72 In fact, the PNSI Legacy Investigations Branch confirmed in 2017 
that they were investigating 1,118 killings, 530 of which are attributed to 
Republicans, 271 of which are attributed to Loyalists, 354 to the security forces and 
33 unknown.73 
With regard to prosecutions, a similar charge has been laid at the office of the Public 
Prosecution Service in general and the former DPP Barra McGrory QC in particular. 
However, as Mr McGrory made clear in a response to these charges, between 2011-
2017 seven republicans have been prosecuted, three loyalists, three soldiers and 
one police officer.74 
That soldiers or police officers would not qualify for early release under the terms of 
the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 which facilitated the early release of 
paramilitary prisoners 
Another argument raised was that the early release provisions of the Good Friday 
Agreement did not apply to soldiers or police officers. That legislation, the Northern 
Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, means that no one convicted of a pre-1998 scheduled 
offence can serve more than two years. In fact, it is clear that there is no legal 
impediment to the soldiers or police officers benefitting from these early release 
provisions if convicted. It is true that anyone convicted of an offence committed 
before 1973 - when ‘scheduling’ was introduced - is still liable to serve his or her full 
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sentence under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act. However, Schedule 18 of the 
current draft Bill sets out amendments to rectify that anomaly. 
That the on-the-run scheme was an amnesty for IRA suspects 
The final important argument to justify the statute of limitations proposals was that 
republican suspects had benefited from the on-the-run (OTR) letters that amounted 
to a de facto amnesty. However, as Mr Justice Sweeney made clear in the failed 
Hyde Park bombing case against John Downey,75 and was confirmed categorically 
by Lady Hallett in her review of the OTR scheme, these letters did not amount to an 
amnesty.76 The effect of OTR letters was to tell their recipients that there were no 
current charges or evidence against them. However, unlike an amnesty, they did not 
rule out a future prosecution if evidence emerged. 
The Potential Effect of a Statute of Limitations on the Historical Investigations Unit 
All of the cases within the HIU’s remit would be over ten years old, and all would 
have been subject to a police, or in the case of solider shootings in the early 1970s, 
Royal Military Police investigation. If a statute of limitations were to become law, it 
would not preclude all HIU investigations per se as the HIU would still have the 
power to investigate conflict related killings. However, soldiers would be investigated 
knowing that they could not be prosecuted. Furthermore, if as discussed above, a 
statute of limitations was extended in practice to cover the actions of paramilitaries, it 
could also mean that they too would face investigations knowing that they could not 
be prosecuted. In effect, the purpose of the HIU would become exclusively focused 
on information recovery for families. 
Conclusion 
As noted above, a statute of limitations for security force personnel would probably 
be in breach of binding international human rights legal obligations including under 
the European Convention of Human Rights. It would also be a source of significant 
international embarrassment to the UK government to be likened to previous military 
dictatorships in Argentina and Chile or the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe and 
undermine the UK’s credibility in the international struggle against impunity and the 
promotion of the rule of law. Finally, the shallowness of the arguments justifying a 
statute of limitations for State actors would all be exposed in court in any effort to 
prosecute a paramilitary suspect. The legal effect of such an amnesty would be to 
render any such prosecutions extremely difficult if not impossible. 
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II. The Historical Investigations Unit 
The Stormont House Agreement 2014 provided for the creation of a Historical 
Investigations Unit (HIU) specifying that: ‘Legislation will establish a new 
independent body to take forward investigations into outstanding Troubles-related 
deaths’.77 The SHA set out a heads of agreement on the HIU in just ten paragraphs 
(30-40). The draft Bill contains the necessary detail and provision on the HIU in 
Clauses 2-39 and Schedules 1-16. 
In 2015, a previous version of the draft Bill (‘the 2015 Bill’) was leaked in the media. 
The inclusion of a Ministerial ‘national security veto’ over the content of HIU reports 
in the 2015 Bill was central to the derailing of the then process. A further version of 
the bill was reportedly produced in Summer 2017 (‘the 2017 Bill’). 
This section examines and critiques the HIU provisions in the 2018 draft Bill as to its 
compliance with human rights standards and the SHA. It examines some of the main 
changes since the 2015 bill, before providing a detailed examination of specific areas 
of the 2018 draft Bill. 
How would the SHA General Principles Guide the Work of the HIU? 
Clause 7(1) of the 2018 draft Bill stipulates that the HIU would have an obligation to 
exercise its functions in a manner that is consistent with the General Principles set 
out in the SHA and Clause 1, along with a number of other matters (fair and 
impartial; proportionate; effective and efficient) and in a manner calculated to secure 
independence and public confidence. 
As indicated in the Executive Summary, we are concerned that the obligation in the 
General Principles to comply with human rights would be interpreted as being limited 
to the Human Rights Act 1998. We therefore recommend that the draft Bill be 
amended to refer to the ECHR and other international human rights instruments in 
the UN and Council of Europe systems. This would include UN human rights 
standards relating to eliminating discrimination against women (CEDAW) and other 
standards relating to peace building. 
Clause 7(2) would place a number of restrictions on the HIU stating that it must not 
do ‘anything’ that might (in summary): 
1. Prejudice the national security interests of the UK; 
2. Put at risk the life or safety of any person; or 
3. Prejudice current or potential criminal / disciplinary proceedings. 
As discussed above, the national security provision in Clause 7(2) could prevent 
effective investigation of human rights violations. As such, its inclusion is both highly 
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problematic but also likely to lead to significant legal challenges to aspects of the 
HIU’s work. 
Which Cases would be in the HIU’s Remit? 
The SHA provided that the HIU would take forward ‘outstanding cases’ from the 
PSNI Historical Enquiries Team (HET) -including HET cases already identified as 
requiring re-examination- and cases from the Police Ombudsman legacy caseload. 
The SHA also provides that other cases could be considered where there is ‘new 
evidence’. 
The draft Bill sets out the parameters for cases that would fall within the ‘HIU Remit’. 
However, it is important to note that not all cases within the HIU remit would be 
investigated by the HIU. As discussed below, where a case is not investigated, the 
HIU would still conduct a review of evidence and produce a family report. This is due 
to provisions that both provide for and restrict the operational discretion of the HIU. 
This section addresses the question of which cases are in the ‘HIU Remit’. The 
question of which cases would actually be investigated is addressed in a separate 
section below. 
Clause 5 provides for which deaths would be within the HIU remit. Under Clause 5(2) 
within 90 days of establishment, the HIU is to publish a document that sets out the 
names of persons within its remit. The HIU must also periodically revise and publish 
this list. Three main categories of cases within the HIU remit are conflict-related 
deaths that are: 
a) Outstanding HET cases; 
b) Outstanding Police Ombudsman cases; or 
c) Occurred between 1998 - March 2004, and for which there is new evidence. 
This table summarises categories and further information on each is provided in the 
sections below. 
Death part of HIU Remit 
Category A) part of PSNI 
Historical Enquiries Team 
(HET) caseload (on the 23 
December 2014, as certified 
by the Chief Constable)78 
AND ‘requires further investigation’ by the HIU meaning 
one of four conditions is met:79 
Condition A: PSNI/Ombudsman certify they had not 
commenced their investigatory process; 
Condition B: PSNI/Ombudsman certify they commenced 
but did not complete their investigatory process; 
Condition C: PSNI/Ombudsman certify the investigatory 
process has been completed but there is either: 
Category B) Death part of 
Police Ombudsman and 
Historical Investigations 
Directorate (HID) (if before a 
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date specified by the 
Secretary of State, the 
Ombudsman certifies the 
death was in the HID remit 
further to a complaint, referral 
or own motion investigation)81 
 new evidence, or 
 ‘conduct in respect of a death’ (lethal force or 
collusion) -requiring further investigation (HET cases 
only); 
Condition D: The DPP refers a death (not already in HIU 
Remit) to the HIU on grounds of new evidence.80 
Category C) Death was 
wholly caused by physical 
injuries/illness that resulted 
from an act of violence or 
force that occurred in 
Northern Ireland from 11 April 
1998 to 31 March 2004.82 
AND has a ‘required connection 
with Northern Ireland’ which is 
either that the violence/force 
was carried out: 
 for a reason related to 
the constitutional status 
of NI or to political or 
sectarian hostility 
between persons there; 
 in connection with 
preventing, investigation 
or otherwise dealing with 
(a).83 
AND – new evidence - 
HIU can only investigate 
if HIU Director has 
reasonable grounds for 
believing criminal 
offence/grave police 
misconduct for which a 
person could be 
identified or 
prosecuted/disciplined.84 
Category A (the HET cases) 
The Chief Constable would be required to provide the HIU with a list of certified HET 
cases, setting out: 
 The names of persons on the HET case list; 
 Whether the PSNI investigatory process had been completed by 23 December 
2014 (but not whether it had begun); and 
 Whether condition C (new evidence or conduct in respect of a death applies).85 
Condition A (HET investigation not commenced) 
Inclusion in this category should be relatively straightforward as it refers to cases that 
the HET did not commence before it was closed, albeit this information is not 
included in the categories above. When it was functioning, the HET completed 
reviews of 1,625 cases, which related to 2,051 deaths.86 
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Condition B (HET cases, commenced but not completed) 
Inclusion in this category would be more complex as it would include cases the HET 
opened but did not finish or for which the HET did not issue a report. 
It would also include cases in which the HET finished its review and a family report 
was issued but the report was unsatisfactory, and hence the investigation is not 
considered ‘completed’. This would cover cases where the PSNI had agreed, on the 
basis of written representations by families on the outcome of the HET process, to 
reconsider or reopen the process, and had written to the family to that end (and 
neither a revised report, nor confirmation an existing report was to stand was given 
to the family). This means the decision to re-open was at the PSNI’s discretion. This 
would limit families who were dissatisfied but who did not correspond with the PSNI 
on the matter (including those who felt they could not due to the standing down of 
the HET), although there appears to be no cut off point for this correspondence in 
the draft Bill. 
Condition C(a) ‘new evidence’ 
Completed HET cases could also be within the HIU remit where the HIU considers it 
has ‘new evidence’ (the threshold for which is discussed below). 
Condition C(b) ‘conduct in respect of a death’ 
‘Condition C’ cases relating to ‘conduct in respect of a death’ appear to relate to 
‘state involvement’ cases (although the draft Bill does not explicitly use that term), in 
the context of the HMIC’s report to the HET which held that a range of state 
involvement cases had not been investigated lawfully. This category relates only to 
HET and not Ombudsman legacy cases.87 
In determining whether a case in this category should be included in the HIU remit, 
the draft Bill stipulates that the Chief Constable should have particular regard to the 
HMIC report into the HET. There are two subcategories: 
 Ground C is where there was direct use of force by a person 
 Ground D is where collusion is suspected (although this term is not used) 
Ground C is relatively straightforward as it relates to those cases – within the HET’s 
remit - where soldiers or police officers directly killed a person. 
In relation to Ground D, the Chief Constable is to have ‘reasonable grounds’ for 
suspecting that a person was involved in what is often termed ‘collusion’ – this is 
defined as a person having: 
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a) Facilitated (assisted or caused, or intended to assist or cause) an offence or 
avoidance of justice relating to the death; 
b) Did so with the intention of achieving an unlawful or improper purpose; and 
c) There are either reasonable grounds for suspecting a criminal offence was 
committed or the gravity or exceptional nature of the (mis)conduct merits 
investigation. 
Whilst this definition in law of ‘collusion’ is less restrictive than one requiring 
evidence of a ‘conspiracy’, it requires the conduct to have been intended to achieve 
an unlawful and improper purpose’. This prompts the question as to when facilitating 
a criminal offence or the avoidance of justice relating to murder is considered lawful 
and proper. It also conditions the conduct to a requirement of intentionality – turning 
a blind eye that leading to a suspect evading justice, or ‘unintentionally’ acting 
unlawfully appears insufficient to meet this threshold. 
This engages the matter of the ‘lawfulness’ of informant handling policy during the 
conflict. The current statutory basis for authorising the use of informants is found in 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). This provides that where 
informant to engage in conduct consistent with the RIPA authorisation their conduct 
is then deemed ‘lawful for all purposes’.88 This essentially provides that informant 
conduct authorised by a handler, regardless of what it is, is ‘lawful’ and hence would 
not meet the threshold for re-investigation proposed for these HIU cases. RIPA 
however post-dates all the HET cases, which are pre-1998. RIPA was the first 
statute to set informant handling on a statutory basis. It may however be argued by 
the police and security forces that RIPA essentially set on a formal footing an 
existing process, and hence informant actions, ‘authorised’ by handlers prior to this 
date, should be considered ‘lawful’ and hence out of bounds to HIU investigations. It 
is publicly known that the RUC at least for some time pre-1998 did have an 
‘authorisation’ procedure whereby an Assistant Chief Constable would sign off on 
informant participation in a crime.89 However, even official reports like the De Silva 
review take a different view arguing that in the absence of statutory framework for 
informant handling, handlers were asked to operate unlawfully.90 In this instance, 
however, the decision as to whether the ‘intention’ was unlawful, is vested in the 
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police service who ran many of the informants in question, which is unlikely to take a 
corporate position that RUC informant handling was routinely ‘unlawful’ given as the 
PSNI would consequently be civilly liable for such acts. 
Condition D DPP Referrals to the HIU based on New Evidence 
Condition D relates to cases referred to the HIU by the DPP that are not already in 
the HIU Remit.91 The draft Bill provides that the DPP could do this where he or she is 
aware of ‘new evidence’. The DPP would be permitted to refer cases back to the HIU 
that the HIU has already investigated, where new evidence emerges.92 (Although in 
this instance, it is not clear if such a referral would be precluded by the technicality of 
the death already being in the HIU remit). 
Category B (the Police Ombudsman Cases) 
The Ombudsman would be required to issue a statement specifying the cases in the 
remit of the HID, which had been completed by the date specified by the Secretary of 
State.93 Cases would be included if one of the following conditions are met: 
 Condition A: Ombudsman cases when an investigation had not commenced 
 Condition B: Ombudsman cases when an investigation had commenced but not 
finished 
 Condition C: new evidence (as above for HET cases – but does not include the 
second category of completed cases that involved direct use of force/collusion) 
 Condition D: referral to HIU of former Ombudsman cases by DPP on basis of 
new evidence 
There are some areas of ambiguity as to cases in the HET and Office of the Police 
Ombudsman of Northern Ireland (OPONI) remit. Specifically, this includes the cases 
of 49 deaths caused directly by RUC shootings. These cases had originally been 
part of the HET caseload, but given the independence requirements (as the HET 
was part of the PSNI); the cases were transferred to the Police Ombudsman. 
However, the Ombudsman was largely precluded from re-examining the cases due 
to domestic law restrictions on re-examination of complaints already previously 
investigated by the police. Whether such cases were still on the HET list on the 23 
December 2014, or on the Ombudsman’s legacy list on the specified date, 
regardless of the interpretation they could not be investigated, would determine as 
the draft Bill stands whether they are included in the HIU Remit. 
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Category C (1998-2004 cases) 
Category C cases (1998-2004) are explicitly restricted to deaths that occurred in 
Northern Ireland. Other cases may examine deaths that occurred in the Republic, 
but which resulted from criminal offences/misconduct in NI. 
In relation to new evidence in Category C, the HIU is to establish a process where 
families can bring new evidence to the attention of the HIU. 
The ‘required connection’ criterion in these cases is aimed at distinguishing deaths 
that are conflict-related from those that are not. The definition (set out in the table 
above) is much more complex than the existing definition in the Victims and 
Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006. The distinct language of ‘violence’ and 
‘force’ appear aimed at differentiating the actions of state and non-state actors. It is 
not clear if this would have any practical impact in limiting this category. 
The extension from 1998 to 2004 was not in the 2015 Bill. 2004 is the date when 
reforms were taken forward in the PSNI further to Ombudsman’s Omagh Bomb 
report, in relation to the manner in which murder investigations were conducted. The 
PSNI considers that it can stand over any murder investigations conducted after this 
date. 
What would be the Threshold for ‘New Evidence’ sufficient to enable the Reopening 
of Cases? 
The ‘new evidence’ criteria is based around the threshold established in Brecknell v 
UK – namely evidence that is capable of leading to the identification of a person and 
prosecution or disciplinary measures for grave and exceptional misconduct. 
The HIU would be empowered to re-investigate HET, PSNI, or one of its own cases 
where there is new evidence. When taking decisions as to new evidence, the HIU 
Director would be required to take into account the credibility of the evidence but 
could disregard factors such as the death or absence from the jurisdiction of a 
suspect (which would affect the likelihood of prosecution/disciplinary sanctions). The 
evidence would be new if it was previously unknown to the HIU, or unknown to the 
previous PSNI/RUC/Ombudsman investigators, or the relevance of the evidence to 
the death was not known.94 
Schedule 6 contains further provisions for ‘new evidence’ cases. It vests a power in 
the Director of Public Prosecutions to refer a case (that would fall within its remit) to 
the HIU for investigation – or re-investigation – similar to the existing powers to refer 
cases vested in the PSNI. Curiously, the DPP would be required to exercise this 
power consistently with the SHA general principles. This may be straightforward 
around principles concerning the ‘rule of law’ or human rights compliance, given that 
there is a clear evidential threshold for the exercise of what is a quasi-judicial 
                                       
94
 Ibid, sch 3, cl 6. 
MODEL BILL TEAM RESPONSE TO NIO LEGACY CONSULTATION 
27 
function. However, it is not clear how principles around ‘balance’ and ‘proportionality’ 
could be engineered (for example, the DPP could not set a ‘quota’ whereby he or 
she ceases to refer e.g. state involvement cases, until an equitable or proportionate 
balance is achieved with non-state cases). 
What Challenges could arise in Gaining Access to ‘New Evidence’? 
Whilst the proposals seek to explicitly deal with those HET cases that were 
considered as having been conducted unlawfully by the HMIC report, there is no 
specific process to assess the impact of significant evidence having been withheld or 
not available to the HET, which may have adversely influenced HET reviews which 
have been completed. 
In 2013, it was revealed that the Ministry of Defence was unlawfully holding 
thousands of files that should have been processed for the National Archive in what 
had been a secret warehouse in southern Derbyshire. Among the 66,000 files were 
significant materials relating to the Northern Ireland conflict. These included 
‘hundreds and hundreds of boxes’ each containing around 10 files relating to the 
1970s and early 1980s, that had been transferred from the British Army’s Northern 
Ireland Headquarters when it closed in 2009. The existence of the archive had not 
been declared to the HET.95 
In 2017, it was revealed the PSNI had not disclosed material to the Coroner from a 
Ministry of Defence intelligence database they had held since 2007. The PSNI 
Disclosure Unit stated it had not known the database was held by the PSNI. It is not 
clear from this whether any of the materials withheld from the Coroner were also 
withheld from the HET and Ombudsman.96 
The question of how families could get former closed HET cases within the HIU 
Remit based on potential ‘new evidence’ in these Ministry of Defence archives or 
other withheld archives highlights gaps in the draft Bill. Families themselves clearly 
would have no access to the MoD archives and would not be aware whether there is 
relevant material. The HIU would be precluded from investigating deaths, and hence 
likely from using its powers of disclosure, for deaths not in the HIU remit. Families 
would therefore be dependent on the HIU happening to come across information 
relating to their loved one whilst investigating related matters. 
The DPP’s powers of referral based on new evidence would only come into play 
where such evidence is in the possession of the DPP, who would likely be reliant on 
another agency having secured such disclosure. Given that the draft Bill would 
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preclude legacy inquests in the HIU’s remit (and the Attorney General’s powers to 
reopen such inquests), it would be increasingly unlikely that the DPP would gain 
access to new evidence. 
HET investigations may have been conducted with significant evidence withheld 
from them, yet it may not be possible for such cases to be within the HIU remit on 
this basis. 
Which Legacy Cases would continue to be Investigated by the PSNI or Police 
Ombudsman? 
Provision is made in Schedule 4 for deaths in the HIU remit that the PSNI or 
Ombudsman would continue to investigate. Provision is also made in Schedule 5 for 
cases which are ‘substantially complete’ to remain with the PSNI or Ombudsman. 
Under these provisions, the PSNI would continue to investigate cases where a report 
may not have been finalised but the PSNI considers there are no further investigative 
steps that could be taken. In addition, the Ombudsman would continue to investigate 
cases where the Ombudsman considers cases to have been substantively 
completed but has decided not to publish a statement on them (or is yet to take a 
decision). 
In relation to the Schedule 4 ‘Transitional Provisions’ cases, the process would be: 
Live Police Cases (PSNI or police force in Great Britain)97 
 If immediately before the specified HIU start date, the Police had a live 
investigation into a case that would be in the HIU remit (by being an HET or 
1998-2004 case) and where the investigation was at an advanced stage but was 
not complete - the HIU and respective Chief Constable could agree it would be 
more appropriate for the police to continue their investigation; 
 The HIU would need to consult family members and have regard to their views 
before making such an agreement. If the agreement was made the family would 
receive the same type of family report as proposed for the HIU in relation to the 
investigation; 
 Where such an agreement would be made, the death would be placed outside 
the HIU remit until the end of a ‘transitional period’ agreed by the HIU and Police 
as necessary for the police to take further investigative steps. The HIU could not 
investigate after this period unless there were reasonable grounds for believing 
criminal offence/grave police misconduct for which a person could be identified or 
prosecuted/disciplined). 
Live Police Ombudsman cases98 
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 In terms of deaths (in the HID or 1998-2004 category) for which OPONI has a live 
investigation before the specified HIU start date, the HIU would be able to agree 
with the OPONI in an initial three-month period in which the case would stay with 
OPONI as it is at an advanced stage but not completed; 
 Family members would be consulted; 
 There would be restrictions on a subsequent HIU case similar to those above for 
police cases. 
‘Substantively Complete’ and 1998-2004 cases 
 Refers to HET or Ombudsman cases that are ‘substantively complete’ (i.e. there 
are no further investigative steps) – or all other cases in ‘category C’ (i.e. 1998-
2004); 
 HIU would not be permitted to investigate unless the HIU Director had reasonable 
grounds for to believe that there was criminal offence/grave police misconduct for 
which a person could be identified or prosecuted/disciplined; 
 When cannot investigate for these reasons, the HIU must determine if additional 
information is available (from PSNI or OPONI), and use this information and any 
other information (from PSNI/OPONI) to produce a family report. 
There is clearly a significant degree of practical sense to permitting the police or 
Ombudsman to retain cases that are already subject to a live investigation at an 
advanced stage and more so when the investigative steps have actually been 
completed. However, a question arises in relation to the PSNI as regards sufficient 
independence to investigate some such cases where there may be state 
involvement, given the requirement to comply with Article 2 ECHR. 
In What Order would the HIU Investigate Cases Within its Remit? 
Clause 8 stipulates that the HIU would prioritise its caseload in chronological order 
with older cases first.99 However, this could exceptionally be varied when it would be 
more effective to do so. This would allow the HIU some flexibility in investigating 
cases that are linked together (e.g. by weapons or suspects) which will be more 
effective. Arguably, it would also permit a variation when dealing with family 
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Which Cases in its Remit would the HIU Investigate? 
Clause 9 would provide that the HIU Director would have operational control over 
decisions on whether a death within the HIU’s remit should be investigated and the 
manner in which investigations would be conducted. The clause also places 
significant constraints on such operational control. These include the SHA stipulation 
that the HIU would aim to complete its caseload within five years. In addition, the 
HIU would be precluded from investigating deaths in its remit unless one of three 
conditions is met: 
a) There is new evidence (capable of leading to identification, prosecution or 
police misconduct proceedings; 
b) The HIU has reasonable grounds for believing a criminal offence has been 
committed and there are further investigative steps that could be taken 
(capable of leading to identification or prosecution); or 
c) HIU has reasonable grounds for believing investigative steps could be taken 
leading to grave or exceptional police misconduct proceedings. 
The HIU may first – in relation to categories B and C seek information to ascertain if 
the thresholds are met. 
In deciding whether it can investigate, the HIU would also be required to take into 
account previous investigations and refrain from unnecessarily duplicating them. 
This is not limited to Article 2 compliant investigations. Investigations that were not 
Article 2 compliant and hence unlawful could still preclude the HIU from 
investigating. 
If the HIU were to be precluded from investigating a death within its remit by the 
above criteria, it would still be required to review existing (and any further) 
information and to produce a family report from the available material, including any 
additional material it would seek. The SHA explicitly states that ‘a report will be 
produced in each case’ in relation to its full caseload.100 This essentially replicates 
the two stage ‘review’ and ‘further investigate’ model of the HET. 
What Powers and Resources would the HIU have? 
Disclosure to the HIU from UK Public Authorities 
The SHA states that the UK would make ‘full disclosure’ of records to the HIU, and 
the HET and Ombudsman casefiles would be passed to the HIU.101 Clause 25 of the 
draft Bill would require ‘relevant’ public authorities to make information available to 
the HIU on request and sets out a number of practical provisions to this end. These 
include setting aside any obligation of confidence or ‘any other restriction’ on 
disclosure, which hopefully would preclude the invocation of the Official Secrets Act 
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to deny disclosure. One weakness in the provision is that there is no sanction for 
non-compliance. It would be for the HIU to go through the complex and costly 
process of judicial review to ensure compliance. 
Clause 39 (interpretation) defines relevant public authorities as the PSNI, 
Ombudsman, UK Minsters, MI5, MI6, CGHQ, any UK Department, NI departments 
and the armed forces. It does not appear to include the Public Records Office. 
There is no ‘national security’ veto over supplying information to the HIU. However, 
relevant authorities would be under a duty to classify whether the information 
provided is ‘sensitive’ (namely, whether it is ‘national security’/covert policing 
related). Disclosure from the HIU would be restricted by the national security veto, 
but this would not prevent the information being given to the HIU in the first place. 
Whilst there is a popular critique that such provisions would be ‘unfair’ as only the 
state agencies and not paramilitaries keep records, this assertion appears to 
overlook that most state records, in particular, past investigation files and intelligence 
files, concern the activities of paramilitaries. Records regarding the actions of the 
state and particularly wrongdoing are often those more likely to have gone ‘missing’. 
In any case, the relevant powers for obtaining information from paramilitary suspects 
and witnesses are the HIU’s police type powers (arrest, search etc.). 
Disclosure to the HIU from Irish Public Authorities 
The SHA provides that ‘Necessary arrangements will be made to ensure full co-
operation of Irish authorities, including disclosure and justice cooperation’. Ireland 
committed to bringing forward any additional legislation required to ensure this.102 
The 2018 draft Bill, as UK legislation, could not bind Irish public authorities, and 
accordingly does not have ‘disclosure powers’ over Irish authorities. There is a duty 
on the HIU to implement any arrangements that would be reached by the UK and 
Ireland on cooperation between the HIU and the Garda Síochána.103 The 2018 draft 
Bill, at the request of the Irish government also contains, at Clause 18(5), a provision 
that would require the HIU Director to include in reports information on the level of 
cooperation from Irish authorities. 
The Irish government in its 2018 paper on cooperation with the SHA institutions set 
out cooperation that is already possible through Ireland’s Criminal Justice (Mutual 
Assistance) Act 2008, as underpinned by an EU Framework and Council of Europe 
treaties. Brexit could of course affect such arrangements. The paper sets out that 
this allows, among other matters, the transmission of evidence and files. The paper 
reiterates that the Irish Government ‘is committed to full cooperation with the HIU 
and its work, including full disclosure’ (emphasis added). The commitment to full 
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disclosure is then qualified to disclosure ‘consistent with its constitutional obligations 
and in accordance with law’. The paper elaborates: 
Some redactions may on rare occasions be required before material 
can be shared. If this occurs the rationale for the proposed redactions 
will be explained fully to the Director of the HIU.104 
An arrangement would be put into place to allow the HIU director a right to judicially 
review the Garda Commissioner in relation to such decisions. The Irish government 
has not sought nor would have a power to redact HIU family reports as is planned for 
UK ministers.105 However, clearly redactions can take place before material is 
provided. Whilst assurances are given that this would be on rare occasions and 
subject to judicial review, this could be significantly strengthened by the defining of 
tight criteria, similar to how the Model Bill team sought to tighten the UK’s concept of 
‘national security’ in the context of the SHA institutions. 
HIU’s Powers to Investigate Crimes and Misconduct 
The SHA provides that the HIU could conduct (1) criminal investigations for which it 
would have policing powers, and (2) non-criminal police misconduct investigations 
for which it would have the same powers as the Police Ombudsman. The SHA 
stated that appropriate governance arrangements would be created to ensure the 
operational independence of these two elements of its work.106 
Under Clause 6(3-6) and Clause 11, the HIU would be required to issue a statement, 
having consulted the Policing Board, of how it would exercise its investigatory 
function. This must in particular deal with ECHR Article 2 compliance and other 
obligations. The HIU Director would be required to keep the statement under review 
and revise it if appropriate. The Policing Board should be consulted on revisions to 
the statement. 
Clause 8 provides that the HIU would conduct investigations into criminal offences 
and any ‘grave or exceptional’ police misconduct107 in relation to a death in the HIU 
remit. The HIU could not investigate misconduct by any other agency such as the 
armed forces or security service. Currently, the Police Ombudsman has powers to 
investigate grave or exceptional police misconduct (a threshold that has been 
reached in relation to offences relating to a death), but there is no equivalent 
independent body to investigate other agencies. If the HIU did not have powers to 
investigate RUC misconduct, it would have less investigative power and scope than 
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the Police Ombudsman and hence would regress accountability. However, there is 
no justification for differentiation between agencies, whereby military and security 
service misconduct would be outside the scope of the HIU, and no seeming 
legitimate reason why the HIU should not be empowered to examine misconduct by 
all agencies. 
In carrying out investigations, Clause 9 of the draft Bill provides that the HIU Director 
would have the power to decide whether an investigation is necessary and how the 
investigation would be conducted. Where necessary, the HIU Director would be able 
to decide that a death requires both a criminal investigation and a non-criminal 
misconduct investigation. Clause 12 sets out the process that the HIU would be 
required to follow to ensure that these investigations are carried out separately. This 
process would require the criminal investigation to be conducted separately and 
before the misconduct investigation. If there was an ongoing misconduct 
investigation, the HIU would be required to suspend it until the criminal investigation 
was concluded, and at which point the misconduct investigation could be resumed. 
The misconduct investigation could be resumed even if the DPP was considering 
bring charges resulting from the criminal offences. This process appears to be 
designed to ensure police powers would not be used in the case of police 
misconduct investigations and to replicate the current situation where there are no 
powers to compel retired RUC officers to cooperate with Ombudsman investigations 
(unless and until questions of criminal conduct come to light). 
With respect to criminal investigations, under Clause 24 and Schedule 7 of the draft 
Bill, the HIU Director could designate HIU officers as having police powers (‘powers 
of a constable’) provided they would only be used for criminal and not police 
misconduct investigations. The types of police powers that would be most relevant 
will be those relating to arrest, searches etc. It would also be made an offence to 
obstruct, impede, or impersonate etc., an HIU officer. 
For non-criminal police misconduct investigations, Clause 14 would require the HIU 
to establish, in consultation with the PSNI and Ombudsman, procedures for 
investigations that are consistent with PSNI and Police Ombudsman procedures. 
These procedures would be provided to any former RUC officer (or in the case of 
post-2000 cases, current or former PSNI officer) who is under investigation and 
requests to receive them. Under Clause 15, for officers who are still in the PSNI, 
processes would be established for the HIU to recommend, or direct, disciplinary 
proceedings. This clearly could not apply to retired officers. 
Would the HIU have the Power to make Findings? 
At the time of writing a challenge taken by retired RUC officers against the Police 
Ombudsman’s Loughinisland report is still before the courts. An earlier ruling by Mr 
Justice Maguire in December 2017 is to be reconsidered further to the judge 
stepping aside after it was revealed he had acted on behalf of the retired officers in a 
similar challenge to an Ombudsman’s report. Whilst a new Judge may take a 
different view, a central plank of the original ruling centres on the contention the 
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Police Ombudsman should not be making findings on matters such as collusion in 
the absence of an express statutory power to do so. Should this ruling stand it would 
have major implications for the HIU, which as the 2018 draft Bill stands, would not be 
able to make findings in its reports. A further secondary consideration would be that 
such a ruling could lead to actions rendering null and void all HET (and a range of 
other public authorities’) reports on grounds of findings for which there was no 
express statutory power – significantly increasing the number of ‘outstanding’ HET 
cases that may have to be dealt with by the HIU. Consideration should therefore be 
given to this and whether the legislation should expressly reflect powers of findings. 
What Information would be provided in the HIU’s Interim and Family Reports? 
The draft Bill provides that for each death investigated by the HIU, it would be 
required to produce a family report.108 The draft Bill further stipulates that the family 
report must be ‘as comprehensive as possible’ as well as accessible to families.109 
With respect to the contents of family reports, the draft Bill provides that: 
 The HIU would confirm and place a statement in the family report that the HIU 
investigation was compliant with Article 2 and other human rights obligations;110 
 Any member of a deceased family could request a copy of the family report and 
the HIU would be required to provide it to defined close family members. It has 
discretion on whether to provide it to other family members;111 (subject to the 
National Security and other caveats and qualifications), although if the ‘national 
security’ veto were apply, the HIU could produce an interim report. Reports to 
family members who are not close relatives could also have information removed 
that would cause distress to close family members. 
 Family (or interim) reports could relate to a single death or to multiple deaths;112 
 If a Secretary of State redacted family or interim reports on ‘national security’ 
grounds, the HIU would be required to include a statement in the report that this 
has happened and to state any reasons given for it.113 
 The HIU would also be required to include a statement in family reports on the 
level of cooperation given by Irish authorities, or, in cases where the Irish 
government has provided information to the HIU, if any information that they 
provided was redacted.114 
 Whilst family/interim reports can also be provided to persons injured in the same 
incident in which others lost their lives, reasonable steps are to be taken to 
consult with family members of the deceased, and material that may cause them 
distress can be removed. 
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 The draft Bill would enable the HIU to publish a family or interim report, subject to 
the ‘national security’ vetoes, and following consultation with family members, 
provided that material that could cause distress to family members is removed. 
‘Maxwellisation’115 
When the HIU is including material in an interim or family report that in its view 
contains significant criticism of an individual ‘who was involved in preventing or 
investigating’ an event related to a death, the draft Bill would require the HIU to notify 
that person and have regard to any representations he or she makes within a 30-day 
period (or longer if the HIU decides that is necessary).116 The draft Bill and 
Explanatory notes should clarify whether ‘preventing and investigating’ an event 
relating to a death includes prosecutorial decisions. 
This provision would codify a process whereby the ‘right to reply’ of, for example, 
former RUC officers, to criticism is afforded a process, but equally the process would 
be time bound to prevent the types of delays suffered by the Chilcott Inquiry into 
Iraq. The draft Bill does not address what would happen if the individual was 
deceased or could not be located (the language of ‘reasonable steps’ as regards 
reports to the injured is not replicated here). The existence of this process does not 
mean individuals would necessarily be named in reports. 
Contextualisation 
There is also a duty on the face of the draft Bill for the Family Reports to ‘take into 
account the context’ in which a previous PSNI/RUC or Ombudsman investigation 
took place, including the ‘procedures followed in police investigations at the time of 
the investigation’.117 This appears to reflect calls by former RUC officers that past 
investigations are not judged by today’s standards. Some former officers have also 
argued that reports should reflect the difficult circumstances in which policing 
operated in the past, with the HET, for example, providing a background narrative in 
its reports. Some families, however, were critical of this approach arguing that this 
embedded a partisan ‘security force narrative’ into the report. In the draft Bill 
proposals, it would be open to the HIU to interpret how it would contextualise past 
investigations. 
 
                                       
115
 ‘Maxwellisation is the process whereby those subject to criticism in a public report are given an 
opportunity to respond to such criticism prior to publication of the report.’ For definition, see House of 
Commons Treasury Committee, Maxwellisation Inquiry 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/treasury-
committee/inquiries1/parliament-2017/maxwellisation-17-19/ accessed 23 August 2018. 
116
 Draft Bill, cls 18(6-8). 
117
 Ibid, cl 17(2). 
MODEL BILL TEAM RESPONSE TO NIO LEGACY CONSULTATION 
36 
Could HIU Criminal Investigations lead to Prosecutions? 
The draft Bill provides that when the HIU finishes a criminal investigation, the HIU 
officer responsible for the investigation would produce a report for the HIU Director 
with details of any criminal and/or police misconduct investigations. Investigation 
reports could relate to single or multiple deaths, and could include reports of multiple 
investigations.118 The HIU Director would be required to provide a copy of these 
reports to the DPP for Northern Ireland. This duty would apply irrespective of 
whether the HIU investigation concluded that criminal offences had been committed. 
However, if the HIU investigation concluded that crimes had taken place, the HIU 
Director would be required to provide the DPP with a statement of the offences, 
together with the report. The HIU would also be permitted to provide the DPP with a 
statement, while a criminal investigation was ongoing. Subsequent decisions on 
prosecutions would remain with the Public Prosecutions Service (PPS). 
What Support and Assistance would the HIU Provide to Families? 
The SHA provided that the HIU would have dedicated family support staff and 
involve next of kin.119 The 2018 draft Bill would place the HIU under a duty to provide 
support and assistance to the families of persons whose death is under 
investigation.120 The HIU would produce, in consultation with the Commission for 
Victims and Survivors, a statement on how such support and assistance would be 
provided (and the HIU would be under a duty to pay regard to this statement). 
Clause 22 set out mandatory provisions including the nomination of an HIU officer to 
serve as point of contact and support close family members through the process of 
receiving a report. 
What Information would the HIU Provide to the IRG? 
Schedule 16, Clause 6 states that five years after the law enters into force, the HIU 
would be required to provide the IRG with a written report on (a) themes and 
patterns emerging from its work, and (b) the level of cooperation it has received. It 
would also be permitted to provide the IRG with interim reports on ‘any of those 
matters’. Clause 1(4) of the same Schedule would require the HIU to share its 
annual reports with the IRG. 
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How would the HIU be Structured? 
Clause 2 of the Bill would set up the HIU as an independent public body under a 
‘body corporate’ model. Under Clause 3, the HIU would be a multi-member 
commission (a similar model to the Equality and Human Rights Commissions) 
consisting of five members, including the HIU Director. Under Schedule 2, the HIU 
could also set up committees and subcommittees consisting of HIU members and 
other persons appointed by the HIU. Explicitly provided for is a power to establish a 
committee to deal with complaints about HIU officers. 
The alternative model would be for the HIU to be a ‘corporation sole’ whereby the 
powers of the office are vested in one figurehead (similar to the Police Ombudsman 
and DPP), which arguably can achieve greater independence, provided the 
appointee does his or her job effectively. A multi-member Commission can bring a 
multitude of talents, but also runs the risk of the appointment of a ‘wrecker’ who can 
grind proceedings to a halt. 
How would the HIU Chair and Commissioners be appointed? 
In this instance, under Schedule 2, Clause 2, two of the four members would be 
appointed by the HIU Director (‘executive members’, who are also HIU officers), the 
other two would be appointed by the Department of Justice ‘appointments panel’ 
(‘non-executive’ members) which would also appoint the HIU Director. 
Persons would be precluded from being HIU members if they had been sentenced to 
imprisonment or detention for three months or more, were insolvent, disqualified as a 
company director, or were a current elected representative. There would be no 
preclusion in relation to former employment, although there would be a permissive 
‘conflicts of interest’ power.121 Under this power, the Minister of Justice (or HIU 
Director in the case of executive members) could require the Director or other HIU 
members or candidates to provide them with information on any matter that could 
reasonably be expected to give rise to a conflict of interest or effect their ability to 
carry out duties fairly and impartially. This information would be provided to the 
Appointments Panel, albeit there would be no duty on them beyond this to ensure 
the candidate would not risk rendering the HIU’s work non-Article 2 compliant. 
Previous proposals in the leaked 2015 draft Bill vested the appointment of the HIU 
Director in the First and deputy First Ministers, in consultation with the Justice 
Minister. This has been changed; with the 2018 draft Bill providing, at Schedule 2, 
that the Minister of Justice would make the appointment. In doing so, the Minister 
would act on the recommendation of an appointments panel consisting of the 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland, the Commissioner for Victims and Survivors, 
the Head of Civil Service, and a person with major criminal investigations experience 
nominated by the Minister of Justice. The notable gap here is that there is no 
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involvement of any international body in the process, which would enhance 
independence, such as the UN human rights agency (OHCHR), which has been 
involved in similar appointments in other jurisdictions. 
Under Schedule 2, the Appointments Panel’s decision would have to be unanimous, 
and would be binding on the Minister, subject to some safeguards. As a ministerial 
appointment, the panel would be required to pay regard to any code of practice of 
the Commissioner for Public Appointments for Northern Ireland. 
How would the HIU be staffed? 
One of the key human rights principles is that those involved in an investigation into 
a death must not have a connection with those implicated in the death. This is a key 
principle of Article 2 compliance. 
Clause 10 of the draft Bill would oblige the HIU Director to organise the HIU into 
separate units. This includes at least one unit that does not include an HIU officer 
with a real or perceived work-related conflict of interest. This would replicate the HET 
model whereby there is a team without former RUC or military officers to deal with 
state involvement cases. In addition, the HIU Director would ensure that each HIU 
Officer involved in an investigation does not have, or could be reasonably perceived 
as having a work-related conflict of interest. The HIU Director would be required to 
have regard to the views of families in allocating a case to a particular unit. 
The HET was closed as the HMIC found that under the model outlined above, the 
state involvement cases were not dealt with in an Article 2 compliant manner. HMIC 
concluded that the HET’s work on ‘state involvement’ cases had given such 
preferential treatment to the suspects that the HET had been operating unlawfully. 
This largely related to military cases that had been dealt with by an independent 
team. Academic research found that even when these teams were in place that 
‘each phase of the HET process included the involvement of former long-serving 
local RUC officers, some of whom have from its inception held key positions in 
senior management’.122 Of particular concern was control over HET’s access to 
intelligence data. The same researcher concluded that ‘all aspects of intelligence are 
managed by former RUC and Special Branch officers’ and further noted that 
‘intelligence is more often available for incidents carried out by paramilitary groups 
than for incidents attributed to the Security Forces.’123 The concerns were echoed in 
the HMIC report, which stated 
We consider that the independence necessary to satisfy Article 2 can 
only be guaranteed if former RUC officers are not involved in 
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investigating state involvement cases, and if processes designed to 
ensure this are, in fact, effective.124 
A second area of concern was the specific issue of control of intelligence material by 
persons who may have conflicts of interests: 
the HET’s intelligence unit is staffed largely by former employees of 
either the RUC or the PSNI. Staff in the PSNI intelligence branch, 
some of whom are former RUC special branch officers, are the 
gatekeepers for intelligence being passed to the HET. The assembling 
of relevant intelligence material plays a central role in the review 
process and in any subsequent investigation. 
The HMIC report goes on to advocate that it would be preferable 
to institute some independent procedure for guaranteeing that all 
relevant intelligence in every case is made available for the purposes 
of review, to ensure compliance with the Article 2 standard.125 
As regards state involvement cases, it is difficult to ascertain which cases fall into 
this category before they have actually been investigated. This is particularly true in 
relation to cases involving informants, as it is usually (but not always) clear when a 
death is directly the result of use of force by the state. The PSNI’s Legacy 
Investigations Branch has already been held by the courts and a UK Parliamentary 
Committee not to be Article 2 compliant.126 
Whilst there have been significant political asks that the HIU permit the employment 
of former RUC Officers, such a practice would be a significant departure from 
existing practice as well as the legal requirements of Article 2, a matter which has 
already been the subject of successful judicial reviews. In relation to current practice, 
the Police Ombudsman restricts such employment in its legacy team. Operation 
Kenova, led by Chief Constable Jon Boutcher of Bedfordshire Police, has also 
stipulated that its investigations team ‘will not include personnel who are serving in or 
have previously served in the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Police Service of Northern 
Ireland, Ministry of Defence, or Security Services.’127 
Clause 3(5-7) of the draft Bill not only departs from this approach but by contrast 
would provide a statutory duty with the purpose or effect of compelling the HIU to 
employ significant numbers of former RUC officers. This is framed as a duty to 
ensure a balance of HIU officers who have previous Northern Ireland policing 
investigative experience with those who have such experience elsewhere. Almost 
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tongue-in-cheek, the draft Bill links this duty to the SHA principle that the approach to 
dealing with the past be ‘balanced, proportionate, transparent, fair and equitable’. 
HIU officers could also be seconded from the PSNI or Great Britain police forces, 
including the military police. Given the passage of time, it is not clear if there are 
sufficient numbers of former RUC officers with recent investigative experience who 
could even make up such a quota, raising additional practical questions. It would 
appear counterproductive to put forward a model that is both impractical and likely to 
be found unlawful. A more sensible approach at this juncture, given we are still likely 
to be some time away from the HIU becoming operational, would be to train further 
detectives now. 
Would the HIU be Subject to Oversight and Complaints Procedures? 
There are detailed arrangements for Oversight of the HIU in Clauses 31-33. Clause 
30 would require the HIU to produce a Code of Ethics for consideration by the 
Policing Board, similar to the PSNI. This Code of Ethics would ‘guide’ HIU officers 
and would set out the HIU’s human rights and equality obligations under Section 75 
of the Northern Ireland Act. The 2018 draft Bill would designate the HIU for the 
purposes of Section 75, but not apparently fair employment monitoring.128 Provision 
is also made in Clause 31 for complaints and disciplinary procedures within the HIU. 
Schedule 13 provides for a procedure for the Police Ombudsman to investigate 
certain complaints. 
Clause 32 sets out the terms of the Policing Board’s oversight of the HIU, along with 
arrangements for inspection by the Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland 
(CJINI) and HMIC (the latter on the invitation of the Department of Justice or the 
Secretary of State, depending if HMIC are asked to look at devolved and non-
devolved matters). Schedule 14 elaborates on these inspection arrangements, 
largely by granting powers to the Secretary of State to redact independent inspection 
reports on ‘national security’ type-grounds. The inability of the devolved department 
to call in HMIC on ‘non-devolved’ matters would risk the usurping of devolved power 
on any matter deemed to relate to ‘national security’ and hence be considered an 
‘excepted’ matter. 
The arrangements relating to the Policing Board are similarly qualified. Under Clause 
32, the Board in its oversight of the HIU would be required to have regard to the 
HIU’s duties under Clause 7. This includes the provision for the HIU to refrain from 
any act that risks the UK’s ‘national security’. Under Clause 32(4), the Board would 
however not be bound by its usual duties under s 3(4) of the Police (Northern 
Ireland) Act 2000 to have regard to ‘the principle that the policing of Northern Ireland 
is to be conducted in an impartial manner’. The Policing Board would be duty bound 
to coordinate and cooperate with other statutory bodies in overseeing the HIU, in a 
similar manner to its oversight of the PSNI under the 2000 Act. 
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Schedule 15 sets out more detailed provisions for oversight and performance 
monitoring by the Policing Board of the HIU. The Policing Board would be granted 
powers of inquiry into the HIU or any aspect of its work, in reference to grave or 
exceptional matters, however, the Secretary of State, who does not have an 
oversight role of the HIU under the SHA, would be granted powers to veto any 
inquiry on ‘national security’ grounds. 
How would the HIU be Funded? 
Clause 4 of the 2018 draft Bill provides that the NI Department of Justice (DoJ) 
would pay the expenses of the HIU, via the Policing Board. The DoJ would decide 
the amount required. Essentially the HIU would be paid from the DoJ’s budget and 
the draft Bill creates no obligation for the UK centrally to provide the DoJ with even 
the initial resource package that the NIO has committed to providing in the SHA. By 
contrast, the Model Implementation Bill envisaged payment from the Consolidated 
Fund through the UK Treasury. 
The model proposed in the draft Bill replicates the current funding models of the 
legacy inquests system and Police Ombudsman. In recent years, both of these 
institutions have had their work hampered by cuts and withholding of resources with 
the purpose or effect of preventing the taking forward of legacy work. The funding 
model in the draft Bill would allow any number of political parties to have 
opportunities to veto the provision of further resources to the HIU should they dislike 
the work it is delivering. This problem is highlighted by the current situation with the 
resourcing of the Legacy Inquests Unit (LIU) for which the High Court held in March 
2018, that the former First Minister’s decision to withhold consideration of a DoJ 
business case for the LIU had been unlawful. The court held that, in relation to the 
backlog of legacy inquests: ‘The systemic delay is caused or significantly contributed 
to by a lack of adequate resources which are needed to speed up the process of 
carrying out the legacy inquests’.129 
How Long would the HIU Operate for? 
SHA had originally provided that the HIU should aim to finish its work within five 
years.130 There is however broad consensus that this timeframe is entirely 
unrealistic. 
The 2018 draft Bill would require the Secretary of State to consult justice sector 
bodies (including the Policing Board and HIU itself), the IRG, and others before 
taking a decision as to whether to extend the timeframe of the HIU. This provision 
was not contained in the 2015 draft Bill. 
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III. The Independent Commission on Information Retrieval 
The Stormont House Agreement (2014) called for the creation of an Independent 
Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) ‘to enable family members to seek and 
privately receive information about the Troubles-related deaths of their relatives’ as 
part of the proposed set of mechanisms to deal with the legacy of the Troubles. 
Unlike the other parts of this package, the ICIR would be created by a treaty 
between the British and Irish governments. However, legislation would be required in 
both jurisdictions to give effect to the treaty. The governments agreed the draft 
Treaty on 15 October 2015, and made it public in January 2016.131 However, it has 
not yet entered into force. On 11 May 2018, the United Kingdom government 
published a consultation on the legacy proposals, including a draft Bill with 
provisions on the ICIR.132 The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has 
indicated that it will seek the Irish government’s approval of its draft Bill on the ICIR 
before summer 2018 and ‘the General Scheme of a Bill will be published before the 
end of the public consultation on the UK legislation’,133 which is due to complete on 
10 September 2018. 
This section sets out the main elements of the ICIR proposals drawing on the draft 
Treaty, draft UK Bill and the related explanatory notes, and the Consultation 
Document. It also analyses the extent to which the proposals comply with 
international human rights standards. This examination draws in particular on the 
work conducted by the Model Bill team to identify the strengths and limitations of the 
draft Bill and Treaty. 
What would be ICIR’s Functions? 
The primary objective of the ICIR is ‘to enable family members to seek and privately 
receive information about the Troubles-related deaths of their relatives’, according to 
the Stormont House Agreement.134 This language appears in the subsequent official 
documents. The draft Treaty outlines the further functions of the ICIR as 
 To receive information about deaths within its remit;135 
 To keep families informed about progress in the information retrieval process, 
when they have requested information about a death; 
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 To provide written reports to families at the conclusion of its enquiries, containing 
only information that has been established to be credible; 
 To provide a written report to the Implementation and Reconciliation Group on 
patterns and themes it has identified in its work and the level of cooperation it has 
received; and 
 To publish an annual report on its finances, administrations and volume of 
work.136 
The draft Bill refers to the list of functions in the draft Treaty.137 
The Model Bill proposed a number of additional functions for the ICIR to ensure that 
its work was conducted in a rigorous manner. These included: 
 To undertake outreach and other activities designed to publicise the work of the 
Commission and give individuals and organisations the necessary confidence to 
approach the Commission to provide information or to request it; 
 To conduct research for the purpose of eliciting information or checking the 
credibility of information received; and 
 To carry out a research function for collating and analysing information received 
to enable information to be cross-checked and themes and patterns to be 
identified. 
What Principles would Govern the ICIR’s Work? 
The Stormont House Agreement stated that all the legacy institutions would operate 
under general principles,138 which are restated in Clause 1 of the draft Bill and are 
provided in the introduction to this report. The draft Bill states that ‘The Commission 
must exercise its functions in a manner that is consistent with the general 
principles’.139 In addition, the preamble to the draft Treaty commits the governments 
to creating an ICIR that reflects the last of the general principles specified in the 
SHA, namely ‘that the approach to dealing with Northern Ireland’s past should be 
balanced, proportionate, transparent, fair and equitable’. 
A later paragraph of the Stormont House Agreement further stated that ‘The ICIR will 
be held accountable to the principles of independence, rigour, fairness and balance, 
transparency and proportionality’.140 However, the additional principles of 
independence and rigour are omitted from the draft Treaty and Bill. 
In addition, the draft Treaty and Bill provide that Commission would not be permitted 
to do anything that might: 
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 Prejudice the national security interests of Ireland or the United Kingdom; 
 Put at risk the life or safety of any person; or 
 Have a prejudicial effect on any actual or prospective legal proceedings in Ireland 
or the United Kingdom.141 
These provisions are important to ensure the protection of the right to life and the 
administration of justice; however, as we will see below, the addition of the 
requirement to refrain from actions that could prejudice national security has 
troubling implications for the ICIR’s work. 
What Powers would the ICIR have to carry out its Work? 
The Stormont House Agreement stated that the ICIR would be ‘free to seek 
information from other jurisdictions, and both governments undertake to support 
such requests’.142 The annex to the draft Treaty restates this commitment,143 but it is 
not referred to in the draft Bill. In addition, the cover note to the draft Treaty states 
that ‘Relevant authorities will cooperate with the ICIR’. However, the Consultation 
document makes clear that 
The ICIR would be entirely separate from the criminal justice system. It 
would not have policing powers, or powers to compel witnesses or 
disclosure of information. All engagement with the ICIR, including by 
families, individual contributors and public authorities, would therefore 
be voluntary.144 
In contrast, the Model Bill proposals recommended that the ICIR have the power to 
require public authorities to disclose to it any information that it requires in the 
exercise of its functions. We view this robust power to compel disclosure by public 
authorities as necessary to help the ICIR test the credibility of the information that it 
receives. 
Who would be able to seek Information from the ICIR? 
The draft Treaty regulates who would be able to make an ‘eligible family request’ to 
the ICIR.145 It anticipates that requests would come from a close family member of 
the deceased who was resident within the United Kingdom or Ireland at the time of 
the death or at the time of making the request. However, the ICIR would be allowed 
to exercise discretion in (a) receiving requests from more distant relatives, where no 
close family member objects, and (b) receiving requests from close family members 
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who do not meet the residency requirement. Similar although not identical provisions 
appear in the draft Bill.146 
Who would be able to Provide Information to the ICIR? 
As the Consultation Document makes clear, anyone would be entitled to approach 
the ICIR voluntarily with information about deaths within its remit: 
The primary source of the information received by the ICIR would be 
individual contributors and it would be open to anyone with information 
to approach the ICIR directly or through an intermediary. It is 
envisaged that the contributors could include those directly involved in 
a particular death, bystanders who witnessed events, and those with 
second-hand information about Troubles-related deaths.147 
In addition, the Annex to the draft Treaty notes that 
The Commission may seek and receive information about a death in 
any medium (including photographs and other such representations). 
The Commission shall not seek or receive any physical object except 
documents, or other media, which record information about a death.148 
However, the Consultation Document clarifies that the ICIR would only proactively 
seek information about a death in cases where there is an eligible family request.149 
In cases where there is no such request, the ICIR would hold unsolicited information 
securely for the duration of the ICIR’s operations in case there is a subsequent 
family request.150 
While it is welcome that the ICIR would receive and hold unsolicited information, it is 
problematic that the draft Treaty and Bill do not stipulate whether the credibility of 
this information is to be subject to any degree of testing in the absence of a family 
request. This is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, under the current proposals, 
unless both governments agree to extend its operations, the ICIR would only operate 
for five years after which point its archives would be destroyed (see below). As it 
would run in parallel to the Historical Investigations Unit and families may choose to 
let a HIU investigation run its course before making a request to the ICIR, the time 
limit for the ICIR’s operations may mean that families run out of time for the ICIR to 
seek information effectively in their case. Secondly, credibility testing of unsolicited 
information could lead to the discovery of information that is relevant to incidents for 
which there has been a family request. Thirdly, it would also make the inclusion of 
unsolicited information in the identification of themes and patterns more reliable. As 
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discussed below, the draft Bill and Treaty are unclear whether unsolicited testimony 
could be included in the ICIR’s analysis of themes and patterns to be supplied to the 
Implementation and Reconciliation Group (see below). 
While we believe that the Commission should only proactively seek to retrieve 
information and to produce family reports following a request from a bereaved family, 
we do not believe that the respecting the voluntary nature of victim engagement 
should preclude the ICIR from testing the credibility of unsolicited information. To 
enable such testing to take place would address the concerns we list above, and in 
particular, if a family decided towards the end of the ICIR’s five-year period of 
operations to request information retrieval in relation to an incident for which 
unsolicited information had already been received, previous credibility testing of 
information could facilitate the Commission producing a family report more rapidly 
before its period of operations expires. We therefore recommend that the draft Bill be 
amended to specify that the ICIR would test the credibility of both solicited and 
unsolicited information. 
How would the ICIR Evaluate the Credibility of the Information it Receives? 
The draft Treaty states that the written reports provided to families by the ICIR would 
‘contain only information the credibility of which has been established to the 
satisfaction of the Commission’.151 The Annex to the Treaty states that ‘The 
Commission may take such steps as it considers appropriate for evaluating the 
credibility of information about deaths that is received by it.’152 The Consultation 
Document gives the following information on the standards and techniques for 
evaluating credibility: 
The ICIR would not be expected to verify information to the same 
standard of testing that would be expected in the criminal justice 
system. It would, however, take appropriate steps to evaluate the 
credibility of the information it received before reporting to families. This 
could include use of a variety of information sources, interview and 
analytical techniques.153 
It further states that ‘with the permission of the family, the ICIR could publicise cases 
on which it is seeking information’.154 In addition, members of the Commission would 
be required to ‘each have experience of, and the skills necessary for: (a) handling 
sensitive information; (b) making judgements about the credibility of information’.155 
The provisions are all welcome. However, for them to operate effectively, the 
language of Article 6 of the draft Treaty should be amended to state that the staff of 
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the Commission should include a multi-disciplinary research team, with the ability to 
test the credibility of information as well as identify themes and patterns in a robust 
and rigorous manner. 
How would the ICIR Engage with Families during the Information Retrieval 
Process? 
As noted above, the ICIR would only seek information about deaths if eligible 
families have asked them to do so.156 Where such requests are made, the draft 
Treaty and draft Bill commit the ICIR to keeping the family informed about the 
progress in the information retrieval process.157 These documents do not contain any 
further provisions relating to engaging with families or providing them with support. 
However, the Consultation Document asks consultees to suggest additional forms of 
support that the ICIR could provide to families.158 
Our model proposals stated that the functions of the Commission should include 
doing outreach with families, and organisations representing their interests, from the 
start of the Commission’s work. Ideally, this would include enabling victims to inform 
the development of the Commission’s procedures where relevant.159 The model 
treaty also stipulated that the ICIR’s functions should include providing appropriate 
support for those who engage with the Commission. Our proposals also contained 
commitments that in engaging with victims, the Commission shall take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that victims and survivors understand that (1) their engagement is 
voluntary and that they may withdraw from the process at any time, and (2) that they 
appreciate in advance the potential legal consequences of engagement with the 
Commission. We further recommended that the support provided by the ICIR to 
families should occur both during the information retrieval process and in helping 
them to deal with the consequences of the process. We also recommended that the 
Commission be able to defray expenses incurred by victims and survivors or other 
persons communicating or otherwise cooperating with the Commission. 
What Information could Families Potentially receive from the Information 
Retrieval Process? 
The draft Treaty states that at the conclusion of its enquiries into a particular request, 
the Commission would provide a written report to the family.160 As noted above, the 
draft Treaty stipulates that ‘Such a report shall contain only information the credibility 
of which has been established to the satisfaction of the Commission.’161 
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Both official draft texts place limits on the information that could be disclosed in the 
reports to families: 
 To ensure confidentiality, the reports could not reveal the name or identity of 
anyone who contributes information;162 
 As the Commission would not be testing information to the standard expected in 
the criminal justice system,163 the reports would not be able to disclose the name 
or identity of those alleged by contributors to be responsible for a death;164 
 In producing the reports, the Commission would be prohibited from doing 
‘anything in carrying out its functions’ that might ‘(a) prejudice the national 
security interests of Ireland or the United Kingdom; (b) put at risk the life or safety 
of any person; or (c) have a prejudicial effect on any actual or prospective legal 
proceedings in Ireland or the United Kingdom’.165 
The draft UK Bill sets out a number of steps that the Commission would be required 
to follow before it could release any written reports to families. These steps are 
intended to ensure that the Commission meets its obligations not to prejudice 
national security, endanger the life or safety of any person, or have a prejudicial 
effect on legal proceedings:166 
 The ICIR would be required to submit all draft family reports to the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland before releasing them to families. 
 The Secretary of State would have 60 days to identify any information in the draft 
report that is deemed to pose a risk. 
 If the Secretary of State determined that the draft report contains information that 
could pose a risk, the Commission would be required to remove all the 
information identified from the report before releasing it to the family. 
 If the Commission decided to produce a different report, it would be required to 
also submit that report to the Secretary of State before it could be released. 
 If the Secretary of State did not respond within 60 days, the Commission could 
release the report. 
 If any member of the Commission breaches these obligations, inside or outside 
the United Kingdom, they could be liable for criminal prosecution with a range of 
potential penalties, the most serious being two years imprisonment, or a fine, or 
both. Similar penalties for disclosure would apply to ICIR staff members or other 
persons carrying out work for or giving advice to the Commission. 
Unlike the proposals on the HIU, there is no provision to appeal decisions by the 
Secretary of State to withhold information contained in family reports produced by 
the ICIR. 
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The draft Treaty notes that legislation in Ireland would set out similar measures to 
prevent disclosure.167 Under these proposals, the ICIR would be required to seek 
notification from the Irish government, in addition to the Secretary of State, as to 
whether any information in each family report would, if disclosed, cause risk to 
Ireland’s national security or the life and safety of any person. Irish legislation would 
set out how the Irish government would respond to these requests, but the 
Commission would not be able to disclose a report without the approval of the Irish 
government. Irish legislation would also create penalties for disclosure of confidential 
information.168 The Consultation Document also noted that the British and Irish 
governments would be able to consult each other when considering any potential 
risks posed by a report.169 It further stated that ‘the ICIR would be required to remove 
the names or any information that could identify contributors or alleged perpetrators, 
before consulting the UK Government or the Irish Government’.170 
As discussed in the above section on national security, these proposals are deeply 
concerning as they could discourage potential information providers from engaging 
with the Commission, they could undermine the ICIR’s legitimacy in the eyes of 
families, and they would risk not being Article 2 compliant. We therefore recommend 
that the national security arrangements for the ICIR be re-examined and assessed in 
terms of their effect on the workability of the ICIR and that alternatives be explored 
that might address legitimate national security concerns on the part of the two 
governments. As we discuss above, one solution might be to place the responsibility 
for determining national security concerns on the ICIR itself with an agreed protocol 
on consulting with either of the relevant governments if national security issues were 
‘flagged’ - rather than have every single ICIR family report read and approved by 
both governments before it is released. At the very least, in keeping with our 
previously published model for information redaction, we recommend that the ICIR 
Chair or family members have the power to appeal any proposed redaction by the 
Secretary of State to an independent judicial authority. 
How would the Confidentiality of the Process be Protected? 
This Stormont House Agreement indicates that the ICIR would be modelled on the 
Independent Commission for the Location of Victims’ Remains. Similar to that 
process, the ICIR proposals contain a number of measures to ensure confidentiality 
for persons who provide information. These protections are intended to remove 
obstacles for persons who could be at risk of exposing themselves to criminal liability 
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and thereby encourage the voluntary provision of information. The draft Treaty and 
the draft Bill outline the following measures to ensure confidentiality: 
 The Commission would not disclose (a) the name or identity of any individual 
from whom the Commission has received information about a death within the 
Commission’s remit; and (b) the name or identity of any individual who is 
identified by that information as being responsible for a death within the 
Commission’s remit or any crimes resulting from that death.171 The latter is a 
reflection that the Commission would not test the credibility of information 
received to the same standard of testing that would be expected in the criminal 
justice system. 
 On completion of its work, the ICIR would destroy the raw material and operating 
files that it holds relating to deaths within its remit.172 
In addition, the Stormont House Agreement stated ‘The ICIR will not disclose 
information provided to it to law enforcement or intelligence agencies’.173 This 
understanding is not explicitly stated in the draft Treaty and draft Bill, but it appears 
in the Consultation Document.174 
As noted above, any Commissioner or staff member of the Commissioner who made 
an unauthorised disclosure could be liable to criminal prosecution and punishment. 
We agree that confidentiality protections are vital for the ICIR to be able to fulfil its 
functions effectively. However, we believe that confidentiality can be ensured 
effectively without destroying the archives after the ICIR ceases to operate. Instead, 
we recommend that the archives are maintained and held confidentially for 50 years, 
and that law enforcement, intelligence agencies or other persons would be precluded 
from accessing them during this period. We felt this was necessary as the ICIR has 
the potential to gather a wealth of information that may be useful for understanding 
Northern Ireland’s history for generations to come. 
Could Information Provided to the ICIR form the basis for Prosecutions? 
At no stage has an amnesty been part of the proposals for the ICIR. However, 
information provided to the ICIR would be inadmissible in criminal, civil and inquest 
proceedings.175 This would mean no information provided to the Commission could 
be relied upon in court, even if it was included in a family report.176 This does not 
grant amnesty for persons who provide information. These individuals could still be 
prosecuted for any crime they committed based on evidence coming from other 
sources, even where it relates to the same information provided to the ICIR. This is 
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acknowledged in the draft Bill, which states that the inadmissibility of information 
provided to the Commission ‘does not affect the admissibility of information which is 
held by a person other than the Commission, unless that information has been 
obtained from the Commission’.177 The Explanatory Notes for this subclause state 
that it 
has the effect that policing authorities or a coroner, for instance, would 
not be prevented from pursuing lines of inquiry based on information 
disclosed by the Commission in a report to a family. If such inquiry, 
pursued on the basis of information in a report, led to evidence being 
generated, then that new evidence would not fall under the 
inadmissibility provisions (despite the report itself being 
inadmissible).178 
This note makes clear that even though information provided to the ICIR would be 
inadmissible in legal proceedings, it would not prevent policing authorities or a 
coroner pursuing lines of inquiry based on information provided to families by the 
Commission. Where such inquiries, generated new evidence, the new evidence 
would be admissible. This observation highlights the possibility that where an 
individual provides information to the Commission, they could run the risk of 
providing information about their own actions or the actions of others that indirectly 
aids the work of criminal investigators and prosecutors. We believe that the risk of 
prosecutions resulting indirectly from information provided to the ICIR is extremely 
low, particularly since (former) paramilitaries may opt to engage with the 
Commission through interlocutors. Furthermore, if any such prosecutions were 
undertaken, they could be met with abuse of process applications from defence 
lawyers that would challenge the admissibility of evidence that was uncovered 
because of information produced by the ICIR. 
In keeping with the Stormont House Agreement, the Model Bill contained similar 
inadmissibility provisions as we regard them as necessary protections against self-
incrimination and a means to remove an obstacle to information providers choosing 
voluntarily to take part. However, the observation in the Explanatory Notes could 
create a disincentive for persons with information engaging with the Commission. To 
address this challenge, we have outlined a number of recommendations to bolster 
the existing safeguards in the ICIR proposals: 
 Clause 3 of the Northern Ireland (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 could 
provide a model for amending Article 9 of the draft Treaty. An amended version 
could include the following: 
(1) The following shall not be admissible in evidence in any legal 
proceedings (including proceedings before a Coroner)— 
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(a) any information received by the Commission about deaths within its 
remit; and 
(b) any evidence obtained (directly or indirectly) as a result of such 
information being so provided. 
To reflect the above changes to the draft Treaty, Clause 45(3) of the draft Bill 
could be amended to state 
The information received by the Commission about deaths within its 
remit or any evidence obtained (directly or indirectly) as a result of such 
information being so provided is not admissible in any legal 
proceedings. 
 In addition, similar to the Explanatory Notes accompanying Clause 3 of the 
Northern Ireland (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999, the Explanatory Notes 
for Clause 45 of the draft Bill should make clear that private prosecutions are 
covered by the inadmissibility provisions. 
 Clause 3(2) of the Northern Ireland (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999 
states that the provisions on inadmissibility ‘shall not apply to the admission of 
evidence adduced in criminal proceedings on behalf of the accused.’ It may be 
useful to explore whether a similar provision should be added to the draft Bill. 
 Clause 42(2) of the draft Bill could be amended to place an obligation on the 
Independent Commission on Information Retrieval to seek to ensure that 
information is not disclosed in family reports that could expose information 
providers to risk of prosecution. Similar language could be added to Article 3(2) of 
the draft Treaty. 
 Article 3(1)(b) of the draft Treaty should be amended to create an obligation to 
ensure that families who request the opening of an information retrieval process 
do so on the basis of fully informed consent that includes discussion of the legal 
consequences of information retrieval process. 
How would the ICIR Contribute to the Analysis of Themes and Patterns? 
The draft Treaty states that the Commission’s functions would include providing the 
Chair of the Implementation and Reconciliation Group with a written report on (1) 
themes and patterns it has identified from its work and (2) the level of cooperation it 
has received in carrying out its work.179 The draft Bill states that this report should be 
submitted on the last working day of the five-year period, which would begin when 
that section enters into force.180 The Commission would also be permitted, but not 
required, to submit interim reports to the IRG.181 As discussed in detail in the section 
on the IRG, the draft Bill stipulates that the IRG would commission a report from 
independent academic experts on themes and patterns that would draw on the 
reports submitted by the ICIR, together with equivalent reports submitted by the HIU, 
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the Oral History Archive, and Coroners’ Courts.182 The academic team could also 
refer to the ICIR’s annual reports and family reports produced by the ICIR that are 
publicly available or made available to the academics by the family concerned.183 
The following points are unclear from the current legislative proposals and require 
further clarification: 
 Whether unsolicited statements could be included in the thematic analysis; 
 The research techniques that would be used to identify themes and patterns; 
 When the ICIR should commence this data analysis within its five-year timeframe 
as to be meaningful and comply with the principles governing its work, as much 
data as possible should be considered within this analysis; and 
 Whether the deadline for submitting thematic reports to the IRG would be 
extended if both governments agree that the ICIR could operate longer than five 
years. 
How would the Commissioners be Appointed? 
As reflected in its title, the Commission is intended to be independent of the British 
and Irish governments. The draft Treaty (reflecting the SHA) states that there would 
be five Commissioners, who would be appointed as follows: 
 One Chair, who may be of international standing, jointly appointed by the UK 
Government and the Irish Government (in consultation with the First Minister and 
deputy First Minister); 
 One Commissioner appointed by the UK Government; 
 One Commissioner appointed by the Irish Government; and 
 Two Commissioners jointly appointed by the First Minister and deputy First 
Minister.184 
In terms of who is eligible to be appointed to the ICIR, the draft Treaty states that 
Commissioners would collectively have: 
 Experience of working with individuals who have suffered injury or bereavement 
as a result of the Troubles; 
 Experience of working in legal practice (with a particular member having to have 
at least 10 years’ work in legal practice to count in that experience) or as a judge 
of the superior courts; and 
 Knowledge or experience of the criminal justice system and in particular of 
policing and security matters.185 
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In addition, all Commissioners would be expected to have experience of, and the 
skills necessary for: 
 Handling sensitive information; 
 Making judgments about the credibility of information; and 
 Establishing good working relationships with organisations of the kind that can 
assist the Commission to carry out its functions.186 
The draft Bill states that ‘The First Minister and the deputy First Minister have the 
power jointly to appoint two members of the Commission in accordance with the ICIR 
agreement’.187 However, it does not set out any appointments criteria. 
This appointments mechanism may need to be amended to reflect the fact that the 
devolved institutions are not functioning. Also the Model Bill differed in its proposals 
for the appointment of Commissioners as we stated that the Chair must be a person 
of international standing and reputation; that there must be at least two women on 
the Commission; and to safeguard independence, the Commissioners must be and 
be perceived to be impartial, and must have no conflicts of interest. In addition, while 
we stated that Commissioners must have experience of handling sensitive 
information, we did not require any Commission members to have experience or 
knowledge of the criminal justice system and in particular, of policing and security 
matters as we felt that many professions can provide relevant experience. To 
enhance the transparency of the process, the Model Bill stated that the appointing 
institutions should publicly state the reasons for appointing their chosen individuals. 
In addition to safeguarding the Commission’s independence, the Model Bill 
contained provisions relating to the tenure of the Commissioners and mechanisms 
for replacing Commissioners where necessary. 
The Model Bill also recommended that the secretariat include staff with experience 
of psychosocial and trauma counselling (including gender sensitivity); handling 
sensitive information and making judgments about its reliability; and that the 
requirements on impartiality and conflicts of interests that apply to Commissioners 
should apply to staff. The draft Treaty and Bill do not contain any such requirements. 
Instead, the draft Treaty states that the Commission may appoint any staff as 
necessary to fulfil its functions, but the terms and conditions of employment are 
subject to the approval of both governments.188 
 
 
                                       
186
 Ibid, art 5(3). 
187
 Draft Bill, cl 40(4). 
188
 Draft Treaty, art 6. 
MODEL BILL TEAM RESPONSE TO NIO LEGACY CONSULTATION 
55 
How would the Commission be Funded? 
The draft Treaty states that the Government of Ireland and the Government of the 
United Kingdom on a basis to be determined by them would provide funding, 
premises, facilities, and services required by the ICIR.189 The draft Bill states that 
‘The Secretary of State may provide the Commission with such moneys, premises, 
facilities and services as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.’190 
Given that the Irish government is committed to contributing towards the running 
costs of the ICIR, part of the funding for this institution would come from outside the 
£150 million that the UK government has earmarked for the legacy institutions.191 To 
safeguard the independence of the Commission, the Model Bill committed the 
Secretary of State to paying for a range of expenses relating to the ICIR and to 
publishing the arrangements for funding the Commission. It further stipulated that 
these costs should be covered by the Consolidated Fund. 
For how long would the Commission Operate? 
The draft Treaty states there would be a three month preparatory period, which 
would begin when the chairperson and at least two other Commissioners are 
appointed and would end three months after the treaty entered into force (unless the 
two governments agree to an earlier date).192 This preparatory period would allow 
the Commission to recruit staff, occupy its premises, and make other arrangements 
to enable it to fulfil its functions.193 After this period ends, the Commission would 
operate for five years.194 This timetable contrasts somewhat with Clause 42 of the 
draft Bill that states 
The Commission must provide the Implementation and Reconciliation 
Group with the report [on themes and patterns] on the last day of the 
period of 5 years beginning with the day on which this section comes 
into force (or, if that day is not a working day, on the last working day 
before it).195 
As there are no provisions to indicate that Clause 42 would come into effect at a 
different time to the rest of the legislation, this provision would seem to indicate that 
the Commission would function for five years after the legislation comes into effect. 
This would not allow for a preparatory period, and given the time that would be 
required to recruit the Chair and Commissioners before the preparatory period would 
even have been triggered, this would could reduce the period of effective operations 
of the Commission substantially. We believe that this would severely hamper the 
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ability of the ICIR to fulfil its functions and we therefore recommend that the draft Bill 
be amended to include provision for the preparatory period that is specified in the 
draft Treaty. We further recommend that the Bill should be amended to make clear 
that references to obligations arising at the end of five years (ie to end the ICIR’s 
operations and submit a report on themes and patterns to the IRG), should be based 
on five years from the end of the preparatory period (rather than five years from the 
entry into effect of the legislation). 
With respect to end of the ICIR’s operations, the draft Treaty states that at the end of 
five years, the Commission should destroy all the information it holds about deaths 
and all records relating to such information.196 In contrast, the draft Bill states that 
Secretary of State may ‘by regulations, make provision for winding up the ICIR’, but 
before doing so, he or she must consult the Irish government and any other persons 
the Secretary of State deems appropriate.197 It continues that the ICIR could operate 
for five years ‘or any other period which is agreed’ between the two governments.198 
We welcome the provisions indicating that the ICIR’s term could be extended beyond 
five years, as we believe, based on the experience of the ICLVR, that it may take 
time for the Commission to gain the confidence of families and information providers. 
In addition, if families choose to let the HIU process run its course in their case 
before requesting an information retrieval process, without the possibility of 
extending the period of the ICIR’s operations, families could lose the opportunity for 
information retrieval if the Commission’s operations were closed before it had time to 
seek information into their relatives’ death. 
Where would the ICIR be Located? 
As a product of a treaty between the two governments, the ICIR would be an 
international institution, and its archives and premises would have the inviolability of 
a diplomatic mission.199 The draft Treaty states that it ‘shall have premises in Dublin, 
Belfast and, if the Commission considers it appropriate, other premises in Ireland or 
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Would the ICIR have to Report on its Work? 
The draft Treaty states that the ICIR would have to report annually to the UK and 
Irish governments in a report that would be published, on 
 The finances of the Commission; 
 The administration of the Commission; 
 The number of requests for information made to the Commission; 
 The number of family reports that have been provided to persons requesting 
them; and 
 Other data relating to the volume of information about deaths received by the 
Commission.201 
The draft Bill reproduces this list; however, it adds that each annual report must state 
the number of notifications relating to disclosure of information that could pose a risk 
to life or national security that the Secretary of State has given to the Commission in 
the previous financial year.202 This is a welcome addition, as it would make public 
how often the Secretary of State uses these powers. In keeping with the 
confidentiality and non-disclosure requirements, the annual reports would not contain 
details of any information received from contributors. 
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IV. The Oral History Archive 
The Stormont House Agreement (2014) stated that: 
The Executive will, by 2016, establish an Oral History Archive to 
provide a central place for people from all backgrounds (and from 
throughout the UK and Ireland) to share experiences and narratives 
related to the Troubles. As well as collecting new material, this archive 
will attempt to draw together and work with existing oral history 
projects.203 
As with the other elements of the Stormont House Agreement, versions of this 
mechanism were trailed in previous rounds of legacy negotiations. As early as 1998, 
the report into victims and survivors commissioned by the then Secretary of State Mo 
Mowlam highlighted ‘the value of “telling the story”’.204 The Consultative Group on 
the Past provided much fuller detail on the potential role for storytelling, recognising 
its potentially ‘cathartic nature’ in enabling people to have their perspective – and in 
particular their pain and suffering - acknowledged. They envisaged a role for the 
chair of the Legacy Commission, through a Reconciliation Forum, to promote 
storytelling schemes and memorial projects and further recommended the collation 
of stories in some form of archive.205 Similarly, the Haass-O’Sullivan document 
recommended that the Northern Ireland Executive should establish ‘an archive for 
conflict-related oral histories, documents and other relevant materials’ for those who 
‘wish to share their experiences connected with the conflict’. That report also 
proposed that, in addition to collecting new material, it would function as a repository 
for existing oral history archives.206 
The NIO draft Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill published in May 
2018 includes provision for the establishment of an Oral History Archive. The 
Consultation Paper that accompanies this bill proposes that those responding to the 
public consultation exercise consider two questions in relation to the OHA: 
Do you think that the Oral History Archive proposals provide an 
appropriate method for people from all backgrounds to share their 
experiences of the Troubles in order to create a valuable resource for 
future generations? Yes/No 
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What steps could be taken to ensure that people who want to share 
their experiences of the Troubles know about the Archive and are 
encouraged to record their stories?207 
Attention is thus focused on the appropriateness of oral history as a methodology 
and the steps that might be taken to publicise the OHA. These questions sidestep a 
more fundamental issue, which is whether the model being proposed for the Archive 
(whereby it is under the charge and superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the 
Public Records Office of Northern Ireland) is an appropriate means of enabling 
people from all backgrounds to record and share their stories. They also gloss over 
the fact that very little detail has been offered as to how the proposed model would 
work in practice. 
We greatly welcome the inclusion of the OHA as a core legacy mechanism but have 
listed in the Executive Summary 17 recommended changes that we believe are 
essential if the archive is to realise its potential. In the sections that follow, we seek 
to place those recommendations in a broader context and to explain our reasoning. 
How Important is the work of the OHA? Why does it Matter? 
In transitional justice contexts, oral history is sometimes regarded as a ‘soft’ option – 
a complement to the ‘serious’ work of prosecutions and information recovery. 
Throughout this consultation process, we have argued that it is in fact ‘core business’ 
– a centrally important element of dealing with the past. 
Beyond Legalism 
The Historical Investigations Unit (HIU) and the Independent Commission for 
Information Retrieval (ICIR) are designed to operate within tightly defined limits. 
They are primarily focused on deaths and must understandably address these on a 
case-by-case basis. Whilst vitally important for victims and survivors, the parameters 
of this work are necessarily narrow.208 The OHA offers a valuable alternative for 
those whose needs cannot be met by the HIU or the ICIR. The importance of this 
was underlined by former UN Special Rapporteur, Pablo de Greiff, in his report on 
Northern Ireland when he stated that the legacy of the past is unlikely to be ‘fixed’ by 
legal means alone: 
Efforts thus far have relied heavily on judicial procedures, leading to an 
inevitable ‘fragmentation’ of the issue. Judicial procedures are 
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traditionally case-based, and therefore primarily individualizing and 
perpetrator-centered.209 
Widening Participation 
The Oral History Archive could act as a buttress against this fragmentation by 
enabling a much broader cross-section of our society to share their experiences of 
conflict. People of all ages, from all walks of life, and from both rural and urban parts 
of Ireland and the UK, could come forward to tell their stories. For those who have 
suffered - publicly and / or privately - this is often, as noted, a significant and 
therapeutic process. It is particularly important for those who feel that they have 
been overlooked, silenced, or excluded.210 
Sharing Responsibility 
Enabling people from all walks of life to participate in the OHA acknowledges the fact 
that those of us who lived through the horror of the last forty years have all – to 
greater and lesser extents – been affected by it and that we have a shared 
responsibility to do what we can to ensure that the burden is not bequeathed to our 
children and grandchildren. 
Hearing ‘the Other’ 
Creating opportunities to recount past experiences in a non-judgmental, measured, 
and respectful context can provide a useful counterweight to other less inclusive 
approaches. Speaking, listening, hearing, and preserving are profoundly humane 
activities – they encourage reflection, empathy, and the broadening of perspectives. 
That is not to suggest that people should not commemorate their loved ones as they 
see fit but rather to acknowledge the potential benefits of couching individual 
narratives in a broader societal context. As De Greiff notes: 
The arduous task is to find a way in which everyone, together, can deal 
with a complicated past, not so that ‘closure’ can be achieved, but so 
that everyone is disburdened of the sense that past tragedies must be 
remembered. Once everyone is recognised as an equal member of a 
shared political project, it is easier to manifest allegiances and loyalties 
in ways that do not call for frequently rehearsing the many ways in 
which different communities aggrieved each other in the past.211 
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Gender Equality 
Addressing a major imbalance in our approach to the past, this mechanism could 
also help to address gender-related issues – prioritising hitherto unheard female 
accounts of the conflict, documenting evidence of sexual and gender-based 
violence, and probing the impact of violence and conflict on masculinities and family 
life.212 The latter would also help to inform our understanding of broader issues 
concerning the impact of the conflict on both physical and mental well-being.213 
Acknowledging Complexity 
There has been much debate in the media in recent times about the need to avoid a 
‘rewriting of the past’. Linked to this is a suggestion that we should aim to 
substantiate with facts and verifiable statistics an agreed and undisputed narrative of 
the past. Like most academics, we are wary of proposals for ‘official’ or ‘agreed’ 
histories. As McBride et al note, ‘The purpose of academic research is not to close 
down public debate but to inform it.’214 Empirical work is the foundation for all 
historical enquiry: facts and verifiable evidence most certainly matter. But the work of 
oral historians goes well beyond ‘who done what, where and when’. Crucially they 
are also inclined to ask ‘why?’ and to document how individuals felt about various 
aspects of their past experience. These complex questions rarely generate ‘black 
and white’ responses. Rather they tend to reveal a variety of motivations, points of 
tension and contradiction, and a range of evolving emotions such as anger, 
resentment, hurt, betrayal, healing, loyalty, patriotism, weakness, shame, pride, 
forgiveness, fear, and joy. By documenting the complexities of human experience 
(including, for example, despondency at times of apparent triumph and humour in 
the face of grim and terrifying ordeals), these individual accounts can act as a 
buttress against naïve and simplistic accounts of the past. 
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Reconciliation and Non-Recurrence 
By providing opportunities to see and hear ourselves in ‘the other’ and by thus 
building empathy and understanding across and between different sections of our 
society this archive could ultimately make an important contribution to the promotion 
of reconciliation. Providing information about the fundamental and underlying causes 
and motivations for conflict it could also advance the much-lauded aim of ‘non-
recurrence’. 
What Principles would underpin the Work of the OHA? 
The principles to which all participants to the Stormont House Agreement signed up 
are set out in the Introduction to this report.215 In relation to the Oral History Archive, 
the Agreement further stipulates that ‘the sharing of experiences will be entirely 
voluntary and, more importantly, it notes that: ‘The Archive will be independent and 
free from political interference’.216 
This principal was included in the preceding Haass-O’Sullivan report and it has since 
been underlined repeatedly by victims and survivors. For example, the Victims 
Commissioner, Judith Thompson, has publicly outlined a set of core legacy 
principles agreed by members of the Victim and Survivors Forum. Central to these is 
the stipulation that all of the legacy mechanisms should be independent and 
impartial, and that they should have ‘no political friends’.217 
Who would take Charge of the OHA? 
The Stormont House Agreement did not specify who would take charge of the OHA 
but in the political negotiations that ensued the Public Records Office of Northern 
Ireland (PRONI) was invited to explore options for the establishment of the Archive. 
We understand that they initially considered a number of models including: 
1. Establishing a statutory office holder with independent decision-making powers; 
2. Contracting a non-statutory body such as a University to run the Archive; and 
3. A partnership model whereby a statutory body would establish agreements with 
other oral history entities as necessary. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Option 1 – whereby PRONI itself takes charge of the 
Archive – was the model recommended and this is now reflected in the NIO 
proposals. The Draft Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill proposes 
that ‘the Public Record Office has the function of organising an oral history archive’ 
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and that ‘The archive is under the charge and superintendence of the Deputy 
Keeper’.218 
Many within the oral history community were surprised at the decision to invite the 
Public Records Office to lead on the Oral History Archive. PRONI is a respected 
institution that provides an important public service, but as the custodian of 
predominantly official and state records, it has never before been actively involved in 
the creation of an oral history collection and (with the notable exception of work on 
the Prison Memory Archive project) has very limited experience of curating oral 
history records. Moreover, given that PRONI is a division of the Department for 
Communities, and its Director, the Deputy Keeper, is a career civil servant, 
accountable to the Minister of the Department for Communities (the ‘Keeper of the 
Records’), we immediately flagged concerns regarding the independence of the 
proposed model.219 In light of the fact that the Victims and Survivors Forum and 
other representative bodies have made it abundantly clear that the issue of 
independence is vital, we believe that the proposed model is unlikely to garner 
widespread public support.220 
The NIO proposals address the issue of independence by granting the Deputy 
Keeper a degree of autonomy from the Minister with regard to their ‘OHA duties’. For 
example, the section titled ‘The Role of the Deputy Keeper’ proposes that ‘A 
Northern Ireland department may not give the Deputy Keeper any direction in 
respect of the Deputy Keeper’s duties under this section’. Whilst this may confer a 
degree of independence in terms of the day-to-day running of the Archive, a 
subsequent section nonetheless makes it clear that 
the relevant Northern Ireland department may make rules about the 
exercise of the function of organising the archive (including the 
performance of the duties of the Deputy Keeper in connection with the 
exercise of that function).221 
In particular, the department would reserve the right to make rules concerning: 
 What records can be admitted to the Archive (see below concerns regarding 
determinations on consent); 
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 The circumstances under which existing oral history records made by community 
groups, academics and others may be admitted to the Archive; and 
 Any other matter arising under section 9 of the Public Records Act (NI) 1923. 
The latter grants far-reaching powers including, for example, the right to make rules 
in respect of the admission of persons to access and use the records (charging a fee 
if deemed appropriate).222 
There are in existence examples of statutorily independent entities that operate 
within a given Department’s accounting boundary. The Attorney General’s office, for 
example, falls within the accounting boundary of the Northern Ireland Executive 
Office and is supported by civil service staff. Unlike PRONI, however, this office is 
not an arms-length division of a government department and the responsibilities and 
roles of the Attorney General are statutorily independent of the First and deputy First 
Minister, the Northern Ireland Executive, and the Northern Ireland Departments. The 
Attorney General is also an independent law officer rather than a career civil 
servant.223 
In order to clarify whether or not the model of independence being proposed by the 
NIO was workable in practice we consulted Dr Maurice Hayes, a former Northern 
Ireland Ombudsman, and Permanent Secretary at the Department of Health and 
Social Services. He suggested that what was being proposed amounted to a ‘fig-leaf 
of independence’ and added: 
There may be, if you like, metaphysical seconds in which a senior civil 
servant has operational autonomy, but to whom is he or she 
accountable for the remainder of that minute, hour, day and week?224 
Reflecting on the public service culture and practice outlined by Dr Hayes, we noted 
in a blog on the proposed model that: ‘Operational independence is well and good in 
theory but, in light of organisational impulses and constraints, it is difficult to 
envisage a career civil servant closing his or her ears when the political piper calls a 
tune.’225 
At any rate, we believe that the solution to the issue of independence is not to 
strengthen the powers of the Deputy Keeper of PRONI vis-à-vis the prevailing 
Minister. This misses the key point set out in the Stormont House Agreement – 
which is to safeguard the independence of the Archive itself. In our Model Bill, we 
proposed that it be established as an independent legal entity by the First and 
deputy First Minister. It would be governed by three executive directors, assisted by 
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a seven-strong Advisory Board or Steering Group. We proposed that PRONI could 
provide the shell for the records and that, as such, the Deputy Keeper of PRONI 
would have an ex officio seat on the Steering Group. The criteria for the appointment 
of the other members of the Steering Group and their remit, function and tenure were 
clearly set out in our Model Bill.226 
In essence we proposed to invert the model outlined by the Northern Ireland Office 
i.e. rather than the Minister and the Deputy Keeper of PRONI consulting the Steering 
Group as and when they deem necessary, the Steering Group should have ‘charge 
and superintendence’ of the Archive, consulting the Deputy Keeper as necessary. As 
outlined below, this diverse and representative Steering Group would assume 
responsibility for 
 Mapping out a clear and transparent vision for the Archive; 
 Establishing a comprehensive code of conduct and an interviewer training 
programme; 
 Agreeing the acquisitions and access policy; 
 Establishing a strategy of outreach and engagement to existing oral history 
organisations, archives and networks; 
 Building cross-community trust and support; and 
 Compiling a report on patterns and themes. 
Such a model we believe would succeed in curbing both potential political 
interference in the design and conduct of the archive and the bureaucratic impulses 
of a ‘top-down’ civil service model. 
How would the OHA Function in Practice? 
The Stormont House Agreement envisaged the OHA as a ‘central place’ for people 
from all backgrounds to ‘share experiences and narratives relating to the Troubles’. 
There is, however, very little detail in the draft NIO bill and related documentation as 
to how the OHA would function in practice. It is unclear, for example, whether or not 
the Archive will be accessible online and / or at the Titanic Quarter premises. We are 
simply told that the Public Records Office would have the function of organising the 
archive and that this includes: 
a) inviting the contribution of oral history records, 
b) making oral history records of experiences recounted by other 
persons, 
c) otherwise receiving oral history records and other relevant 
records, 
d) preserving the archive (including by enhancing or changing the 
format in which records are kept), and 
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e) making the archive publicly available, except to the extent that it 
is appropriate or necessary for particular records not to be made 
publicly available.227 
In our Model Bill, we included provision for a non-statutory Code of Practice and set 
out in some detail how the Archive might work in practice.228 This included reference 
to the need to conduct extensive research to inform the overall acquisitions policy, to 
consult stakeholders nationally and internationally (including victims and survivors 
and those who represent them), and to make practical arrangements for the conduct, 
processing and accessing of oral history records. 
With regard to the appointment of interviewers to carry out the oral history interviews, 
we proposed a partnership model that was designed to work with and through 
existing oral history networks, organisations, and projects. This included a flexible 
‘train the trainers’ scheme. The rationale for the latter was fourfold: 
 Many individuals only feel comfortable conducting an interview with a known and 
trusted interviewer; 
 It is nonetheless imperative that all interviews adhere to core ethical, technical 
and legal standards; 
 Interviewees must be made fully aware of procedures regarding long-term access 
and storage to ensure that they are not lulled into a false sense of security; and 
 This scheme enables existing practitioners to secure a ‘license’ to point their 
collections in the direction of PRONI and provides them with the resources 
necessary to up-skill other members of their host organisation. This is a cost-
effective means of maximising the reach and workability of the Archive. 
With the skeletal model that has been put out for public consultation we are being 
invited – in the absence of any detail with regard to how the stories will be collected 
– to simply trust that the Deputy Keeper of PRONI will include similar provisions and 
basically get all of this right. We are particularly concerned about the prospect of a 
business model that seeks to collect interviews based on tenders for set targets. 
Who would Staff the OHA? 
The NIO draft Bill proposes that the Deputy Keeper must superintend the persons 
employed in the Public Record Office in keeping the Archive and further suggests 
that persons appointed under section 2(3) of the Public Records Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1923 are to assist in exercising the function of organising the Archive under 
the superintendence of the Deputy Keeper. The section of the Public Records Act 
referred to simply highlights the fact that such staff are appointed by and answerable 
to the Minister: ‘the persons so appointed shall assist in executing this Act under the 
superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the Records of Northern Ireland in such 
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manner as the Minister [of Finance] may direct.’ This does nothing to allay fears 
about the independence of the proposed model or to address the core challenge of 
securing the trust of those who may consider sharing their personal and private 
recollections with the Archive. 
In our Model Bill, we proposed that a dedicated secretariat provide research, 
archival, interviewing, and other professional and administrative support to the OHA. 
We also specified that staff should have between them experience and knowledge of 
a) the potential for memory to provoke trauma b) gender sensitivity and c) handling 
sensitive information and making judgments about its suitability for public release. 
We also cross-referenced the criteria for appointments to the Steering Group (see 
below) which includes reference to the need to be impartial and to avoid conflicts of 
interest. We deliberately proposed that ‘Staff may be (but need not be) appointed on 
secondment from a public authority, including PRONI’. 
To what Extent would PRONI draw on Broader Expertise and Experience? 
We welcome the inclusion in the draft NIO bill of a Steering Group who might help to 
shape the OHA. Unfortunately, however, we consider that the provisions regarding 
the Steering Group fall well short of what is required to hold the Deputy Keeper to 
account and to inspire confidence and trust across the broader community. The NIO 
provisions propose that the Deputy Keeper ‘must consult’ the steering group when 
issuing the statement setting out the manner in which the Deputy Keeper is to 
exercise his or her functions in relation to the archive. Similarly it is stated that before 
making rules concerning procedures for destroying records not forming part of the 
archive, the relevant Northern Ireland department ‘must consult’ the steering group. 
There is a slight advance in a later clause that states that the Deputy Keeper must 
‘have regard’ to any advice given by the Steering Group.229 However, this does not 
amount to a binding obligation to heed the advice and input of the Steering Group. 
The proposed ‘good faith’ model could potentially work were it not for the trust deficit 
that exists in our divided society. In light of that reality – and to ensure that the OHA 
has a decent chance of garnering widespread support and buy-in across the UK and 
Ireland – we included in our Model Bill provision for a strong, diverse, and 
independent Steering Group. We set out the necessary criteria for appointments to 
this body i.e. experience of: the management of public bodies; the administration of 
archives; the practice of oral history; relevant academic work; or working with victims 
and survivors. We also emphasised the importance of members having qualities 
which: 
 Are likely to command the respect and confidence of contributors and other 
persons likely to engage with the OHA, including victims and survivors; 
 Are impartial, and perceived to be impartial, by contributors and other persons 
likely to engage with the OHA, including victims and survivors; 
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 Have experience and skills which will assist the OHA in handling sensitive 
information and making judgements about the circumstances and timing of 
contributions being made public; and 
 Neither have nor expect to have any financial or other interests that are 
reasonably likely to conflict with the exercise of their functions. 
As noted above, we believe that this body should (by majority vote if necessary) be 
tasked with agreeing the aims and objectives for the OHA, and the necessary 
policies and procedures to collect, preserve and publish new and existing oral history 
accounts. 
How would Appointments to the OHA Steering Group be made? 
The NIO draft Bill proposes that the Deputy Keeper 
must make arrangements to appoint a group of at least five persons 
(‘the steering group’) who, in the Deputy Keeper’s view, have (between 
them) experience of obtaining oral history records in Northern Ireland 
and experience of obtaining oral history records outside Northern 
Ireland. 
The proposals also state that it would be for the Deputy Keeper to decide who has 
the necessary ‘experience of obtaining oral history records’ and thus qualified to 
serve on the Group.230 
As noted above we propose to give to the Steering Group much more wide ranging 
and specific powers than proposed in the NIO draft Bill (as crafted it is merely a 
consultative group) and as such we recognise the importance of ensuring that 
suitably qualified individuals are appointed to it. 
We also see in the Steering Group an important opportunity to ensure representation 
from existing community oral history initiatives and networks and to bring to the fore 
relevant professional, practical, technical, medical, and legal expertise. It is thus very 
important that the criteria for appointments to the group are clear, specific, and 
transparent. 
The NIO’s Consultation Paper that accompanies the draft NIO Bill highlights the 
importance of ensuring that the work of the academics appointed to the 
Implementation and Reconciliation Group is ‘recognised as being independent, 
rigorous and in line with academic best practice.’ It furthermore suggests that ‘it may 
be valuable for the academic report to use a multi-disciplinary approach and to work 
with organisations such as the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) to 
help provide structure for the project’. We think that it is equally important to ensure 
that the OHA Steering Group is ‘recognised as being independent, rigorous and in 
line with academic best practice’. We thus suggest that either the ESRC or its sister 
                                       
230
 Ibid, cl 52(9). 
MODEL BILL TEAM RESPONSE TO NIO LEGACY CONSULTATION 
69 
body – the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) – could be drawn upon to 
help establish and apply criteria for appointments to the OHA Steering Group. 
What Records would the OHA admit? 
The NIO draft Bill stipulates that the archive would relate to 
events that have the required connection with Northern Ireland and 
occurred in Northern Ireland or Ireland during the period beginning 
with 1 January 1966 and ending with 10 April 1998; and other 
significant events that have the required connection with Northern 
Ireland.231 
The ‘required connection with Northern Ireland’ is defined in this section as relating 
to events related to: 
a) the constitutional status of Northern Ireland or 
b) sectarian or political hostility between persons in Northern 
Ireland.232 
With regard to the HIU, an act of violence or force would be interpreted as having the 
‘required connection with Northern Ireland’ if the act was carried out: 
a) for a reason related to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland 
or to political or sectarian hostility between persons there, or 
b) in connection with preventing, investigating, or otherwise dealing 
with the consequences of, an act intended to be done, or done, for 
a reason related to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland or 
to political or sectarian hostility between persons there. 
It is unclear why the definition of the ‘required connection with Northern Ireland’ is 
narrower with regard to the OHA but, at any rate, the key point is that decisions 
about how the ‘required connection’ is applied in practice should not be taken solely 
by the Deputy Keeper of PRONI. The NIO draft Bill proposals define an ‘oral history 
archive’ as ‘a collection of records which recount personal experiences (“oral history 
records”) and which are of a lasting historical significance.’ Presumably gender-
based violence, intergenerational trauma and so forth could qualify as relating to 
‘sectarian or political hostility’ but the point again is that, as proposed, it is for the 
Deputy Keeper to determine what records have ‘the required connection’. 
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The draft NIO bill also states that the oral history records in the archive may take 
‘any form’ including audio, visual, and audio-visual records and transcripts. However, 
it notes that the OHA 
may also include records … that are not oral history records (including 
catalogues and indexes, and records which would or might be 
regarded in other contexts as ephemera), if they 
a) are ancillary to oral history records in the archive, and 
b) would assist the orderly preservation of, and access to, the 
archive.233 
It is unclear from these clauses whether quilts and other artefacts that have been 
central to the creation of some oral history collections would be admissible. Again, if 
the Bill as proposed becomes law, the admissibility of such material would depend 
on what the Deputy Keeper deemed to be ‘ancillary’ to the oral history records and 
the extent to which they assist the cause of ‘preservation’ and ‘access’. 
How would ‘Informed Consent’ be Determined? 
The draft Bill stipulates that the relevant Northern Ireland department would have the 
power to make rules that make provision about: 
 The giving of consent by a person to any oral history record of that person’s 
experiences being made by, or on behalf of, the Public Record Office for the 
archive; and 
 The receipt of records not made by, or on behalf of, the Public Record Office for 
the archive234 
Securing informed consent by way of a participation agreement (ideally signed in 
advance) for the conduct, archiving, and dissemination of an oral history interview is 
nowadays a basic ethical standard. It is thus entirely reasonable that those tasked 
with running the OHA should strive to ensure that this is secured for all new 
interviews and – insofar as is reasonably practicable – for all existing oral history 
records donated to the archive. There is nonetheless a concern that, as set out in the 
draft Bill, these sections could be employed by the Deputy Keeper and the Minister 
for Communities as a carte blanche to decide which records they choose to admit 
and which they choose - not only to discard - but also to destroy. 
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What Records would the OHA Destroy? 
It is curious that, although there is hardly any substantive detail in the draft Bill as to 
how the OHA would work in practice, there are no less than ten subsections on the 
procedures for disposing of records not forming part of the Archive. In particular, it is 
proposed to bestow on the Deputy Keeper the power to ‘dispose of records’ which 
‘the Deputy Keeper has decided should not form part of the archive’ and ‘records in 
respect of which any required consent has not been given’. The relevant subclauses 
include provision for laying before the Department for Communities and in turn the 
Assembly a copy of the schedule for disposal (by destruction or otherwise) of 
particular records (some of which may be listed in aggregate) that the Deputy 
Keeper deems to fall outside the remit of the archive. It is notable that, although the 
Deputy Keeper would be obliged to inform the Minister for Communities and 
politicians in the Assembly about proposals to destroy records, there is no mention of 
any obligation to inform the individual human beings to whom the records relate, or 
to give them any say in what happens to their records. Whatever the specific detail of 
the proposals to destroy records, this type of approach tends to feed accusations of 
a ‘state-centric’ model that is more concerned with protecting the institution than the 
individuals it is designed to help. 
The proposed procedures to allow the Deputy Keeper to decide what records meet 
the criteria for inclusion in the OHA and to empower the Department for 
Communities to make rules about the issue of consent also highlights the importance 
of balancing legal obligations with creativity, imagination, and common sense. It 
goes without saying that both archivists and oral history practitioners must be ever 
vigilant to matters of legal and ethical probity, but there is currently a very lively and 
important debate in oral history circles about the competing dangers of 
a) insufficient regard for the letter of the law, and 
b) a disproportionately risk-averse and legalistic approach to the 
filleting and disposal of invaluable historical records. 
These important and challenging deliberations about what to collect, how to collect it, 
who should access it and what should be redacted, withheld or destroyed should in 
our view be taken by a Steering Group comprising individuals with the necessary 
legal, practitioner and curatorial expertise rather than by the Deputy Keeper of 
PRONI and the Department for Communities.235 
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Who would be able to Contribute to the OHA? 
The Stormont House Agreement states simply that the sharing of experiences with 
the OHA would be ‘entirely voluntary’. The draft Bill echoes this commitment by 
stating that people would be invited to contribute oral history records. In our Model 
Bill, we emphasised the importance of enabling and facilitating contributions from 
individuals – and in particular victims and survivors - residing outside Northern 
Ireland. We thus welcome the proposal in the draft Bill that states: ‘The records in 
the oral history archive may be received from persons in the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, or elsewhere.’236 In theory, any individual who wishes to recount their 
personal experiences of events relating to the Northern Ireland conflict could 
contribute to the OHA but, as noted, we are concerned that stories would only be 
admitted it they meet the qualifying criteria to be determined and decided upon by 
the Deputy Keeper. In our Model Bill, we underlined the importance of seeking the 
cooperation of individuals and organisations outside Northern Ireland by including a 
dedicated section on ‘Arrangements with the Republic of Ireland’. By contrast, the 
Explanatory Notes to the draft Bill make it clear that ‘The majority of the provisions in 
the Bill extend to the whole of the UK, with the exception of Part 4 (the Oral History 
Archive) … which extend to Northern Ireland only.’237 It is vitally important the 
Archive is poised to be outward rather than inward facing and as such, this is an 
issue that could usefully be clarified in the course of the consultation. 
Would Certain Individuals or Stories be Prioritised? 
The draft Bill proposes that the Deputy Keeper 
make arrangements for the Public Record Office to identify other 
organisations which have made, or make, oral history records, and to 
inform those other organisations of the possibility of the oral history 
records made by them being included in the archive.238 
Beyond an obligation to make this possibility known and to invite the contribution of 
new records there is no reference in the draft Bill or accompanying documentation to 
a strategy for targeting of existing and new material. 
The contribution of records to the oral history archive must, of course, be on a 
voluntary basis but oral historians have long since cautioned against the dangers of 
a ‘lazy reliance’ on ‘voluntary self-selection’.239 Without a concerted effort to a) 
identify work that has already been done; b) establish gaps and omissions; and c) 
reach out to unheard or ‘hard to reach’ voices and perspectives, there is a danger 
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that only the ‘middle groups’ in society are represented and/or that louder or more 
insistent voices dominate the overall collection. 
We feel that the difficult and challenging questions concerning where efforts and 
resources are channelled should not be sidestepped and that rather there should be 
an open and transparent articulation of the aims and objectives of the Archive, and a 
corresponding five-year strategy for the prioritisation and acquisition of new and 
existing material. Again, this should be determined by a strong and diverse Steering 
Group, rather than the Deputy Keeper. 
What would be the Purpose of the Proposed Historical Timeline? 
The Stormont House Agreement included a paragraph which proposed that ‘A 
research project will be established as part of the Archive, led by academics to 
produce a factual historical timeline and statistical analysis of the Troubles, to report 
within 12 months.’240 The draft Bill curiously does not include reference to this 
timeline in the section on the OHA but it is referenced in a later section on ‘Reports 
to the IRG’, which refers to ‘a report provided to the IRG by any research project 
established as part of the oral history archive (see paragraph 25 of the Stormont 
House Agreement)’.241 It is also referred to in the NIO’s Consultation Paper and 
summary documents (longer version and easy read version). Here it is stated that, in 
addition to recording new stories and gathering information about existing projects, 
the OHA would ‘make a historical timeline of the Troubles’.242 
This issue was addressed by a team of historians and social scientists from Northern 
Ireland, Ireland and Britain at a workshop on ‘Historians and the Stormont House 
Agreement’ led by Professor Ian McBride at Hertford College, Oxford, in October 
2016. In their joint report, they noted that ‘the purpose of “a factual historical timeline” 
is unclear’. They note the existence of a plethora of excellent detailed chronologies 
and caution that greater clarity about the purpose of this timeline is necessary in 
order to avoid the ‘risk of creating misunderstandings among the wider public about 
the nature of academic research’. The report goes on to acknowledge that: 
One advantage of historical scholarship is precisely the lack of 
importance attached to polemical arguments over ‘who fired the first 
shot?’ Dealing with the past in Northern Ireland will require engaging 
with more complex questions of causation and responsibility.243 
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As noted above, the purpose of this Archive in our view is indeed to get beyond the 
dehumanising and reductionist approach of a statistical timeline and instead to give 
space to individuals to tell their story in full, in context, and in all of its broader 
complexity. Professor Paul Thompson emphasises the potential that oral history 
holds out to engage with the ‘messiness’ of ‘awkwardly individual lives’ and notes: 
Reality is complex and many-sided; and it is a primary merit of oral 
history that, to a much greater extent than most sources, it allows the 
original multiplicity of standpoints to be recreated.244 
Before asking members of the general public to comment on whether or not ‘the Oral 
History Archive proposals provide an appropriate method for people from all 
backgrounds to share their experiences of the Troubles’, it is imperative that more 
detail is provided on those proposals, including the role and function of the proposed 
historical timeline and any related ‘research projects’. In particular, the NIO should 
articulate clearly how and to what extent the timeline (and any related ‘research 
projects’) might influence the criteria for inclusion of stories to the OHA and the 
subsequent report on patterns and themes. 
How would the OHA ‘attempt to draw together and work with existing groups’? 
The SHA stated that the OHA ‘will attempt to draw together and work with existing 
oral history projects’.245 In the draft Bill, the nature of this cooperation is reduced to a 
commitment by PRONI to facilitate the inclusion of existing oral history records i.e. a 
commitment that the Archive may include existing oral history records ‘which have 
been made, or are, made (at any time) by other persons (whether received by the 
archive from the person who made them or from another person)’.246 There is a 
further clause which proposes that the Deputy Keeper must make arrangements for 
the Public Record Office to ‘identify other organisations which have made, or make, 
oral history records, and to inform those other organisations of the possibility of the 
oral history records made by them being included in the archive’. 
Given the central importance of working with and through existing groups, this 
approach is unduly passive. It goes without saying that no organisation or group 
should be compelled to cooperate with the OHA but a concerted effort should be 
made to facilitate and enable the long-term preservation of existing collections. It is 
undoubtedly easier to create new material but the tendency in transitional justice to 
‘reinvent the wheel’ and overlook the valuable work that has already been done 
should be avoided. Identifying and preserving existing collections is time-consuming 
and painstaking work. It necessitates: 
 Updating and aggregating existing inventories of oral history collections; 
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 Reaching out to archivists and project leaders (many of whom have retired or 
moved on to other projects); 
 Proposing sensible and workable accommodations with regard to the legal 
requirements for the deposit of collections at PRONI; and 
 Working in a spirit of partnership with existing groups to provide viable solutions 
for the digitisation and long-term preservation of their collections. 
Securing the trust of individuals who gave their story to one individual or group and 
who are now being invited to update the terms of their participation to including long-
term preservation at PRONI is a significant challenge. It is obviously complicated in 
situations where the participants are now deceased or incapable of providing 
informed consent. However, these challenges are not insurmountable. 
We see in the creation of the Steering Group an opportunity to enlist the support of 
existing oral history networks and organisations – to gain from their experience and 
expertise and to help garner widespread support for the archive. Our thinking on this 
issue was influenced by the ‘aggregator’ models that colleagues in the international 
oral history community pointed us towards, namely the Digital Public Library of 
America and the Europeana initiatives – both of which attempt to maximise public 
access to shared history, culture and knowledge by connecting the riches held within 
dispersed historical, archival and cultural heritage organisations.247 As noted in the 
Explanatory Notes to our Model Bill we believe that the relationship between the 
OHA and existing projects could be mutually beneficial. The OHA could, for example, 
provide the resources necessary to digitise and safeguard vulnerable collections into 
the future. In order to achieve this, we think it important that the Steering Group 
establish a comprehensive outreach and engagement strategy for existing 
organisations, identifying potential barriers to participation and agreeing workable 
solutions. It could, for example, design deposit agreements with suitably flexible 
terms and conditions. In the same way that it is possible for individual contributors to 
put a ‘stay’ on elements of their interview for a specified period of time, it should be 
possible to provide a range of access options for these collections. 
Should Existing Oral History Groups feel Threatened by the Proposed OHA? 
The fact that there is in existence a plethora of excellent conflict-related oral history 
archives, groups, and networks raises a fundamentally important question. When the 
proposed OHA was first mooted a number of local oral historians understandably 
asked: Why do we need a central, state-sponsored archive? Would it not be better to 
fund and support existing archives, groups, and networks? Is there not a danger that 
this new central body would displace and disrupt the good work that is being done on 
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the ground rather that supporting and enabling it? This was likened in our 
consultation with the president of the Oral History Association to the effect of 
Walmart coming to town and gradually wiping out smaller grocery stores.248 
Whilst we fully understand these concerns and feel strongly that existing groups 
should not in any way be threatened or diminished by the OHA, our sense is that 
there is a need for a coordinated strategy for conflict-related oral history research 
and that this mechanism could bring to light the valuable work that has gone before 
and point up new directions for future work. Most importantly, we recognise that, in 
the absence of a properly funded sound archive, with adequate space, resources 
and longevity, much of the valuable heritage material currently held in drawers and 
attics, or indeed in smaller archives that have run out of funding, is currently at risk. 
The pace of change in recording technology is relentless and sound files are thus 
particularly vulnerable to becoming obsolete. Likewise, online archives can easily go 
under when funding dries up due to broken links, viruses, and failure to maintain 
domains.249 We see in the creation of a central archive a valuable opportunity to 
safeguard the viability of at-risk sound archives and at the same time to create 
opportunities to magnify their impact and reach. 
Whilst PRONI may not have been our first choice for the provision of a central 
repository, it does have the benefit of a new and purpose built premises in the Titanic 
quarter and has fully trained staff with expertise in archiving and preserving records. 
As such – subject to the necessary checks and balances – it could provide the 
platform for a long-overdue, properly resourced, sound archive. 
How would the Credibility of Stories be Evaluated? 
Unlike the evidence submitted to the ICIR and the HIU for the purposes of compiling 
family reports and (in the case of the HIU) potentially triggering a prosecution, there 
is less emphasis with oral history records on the verification of facts. Ethical and 
well-trained oral historians are obviously concerned to avoid vexatious and 
deliberately distorted accounts of the past. For example, they generally conduct as 
much background research as possible in order to help individual interviewees 
faithfully recount their memories. That said, an oral history interview is not an 
interrogation and the credibility of individual accounts is something that tends to be 
evaluated after the event by historians and others (typically by triangulating and 
crosschecking with other sources, checking for internal consistency and validity, and 
considering potential bias and distortion). Whatever about the credibility of individual 
stories, it is nonetheless important to bear in mind that the credibility of the OHA as a 
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whole would depend on the extent to which it succeeds in garnering widespread 
support and input from across communities. 
To what Extent would the Confidentiality of Stories admitted to the OHA be 
Protected? 
The SHA stated that ‘The Archive will bring forward proposals on the circumstances 
and timing of contributions being made public’. The NIO Consultation Paper expands 
on this point noting that, in some cases, final contributions could contain information, 
for example personal information, which is fundamental to the oral history account 
and its historical value but which, for legislative reasons, or at the request of the 
contributor should not be made public immediately. It is envisaged that this 
information could be kept private for an extended period, if necessary. The draft NIO 
bill bestows the power to make such decisions on the Deputy Keeper.250 The draft 
Bill and accompanying documentation do not, however, contain any detail about the 
criteria by which public access decisions would be taken. Presumably, the records 
admitted to the archive would be subject to a standard ‘sensitivity review’: there 
would be an assumption of public access and restrictions and / or redactions would 
only be introduced for specific reasons and for a limited time span. As with the 
decisions regarding which records are to cease to form part of the Archive and to be 
destroyed, we feel that more should be said about the rights of the individual 
contributors in relation to decisions affecting access to their stories. In the Model Bill, 
we included a series of sections acknowledging the right of contributors to make 
requests regarding the publication of their story (or parts thereof) and to be consulted 
and fully informed regarding any decision taken to redact their story or withhold it 
from publication. 
Would the OHA offer Immunity from Legal Liabilities? 
At no stage has any form of amnesty or immunity from prosecution been part of the 
proposals for the OHA. The NIO Consultation Paper notes in the section on the OHA 
that: 
Potential contributors would also be made aware of PRONI’s duties 
regarding the protection of information and disclosure. In relation to the 
OHA, PRONI would be subject to existing laws on protection of 
information and disclosure, including the Data Protection Act 1998, the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
would not be exempt from any court order served for the release of 
information, including requests for disclosure in relation to criminal 
investigations. Nor would it be exempt from any statutory duty to report 
crimes. 
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It is thus clear that information provided to the OHA would be admissible in criminal, 
civil and inquest proceedings. This reality has been underlined in the sharpest 
possible terms by the repercussions of the Boston College Tapes project. In 2011, 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) began a legal bid to access oral history 
interviews given by former paramilitaries. Subpoenas were subsequently issued and 
several of the accounts admitted to the archive were then used in criminal 
investigations and proceedings. The repercussions of this project have undoubtedly 
introduced a ‘chill factor’ in relation to sensitive oral history research and, in 
particular, fears have heightened about the risks of inadvertently incriminating 
oneself or named third parties. This fear is not confined to paramilitaries but affects 
state actors and indeed all members of the general public who may have witnessed 
unlawful activity of one kind or another. 
Our approach to this issue is to mitigate the potential dangers and thus reassure 
potential contributors that their stories can be safely told. This is generally achieved 
by ensuring that, as part of their training, interviewers are made familiar with the 
relevant legislation (e.g. Section 5 of the Criminal Law Act (NI) 1967) and that the 
potential repercussions of disclosing information about criminal activity or allegations 
of criminal offences that have not been prosecuted and fully determined are 
explained clearly to interviewees. 
We feel that it is important to keep these issues in context. The OHA would not be 
designed to be a magnet for information about illegal activity (contributors wishing to 
share such information with victims will be directed to the Independent Commission 
on Information Retrieval). Whilst it is possible that information disclosed to the 
archive could be used in a criminal investigation, the police cannot go on ‘fishing 
trips’ in archives to scan individual stories – in order to request access to a 
confidential account they would need a genuine reason linked to the investigation of 
a named serious offence.251 It should also be borne in mind that, whilst projects that 
could potentially attract information about unlawful activity have undoubtedly been 
thwarted, serious, and sensitive post-conflict oral history projects have been 
successfully completed before and after the Boston project.252 All concerned should 
be mindful of the potential risks and dangers, but fear should not become an alibi for 
unnecessary self-censorship. 
The draft Bill specifically addresses the issue of defamation, and proposes that, in 
relation to work carried out for the OHA, the Department, its staff and agents have 
limited protection from defamation claims in the courts. A further clause proposes 
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that the Deputy Keeper reserves the power to waive this immunity (in whole or to any 
extent) on any person.253 Whilst we think it understandable for PRONI to seek to 
protect its staff against defamation and other claims with regard to the Archive, it is 
equally important to consider the rights and vulnerabilities of contributors. Rather 
than simply making contributors aware of PRONI’s legal obligations, all interviewers 
should be fully trained on these issues. Decisions regarding the disclosure of 
information contained within individual records or the need to exclude records (or 
parts thereof) from the Archive on legal grounds should be taken by the Steering 
Group in light of clear and transparent criteria. As noted above (and as stipulated in 
the Model Bill), the original contributor should also be granted the opportunity to 
make representations and should be informed about decisions affecting their 
story.254 
Does the issue of National Security arise in relation to the Oral History 
Archive? 
The OHA is not designed to attract information about unlawful activity or secrets of 
the state but it is nonetheless possible that information included in an individual 
testimony could be deemed harmful to national security and, on that account, 
redacted or destroyed. 
We propose that decisions on redaction and closure should be taken by the Steering 
Group in line with clear and transparent criteria. In the (albeit highly unlikely) event 
that it is proposed to redact or destroy an account because the information contained 
within it is deemed harmful to national security, we recommend that the individual 
who contributed the information should (if they are unhappy with the decision of the 
Steering Group) have recourse to the appeal mechanism we have proposed for 
national security redactions arising in the context of the HIU and the ICIR (see 
section on ‘National Security’ in ‘Key Issues That Must be Addressed’ and 
Appendix). 
To what extent would Vulnerable Interviewees be Facilitated and Protected? 
There is no information in the draft Bill and accompanying papers about the ways in 
which the OHA would work with and through existing organisations that represent 
victims and survivors such as the Victims and Survivors Service. We propose that 
individuals with direct experience of working with victims be included in the Steering 
Group and that efforts are made via the ‘train the trainers’ model to capitalise on the 
knowledge and expertise of those who have specific experience of interviewing and 
supporting vulnerable and traumatised individuals. We further propose that an 
individual with professional training in trauma is included on the Steering Group and 
that every effort is made to ensure cross learning between oral historians and other 
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professionals with relevant practical, medical, and legal training. In our Model Bill, we 
proposed that this should be reflected both in the interviewer training programme 
and in a comprehensive code of practice that includes a range of measures to 
facilitate contributions from victims and survivors. 
How would the OHA be Funded? 
The OHA section in the draft Bill does not have a specific section on ‘funding’. 
However, the Explanatory Notes suggest under ‘Financial Implications of the Bill’ that 
it would be funded from the £150 million (£30 million per annum for 5 years) 
allocated by the UK Government. Given that the Public Record Office, which is a 
division within the NI Department for Communities, would be assigned the function of 
organising it, we presume that the NIO is proposing that the Department of 
Communities should decide the amount necessary to set up and run the OHA and to 
duly pay the expenses via PRONI. The OHA would thus be paid from the 
Department for Communities’ budget and there would be no obligation on the UK 
centrally to resource it. By contrast, the Model Implementation Bill proposed payment 
from the Consolidated Fund through the UK Treasury. We also noted in our 
Explanatory Notes to the Model Bill the vital importance of ensuring funding beyond 
the five-year window proposed for the other mechanisms.255 
For how Long would the OHA Operate? 
Unlike the HIU and the ICIR, the work of the OHA (subject to available funding) is not 
time-bound. This is one of its greatest strengths. Archives are designed to last and 
the fact that accounts could be contributed for years to come facilitates important 
intergenerational work. More importantly, it means that victims and survivors can 
come forward to tell their story in full and in context, at a time and place that best 
suits their needs.256 They can also revisit their stories in light of changing 
circumstances and perspectives. 
The read across to the work of the Implementation and Reconciliation Group does, 
however, introduce an important caveat with regard to the proposed timeframe. As 
noted below the stories admitted to the OHA are destined to be a central source of 
information for the identification of patterns and themes. This work is due to 
commence five years after the mechanisms get up and running. As things stand, it is 
unclear whether stories that are admitted to the OHA after this period can be 
considered. 
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Would the OHA have to Report on its Work? 
The draft Bill proposes that the Deputy Keeper of PRONI must produce and publish 
an annual report on the exercise of the function of organising the Archive. The draft 
Bill further proposes that a copy of this annual report must be given to the HIU, the 
ICIR and the IRG but it is unclear how, if at all, the report should influence the work 
of these bodies. This issue was raised at a recent briefing we provided to the Victims 
and Survivors Forum.257 One member of that group welcomed our emphasis on the 
contribution that the OHA could make to documenting gender-related issues but 
asked how, if at all, this might affect the work of the HIU or the ICIR. In her view, it 
was not enough that, for example, testimonies relating to gender discrimination 
should simply inform a few paragraphs in the IRG’s report on patterns and themes 
and that the relevant testimonies should then be available to future generations. 
Rather she wanted to know how the stories accruing to the OHA might inform and 
shape the work of the other legacy mechanisms. We think this is an important point 
and thus suggest that the annual report relating to the OHA should include 
consideration as to how the patterns and themes emerging might inform wider 
legacy work. This speaks to the overarching need to avoid fragmentation and to 
ensure that all of the legacy mechanisms are harnessed to pull together. 
How would the OHA Contribute to analysis of Themes and Patterns? 
There has been some debate to date about the procedures by which academics 
might be appointed to work on a report on patterns and themes for the 
Implementation and Reconciliation Group (IRG). Concerns have also been raised 
about the sources that the academics might draw upon to compile that report. Less 
attention has been paid to the processes by which evidence will accrue to the Oral 
History Archive. We regard this as a significant oversight because, regardless of the 
other sources that the IRG appointed academics may or may not consult, the reports 
from the ICIR, HIU and OHA are clearly flagged as ‘the principal reports’.258 
As currently crafted, the draft NIO bill proposes to give the Deputy Keeper the power 
to decide which stories meet the criteria for inclusion in the archive. It furthermore 
proposes that: 
The Deputy Keeper must provide the Implementation and 
Reconciliation Group with a report on patterns and themes the Deputy 
Keeper has identified from the exercise of the function of organising the 
archive.259 
The draft Bill proposes this report must be provided to the IRG exactly five years 
after the Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill comes into force. 
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It is totally unacceptable, in our view, to grant a career civil servant, accountable to 
the Minister for Communities, with sole discretion to determine which stories can be 
admitted to the Archive, which should be redacted, withheld or destroyed, and which 
sections of the publicly available accounts should inform a report on patterns and 
themes. The work on patterns and themes is a cornerstone of the legacy programme 
and as such, it is imperative that it should be guided and directed by an independent, 
diverse, and representative Steering Group. 
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V. The Implementation and Reconciliation Group 
The Stormont House Agreement also provided for the creation of an Implementation 
and Reconciliation Group (IRG). Three very brief paragraphs (51-54) refer to the 
work of the IRG. Paragraph 51 provides that the IRG would be established to 
oversee ‘themes, archives and patterns’ and that after five years after the IRG and 
the other legacy institutions are established, the IRG should commission 
independent academic experts to produce a report on themes and patterns. It also 
stipulates that ‘any potential evidence base for patterns and themes should be 
referred to from any of the legacy mechanisms which may comment on the level of 
cooperation received’. Finally, it declares that ‘this process should be conducted with 
sensitivity and rigorous intellectual integrity, devoid of any political interference.’ 
Paragraph 52 states 
Promoting reconciliation will underlie all of the work of the IRG. It will 
encourage and support other initiatives that contribute to reconciliation, 
better understanding of the past and reducing sectarianism. 
Paragraph 53 states that in the context of the work of the IRG, the UK and Irish 
governments would consider statements of acknowledgement and would expect 
others to do the same. 
Paragraph 54 deals with the make-up of the IRG. It states that the IRG will consist of 
political appointees (DUP 3, Sinn Féin 2, one each from SDLP, UUP, Alliance, UK, 
and Irish government). 
The leaked version of the 2015 Stormont House Bill did not contain any provisions 
relating to the IRG. However the 2018 draft Bill and related consultation document 
contains provisions on the functions of the IRG, how it would operate, how its 
members would be appointed and proposed governance structures with regard to 
the work of the academics involved in the preparation of the report on themes and 
patterns. 
This section of our response will provide an overview of key components of the IRG 
and where appropriate will make recommendations for amendments to the draft Bill 
to ensure that the IRG delivers upon its mandate in a manner that is both workable 
and human rights compliant. 
What would be the Functions of the IRG? 
Clause 60 of the draft Bill details the IRG’s functions. These are: 
 To take such steps as the IRG considers necessary promote reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland and combat sectarianism; 
 To support and encourage other persons in the promotion of reconciliation; 
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 To review and assessment the implementation of all past-related parts of the 
Stormont House Agreement; and 
 To report annually to the FM/DFM and UK and Irish governments on any steps 
that it has taken to promote reconciliation and review and assess legacy work. 
The formulation of the IRG’s functions in the draft Bill seemingly extends beyond the 
SHA as the SHA tasked the IRG with overseeing ‘themes, patterns and information 
recovery’, whereas the draft Bill expands its oversight responsibilities to include the 
HIU. This expansion seems inconsistent with the provisions in the draft Bill relating to 
oversight of the HIU, which do not mention the IRG. 
Although it is not expressly listed as a function of the IRG, as discussed below, 
Clause 62 requires the IRG to commission an independent academic report on the 
themes and patterns identified in the work of the HIU, ICIR, OHA, and the Coroners’ 
Courts. 
Which Principles would Govern the IRG’s work? 
In exercising its functions, the IRG is required to act consistently with the general 
principles in the SHA and Clause 1 of the draft Bill. In addition, Clause 60(6) 
provides that the person chairing the IRG must ensure that the Group’s annual 
reports do ‘not contain any information which— (a) might put at risk the life or safety 
of any person, or (b) would contravene the Data Protection Act 1998, if it were to be 
published.’260 Furthermore, Clause 60(7) requires ‘The members of the IRG must 
have regard to the need for them to work collaboratively and in such a way as to 
secure public confidence in the IRG’. 
How would the IRG Promote Reconciliation? 
The promotion of reconciliation is an overarching principle of the SHA’s legacy 
proposals, in recognition that 20 years after the Good Friday Agreement, meaningful 
societal reconciliation has largely not yet been achieved. The Implementation and 
Reconciliation Group is the body primarily tasked with drawing together the work of 
the other mechanisms and advancing this vitally important objective. However, 
beyond the broadly framed commitments to promoting reconciliation referred to in 
the IRG’s functions, the package of documents in the consultation provide no further 
guidance on how the IRG would promote reconciliation. It would certainly be helpful 
if further clarification was provided on this point as a result of the consultation. 
Under the IRG’s power to support or encourage persons to promote reconciliation, it 
might, for example, be able to award some funding to grassroots reconciliation 
projects, which would be welcome. 
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In addition, the academic report on themes and patterns that is to be commissioned 
by the IRG could help the process of broader reconciliation. 
Furthermore, the IRG could promote reconciliation and support reconciliation efforts 
of others by promoting statements of acknowledgment. The Stormont House 
Agreement states that ‘In the context of the work of the IRG, the UK and Irish 
Governments will consider statements of acknowledgement and would expect others 
to do the same.’261 However, the draft Bill does not mention the link between the 
work of the IRG and these proposed statements of acknowledgement. 
Consideration should be given to the placing of a statutory duty on the IRG to 
conduct such work as it deems necessary for preparing materials that will be useful 
for two governments and others to considering the issuing of statements of 
acknowledgement as mandated in the Stormont House Agreement. 
How would the IRG Oversee the Implementation of the Stormont House 
Agreement? 
The IRG would be established as body corporate and would be intended to operate 
independently to oversee the review and assess the implementation of the Stormont 
House Agreement. In the draft Bill, the IRG’s means of performing this function are 
presented as receiving and producing reports. 
The HIU, ICIR, and the OHA would be required to submit copies of their annual 
reports to the IRG among other recipients.262 Furthermore, in addition to providing 
final reports to the IRG on themes and patterns, these institutions would be permitted 
to submit interim reports to the IRG on themes and patterns or in the case of the 
ICIR, on the level of cooperation they were receiving.263 These interim reports would 
not be disclosed and the Chair of the IRG would have a duty to receive the reports in 
confidence. The Chair would be required to share the reports with the other 
members of the IRG once the four ‘principal reports’ have been received, but the 
Chair has the discretion to share reports with other IRG members earlier if he or she 
thinks it is appropriate to do so. The IRG can also receive from the OHA ‘a report … 
by any research project established as part of the oral history archive’.264 
As noted above, the IRG would be required to produce annual reports detailing the 
steps it has taken to oversee the implementation of the SHA and to provide these 
reports to both governments and FM/DFM. However, the draft Bill provides no further 
guidance on how the IRG would carry out its oversight functions. In particular, it is 
unclear whether the IRG would be permitted or required to take any action if the HIU 
or ICIR submitted an interim report declaring that it was not receiving adequate 
cooperation from an entity. 
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How would the IRG Members be Appointed? 
The draft Bill makes it clear that while those appointed to the IRG are political 
appointees, they cannot simultaneously hold a relevant public elected position. 
Relevant public elected positions include being a member of the Northern Ireland 
Legislative Assembly, a councillor in Northern Ireland, a Member of Parliament, a 
member of the House of Lords, a member of Dáil Éireann, a member of Seanad 
Éireann or a member of the European Parliament from any member state. 
The draft Bill proposes that the IRG would be chaired by a person ‘of international 
standing’ to be appointed by the First and deputy First Minister. The SHA stipulates 
that one member would be appointed by the UK government, another by the Irish 
government, and the remainder nominated by the five largest political parties in 
Northern Ireland according to the formula agreed in the Stormont House Agreement. 
The draft Bill lays out the process for nomination to these positions. 
What would be the Process for Removing Members of the IRG? 
Schedule 17, Clause 2(2) states that the relevant ‘appointing authority’ may remove 
a member of the IRG from office simply by giving him or her ‘written notice of 
removal’. This would appear to present the obvious risk that once nominated onto 
the IRG, unless a person rigidly follows the party political positions of the different 
political parties (or indeed the two governments), they could be summarily removed 
from the IRG and presumably be replaced by someone more pliant who would not 
deviate from such party political positions. For the IRG to function properly, be 
consistent with principles (a) and (f) of Clause 1 of the Draft Bill, and fulfil its 
mandate with regard to promoting reconciliation, it would require those appointed to 
act in the public interest and to act without fear that they will be summarily removed 
for narrow party political reasons. 
The solution to the risk of IRG members being dismissed for party political reasons 
could be found in Schedule 17, Clause 2(6) of the Draft Bill. It provides that IRG 
members are to hold office subject to the terms and conditions to be determined by 
the First and deputy First Minister and that any additional provision on the removal of 
office could be contained therein. 
The current carte blanche provisions in Schedule 17, Clause 2(2) of the draft Bill 
should be removed and replaced by an agreed protocol from FM/DFM that would 
detail the responsibilities of the IRG members as office holders. This would include 
how they are to abide by the principles outlined in the SHA and Clause 1 of the draft 
Bill and stipulate the precise grounds by which any IRG member could be removed 
by the IRG itself rather than by the nominating parties. Removal for party political 
reasons should not be one of those grounds. These grounds, including those relating 
to confidentiality, should also make clear how the terms of appointment of IRG 
members will square with current protections for whistle-blowers who become aware 
of human rights abuses or other illegal activities. 
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What Procedures would Govern the IRG’s Operations? Could any Member or 
Group of Members Exercise a Veto? 
The draft Bill stipulates (as did the Model Bill) that the IRG should be established as 
a body corporate, similar to the HIU and ICIR as discussed above. Again, this is to 
be broadly welcomed as a required step to protect the independence of the IRG. 
One obvious point with regard to the proposed nomination formula for the IRG is that 
it reflects the political configuration in 2014 when the Stormont House Agreement 
was concluded. Presumably, those negotiating this formula in the SHA assumed that 
the enabling legislation would be introduced either in 2015, or at least before the 
next Assembly elections. However, this did not happen and it may be several years 
before legislation is passed, the IRG is established and its members are appointed, 
by which time the political arithmetic may have altered.265 
With regard to its practical working arrangements, Schedule 17 makes clear that for 
the IRG to be quorate 7 members must be present including the Chair, the UK 
Government nominee, and the Government of Ireland nominee. It also stipulates that 
decisions must be agreed by at least two-thirds of members participating. For 
example, this would mean if there are 7 members participating, 5 members would 
need to agree for a valid decision to be made, if there were 8 or 9 members 
participating, 6 would need to agree, if there were 10 members participating, 7 would 
need to agree, and if 11 members were participating, 8 would need to agree for any 
decision to be valid. 
The requirement of a two-thirds working majority,266 which is not contained in the 
Stormont House Agreement, in effect offers the combined voting of the Democratic 
Unionist Party (3 nominees) and the Ulster Unionist Party (1 nominee) a de facto 
veto over any decision made by the IRG. The two nationalist parties (Sinn Féin 2 
nominees, and SDLP 1 nominee) could not exercise and such veto without the 
support of the Irish government or Alliance Party (1 nominee each). If the current 
formula were retained, the combined votes of the DUP and UUP would not require 
the support of the British government or any other party to exercise any such veto. 
The key issue in judging the impact of that veto is what are the ‘decisions’ which are 
likely to be made by the IRG which could be blocked by any such veto. Decisions to 
be made by the IRG would include those related to the promotion of reconciliation267 
and the role of the IRG in reviewing and assessing implementation of the other 
legacy mechanisms of the Stormont House Agreement.268 
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Given the long delay, the configuration of political nominees to the IRG should be 
based on the most recent Northern Ireland Assembly election results prior to the 
IRG’s establishment rather than ‘frozen’ in 2014 – and thus the legislation should be 
amended accordingly. 
To avoid the risk of the credibility of the IRG being undermined by the appearance 
that the political representatives of one section of the community could operate a de 
facto blocking veto over the decision-making process within the IRG, a simple 
majority of 6 from 11 (or equivalent if less members are present) should be adopted. 
What Procedures or Standards would govern the Commissioning of the 
Independent Academic Report on Themes and Patterns? 
Clause 62(1) of the draft Bill states the IRG ‘must commission academic experts to 
identify, and then report to the IRG on, patterns and themes’. This report would be 
commissioned once the IRG has received the principal reports (but not simply 
interim reports) from the HIU, ICIR, OHA, and the Coroners' Courts of Northern 
Ireland. This would not happen until five years after the legislation has entered into 
effect in order to ensure that the independent academic experts have a sufficient 
evidence base with which to work. 
In addition to the draft Bill and Explanatory Notes, the Northern Ireland Office 
published a specific document on how the Independent Academic Report element of 
the IRG could work.269 That document considers ‘how the academic expert work 
could be commissioned, taking into account issues of independence and impartiality; 
good governance and ethics; and ownership of research’.270 It refers to existing 
mechanisms, which fund high quality research as well as provide an architecture for 
the commissioning, governance, peer review, independence, and ethics of that 
research. It suggests that these mechanisms could provide a model for 
commissioning academic research. It cites the examples of the Economic and Social 
Research Council (which oversees social science research including sociology, 
politics, law, elements of psychology etc.), the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (which oversees arts subjects such as history, languages, religious studies, 
aspects of law etc.). It also refers to the Irish Research Council, which covers both 
social science and arts subjects and provides a similar architecture for research 
governance, independence, and rigour. 
It also correctly notes the strong emphasis on multi-disciplinary research across all of 
these bodies and that the ESRC (and AHRC) regularly ‘provide advice and support’ 
to those seeking to benefit from their expertise and connections to academic 
networks. 
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How would the Independence of the Independent Academic Experts be 
Safeguarded? 
Clause 62(4) of the draft Bill states that ‘the academic experts must be independent, 
free from political influence and act in way which can secure public confidence’. 
Given that the IRG would be made up of political appointees, the independence, 
professionalism, and integrity of the work of the academic report on themes and 
patterns would be absolutely central to the credibility of the work of the IRG and 
indeed the SHA legacy mechanisms in general. In the absence of such a report on 
themes and patterns, the work of the OHA, HIU, and ICIR is by its nature largely 
individualistic and ‘case by case’ focused. It is the role of the IRG, through the 
academic report, to produce an account that assesses the themes and patterns or 
‘bigger picture of the conflict.’ This work would in turn be central to the efforts of the 
IRG to challenge sectarianism and promote reconciliation. 
The ESRC and AHRC should be engaged explicitly to commission the academic 
work on patterns and themes to ensure independence, impartiality, and best practice 
in the academic research. The reason for engaging both the ESRC and AHRC (who 
work collaboratively on a regular basis under the broader umbrella of UK Research 
and Innovation)271 is to ensure that those involved in preparing the academic report 
encompass both social science and arts disciplines. Placing the ESRC and AHRC at 
centre of this process, rather than simply advising the political appointees who make 
up the IRG, is a fundamental prerequisite to the credibility of this work. 
In addition, a new provision should be inserted into the relevant clause of the 
legislation making it clear that any attempt by any member of the IRG to unduly 
influence or otherwise unduly interfere with the work of the independent academics 
involved in producing the academic report may be viewed as a breach of duty and 
that individual may be excluded from the IRG. If the power to suspend a nominating 
authority’s ability to replace someone who has been so excluded (either a political 
party or one of the two governments) for up to six months is retained in the final 
version of the legislation as a sanction for breach of the duty on the IRG, interference 
with the work of the academics involved in producing the academic reports should be 
one of the specified grounds for such a sanction. 
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What Sources of Information would inform the Work of the Independent 
Academic Experts? 
To assist the academic experts in writing their report on the patterns and themes, the 
draft Bill states in Clause 62(2)(a) that ‘the academic experts may (to the extent, if 
any, that the academic experts think it appropriate to do so) take account of 
information’ from a range of specified sources listed in subclause (3). Clause 
62(2)(b) states academic experts may not take account of such information 
unless it has lawfully been made available in the way referred to in subclause 
(3). 
The sources referred to in subclause 3 are: 
 HIU family reports and annual reports; 
 HET reports that are publicly available or made available to the academic experts 
by the family concerned; 
 ICIR reports that are publicly available or made available to the academic experts 
by the family concerned; 
 ICIR annual reports; 
 Police Ombudsman reports that are publicly available, or in the case of family 
reports, that are made available to the academic experts by the family concerned; 
 OHA records that are publicly available; 
 OHA reports that are produced by the Deputy Keeper (annual reports relating to 
the oral history archive); 
 Criminal Court Decisions in the United Kingdom and Ireland; 
 Judgments of civil courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom and Ireland that are 
made publicly available; 
 Conclusions reached in Coroners’ Courts proceedings in the UK and Ireland and 
inquiries under the Inquiries into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2015, that are made publicly available. 
The Stormont House Agreement (paragraph 51) states that ‘any potential evidence 
base for patterns and themes should be referred to the IRG from any of the legacy 
mechanisms.’ As noted above, it further states that ‘this process should be 
conducted with sensitivity and rigorous intellectual integrity, devoid of political 
interference.’ 
This makes clear that the evidence base for the examination of themes and patterns 
should emerge from the other SHA mechanisms. However, once a possible theme or 
pattern emerges from those mechanisms, it is difficult to see how the academics 
appointed could assess the validity of any such potential theme or pattern with the 
required level of ‘sensitivity and rigorous intellectual integrity’ by only researching its 
merits from the list of sources in subclause 3. 
The word ‘may’ in Clause 62(2)(a) would seem to suggest that the academics may 
give whatever weight they wish to the information provided by the list of sources 
detailed in subclause 3. However, it does not provide the independent academic 
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experts with express authority to consult sources beyond this list and weigh up the 
relevance or otherwise of those other sources in assessing the veracity of any 
suggested theme or pattern. Common sense would suggest that they should have 
such authority but that authority is not express in the draft Bill. 
If the independent academic experts were not to be permitted to read beyond the list 
of sources in subclause 3, they would not (for example) be able to consult the widely 
used Cain web service on the Troubles,272 the extensive Linenhall Library Northern 
Ireland Political Collection,273 the numerous official reports into key events in 
Northern Ireland274 or authoritative academic or historical reference points such as 
the Lost Lives book.275 
This would seem a perverse act of anti-intellectualism and run contrary to the 
statutory obligation placed upon the independent academic experts for ‘rigorous 
intellectual integrity’ and operating ‘in such a way as to secure public confidence in 
the reports’. Moreover, it would run contrary to the professional standards that 
govern academic research across all social science and arts disciplines and would 
almost certainly mean that academics with the required professional profile would be 
unwilling to undertake the work. 
In 2016, a group of distinguished academics led by Professor Ian McBride (Foster 
Professor of Irish History at Oxford) held a workshop at the University of Oxford on 
the role of historians with regard to the implementation of the Stormont House 
Agreement mechanisms.276 Although it is envisaged that the independent academic 
experts working with the IRG on themes and patterns would be drawn from a range 
of backgrounds (not just history), their conclusions have obvious read across for 
other disciplines. They argued that the academics involved in work associated with 
the IRG ‘should have access to a wider range of archival sources’ beyond those 
available in the UK national archives and the Public Records Office of Northern 
Ireland.277 They argued that the SHA should result in greater access for the 
academics appointed to relevant records held by the Northern Ireland Office, Ministry 
of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Cabinet Office archives – all of 
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which ‘hold thousands of files relevant to the writing of the thematic reports’.278 They 
further argued that 
the opening up of government records will not inevitably lead to one-
sided accounts concentrating exclusively on the security forces. Official 
records also contain extensive information on paramilitary organisation 
and activities, because they were a central focus for the state. 
They also suggested that the records of various churches, peace campaigners, 
political parties, and international organisations could be drawn upon when the 
thematic reports are being written. 
The power of the independent academic experts to review, evaluate and determine 
the relevance of all open access materials in assessing themes and patterns 
emerging from the SHA legacy mechanisms should be made explicit in the 
legislation. Moreover, as recommended by Professor McBride and his colleagues, 
with regard to archives that are not currently available, compromises must be 
reached on releasing as much material to the academic experts as possible to aid 
understanding without endangering people’s lives. 
What Guarantees are there that the Independent Academic Report would be 
Published? 
A key concern for academics involved in the writing of the report on themes and 
patterns will be to ensure that once all necessary legal and quality checks have been 
made, the report will actually be published. Clause 62(6) of the draft Bill stipulates 
that the IRG must give copies of any academic report that is produced to (a) the First 
Minister and deputy First Minister; (b) the Secretary of State, and (c) the Government 
of Ireland at the same time. Since the term used is ‘must’, it would appear that there 
no ‘decision’ on the part of the IRG regarding the passing on of the academic report. 
Clause 62(8) states that The First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly 
must—(a) lay the copy of the academic report given to them before the Northern 
Ireland Assembly, and (b) publish that copy of the report in the manner which the 
First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly consider appropriate. Again, this 
appears to be a straightforward statutory obligation to lay the academic report before 
the Assembly and to publish it. 
While the obligation to lay a copy of the academic report before the Assembly 
appears absolute, given past experiences with regard to legacy related matters, 
concerns have been expressed to us during the consultation that the requirement to 
act jointly in publishing the report ‘in a manner that the OFM/DFM jointly consider 
appropriate’ could be used to unreasonably delay publication of the report. Obviously 
if the report is laid before the Assembly, it is to all intents and purposes in the public 
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domain. However, if there is any doubt created by the requirement to publish the 
academic report when it is jointly considered appropriate, additional wording could 
be added to Clause 62(8) stating that that the requirement to act jointly cannot be 
utilised to unreasonably delay the publication of the academic report on themes and 
patterns or in laying it before the Assembly. In the event of the FM/DFM failing to 
agree an appropriate format for the publication of the academic report within a 
reasonable time, it should be published in the manner it is received. 
Would the IRG Funding Arrangements ensure Delivery of the Reconciliation 
and Themes and Patterns Work? 
Clause 59(4) provides that The First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly 
must provide the IRG with such moneys, premises, facilities, and services, as it 
considers appropriate. Schedule 17, Clause 5 also states that the IRG may do 
anything it thinks necessary or expedient in connection with the exercise of its 
functions including employing or seconding staff, entering into contracts and 
acquiring or disposing of property. 
Given past experiences regarding the unlawful blocking of legacy related funding 
(with regard to inquests) there are likely be concerns in Northern Ireland that the 
reconciliation facing and themes and patterns focused work of the IRG might be put 
at risk with similar difficulties related to funding. In order to avoid such difficulties, as 
suggested in the Model Bill, we would argue that the IRG should be paid for by the 
UK treasury from the Consolidated Fund. 
Are the Procedures for Winding up the IRG Clear Enough? 
Clause 63 provides that the FM/DFM acting jointly or the Secretary of State may, 
make provision for winding up the IRG after consulting the Government of Ireland 
and any other person the FM/DFM considers appropriate. The draft Explanatory 
Notes (Note 192) make it clear that this would happen ‘at the conclusion of its work.’ 
That phrase is not included in the draft Bill. 
The phrase ‘At the Conclusion of its Work’, should be inserted into the first sentence 
of Clause 63 of the draft Bill. 
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Appendix:  
Dealing with the Past: A Proposed Model for Information 
Redaction under the Stormont House Agreement 
Introduction 
This paper is designed to assist efforts to narrow the gap between the different 
actors on the outstanding issues preventing the establishment of the various past-
focused institutions contained in the Stormont House Agreement (2014). In 
particular, it suggests an independent judicial mechanism that could make 
determinations on balancing the state’s responsibilities to protect people, with the 
truth-recovery related rights of families affected by the conflict. It focuses, in 
particular, on the workings of the Historical Investigations Unit (HIU). In the interests 
of harmonising as much as possible the work of the Stormont House Agreement 
institutions, the proposed mechanism could be used to make independent 
determinations in any analogous disputes between the Independent Commission on 
Information Retrieval (ICIR) and the British or Irish governments or indeed any 
disagreements which might arise with regard to the other agreed mechanisms in the 
SHA. 
Underpinning Principles 
Having examined in some detail the relevant UK and European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence in particular, as well as analogous practical experience in the 
UK and elsewhere, a number of working assumptions have emerged which have 
underpinned and been incorporated into the model proposed below: 
 Families who have lost relatives as a direct result of the conflict have a right to 
truth and the right to an investigation into the circumstances of such deaths, 
which is compliant with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 The State has an obligation to provide Article 2 compliant investigations in all 
conflict-related deaths. 
 States have a legal obligation to protect all persons within their jurisdiction from 
harm. In tightly defined circumstances (see Appendix 1), this may necessitate 
proportionate restrictions on disclosure to protect the effectiveness of operational 
methods of the police and other security services which are in current use and 
which are lawful. 
 Such restrictions cannot be used to hide human rights violations or otherwise 
unlawful or embarrassing activities. 
 Public confidence in the HIU, ICIR and other mechanisms outlined in the SHA 
can only be served by maximising the independence and decision-making 
powers of the relevant institutions, free from state or other political interference. 
 Where disputes arise between the HIU and the Secretary of State or other 
government departments with regard to onward disclosure of information to 
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families, and where such disputes cannot be resolved within a reasonable period 
of time, decisions on balancing competing imperatives should be made by an 
independent mechanism. 
 This independent mechanism should be presided over by a judge, or judges, of at 
least high court level. 
 To maximise public confidence in the process, criteria to inform the HIU and 
(where necessary) the independent judicial mechanism should be published in 
the legislation that establishes the Stormont House Agreement institutions. Those 
criteria should be devised from the relevant UK, European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence and other relevant international standards (see Appendix 1 
draft criteria). 
 The UK government has to date indicated a desire to use the term national 
security as the basis for seeking to redact sensitive information from HIU reports. 
However, national security is not defined in UK legislation. Using this term in the 
implementing legislation would require defining the term – at least for the 
purposes of dealing with the past regarding the conflict in or related to Northern 
Ireland. 
 A more straightforward approach would be to excise the term national security 
from the enabling legislation and replace it in the legislation with the actual 
criteria for redaction. The term that is used in the Stormont House Agreement is 
‘keeping people safe and secure’ and that could be used as short hand for this 
duty. 
 The independent judicial mechanism tasked with reviewing decisions on 
information redaction should involve an adversarial process wherein the 
respective arguments of the HIU, government departments and the public interest 
in disclosure would be tested. 
 Such an adversarial process requires that all parties are represented by lawyers 
in whom they have full confidence. Steps should be taken to ensure ‘equality of 
arms’ between those lawyers representing the Secretary of State, the HIU 
Director, and the affected families. To that end, a pool of independent or ‘public 
interest’ advocates should be created. Families would then choose lawyers from 
that pool to represent their interests before the independent judicial mechanism. 
These lawyers would be vetted to ensure that they could have access to all 
sensitive materials. Protocols should be developed to allow these advocates to 
provide a ‘gist’ of the proceedings to the families, their lawyers, and NGOs 
supporting them as part of taking their instructions (see further below). 
 Senior judicial personnel with relevant knowledge and experience, in either the 
jurisdiction or elsewhere, should staff the independent judicial mechanism. The 
appointed judge(s) must be capable of commanding public confidence and 
support. The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, in consultation with the 
British and Irish governments, should appointed the judge(s). Other appropriate 
international institutional stakeholders should also be consulted, including the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees 
of Non-Recurrence and the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights. 
 The detailed reasoning for the decision taken by the independent judicial 
mechanism should be published, subject to the same redaction criteria. 
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 If a decision is taken to redact sensitive information from a report to families, the 
redactions must be the minimum necessary to materially reduce the risk of death 
or harm to the specified persons concerned and proportionate to the level of risk 
when balanced against the public interest in disclosure. As is the case with 
reports issued by the Office of the Police Ombudsman, such redactions should 
only relate to the narrative or ‘findings’ elements of HIU report and not to the 
conclusions reached. Such redactions cannot be used to obscure or block 
information below the minimum disclosure requirements as detailed in Appendix 
One. 
 All steps should be taken to minimise the potential for vexatious challenges to the 
decision of the independent judicial mechanism. One way to minimise such 
challenges would be to include a statutory appeal mechanism within the enabling 
legislation with a right of appeal to a higher judicial authority (e.g. the Northern 
Ireland Court of Appeal) with the grounds for appeal specified in that legislation.




































Investigation & Recommendation Issued to HIU 
Panel 
Stage 2: 
Preliminary Decision by Director 




State informed of preliminary indications of 




Independent judicial mechanism with 
adversarial process to decide on: 
 
a) Sec of State challenges or 
b) HIU challenge or 





if any redactions 
proposed 




lodged in time, 
report issued to 
families 
MODEL BILL TEAM RESPONSE TO NIO LEGACY CONSULTATION 
98 
Stage One: HIU Investigation and Recommendation 
HIU investigation team conducts investigation and drafts case report findings for 
families. The enabling legislation should specify the assumption that all relevant 
information shall be provided to families, subject only to the duty to keep people safe 
and secure. Draft reports shall indicate whether any ‘sensitive information’ is 
included relevant to the death(s) under investigation. 
Stage Two: Preliminary Decision by HIU 
Advised by an appropriate panel, the HIU Director shall consider whether the 
sensitive information should be included in the report. That panel shall include a 
Human Rights Advisor and an Advisor on Public Safety and Security. The Policing 
Board will appoint the panel members. The panel shall balance the public interest 
and families’ truth-recovery related rights against the duty to keep people safe and 
secure. 
Stage Three: Preliminary Indication on Sensitive Information and Space for 
Resolution of any Disputes 
The HIU Director shall inform the Secretary of State of the intent to use any sensitive 
information in the report and shall specify which sensitive information is intended to 
be used. The Secretary of State shall have a specified period to respond; otherwise, 
the report including the sensitive information will be issued to the family. 
This stage may include provision for a time-limited resolution of any disputes 
between the HIU and the relevant authorities regarding the publication of sensitive 
information. 
If there are disputes between the HIU and the Secretary of State relating to the 
publication of any sensitive information that cannot be resolved, either the HIU or the 
Secretary of State may refer the matter to an independent judicial mechanism. 
Affected families members shall have a similar right of referral to the independent 
judicial mechanism. 
Stage Four: Independent Judicial Mechanism to Review HIU Decision re 
Sensitive Information Redaction or Inclusion 
Once engaged, the independent judicial mechanism would hear arguments on the 
merits regarding redaction or disclosure of sensitive information in reports destined 
to go to families and make binding determinations. This would be substantial review 
rather than a review of the decision-making process. In a review, the senior judge or 
judges would examine the granular detail of the sensitive information to be included 
or redacted. Any element of the hearing that relates to sensitive information would be 
held in camera. Throughout, the review would be an adversarial process with the 
respective interests of the Secretary of State, the HIU and the families’ interests in 
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disclosure being legally represented. The criteria by which the independent judicial 
mechanism shall make its determination should be published in the enabling 
legislation (see below). The detailed reasoning for the judicial decision taken shall be 
published, subject to the duty to keep people safe and secure. The independent 
judicial mechanism shall determine whether the relevant sensitive information should 
be included or redacted and instruct the HIU accordingly. 
As far as is legally possible, the enabling legislation should seek to narrow the 
grounds for vexatious challenges to the independent judicial mechanism. One 
effective way of doing this would be through incorporating a statutory appeal 
mechanism in the legislation providing for the ability to appeal a decision of the 
judicial mechanism to a higher judicial authority (e.g. the Appeal Court of NI) on a 
range of appropriately specified grounds. 
The Legal Representation of Families 
To ensure that the rights of families are properly protected, and in particular, that 
they have ‘equality of arms’ before the independent judicial mechanism, a process 
should be devised whereby lawyers representing their interests and the public 
interest in disclosure can play a full part in the discussion of sensitive information 
before the independent judicial mechanism. Having considered a number of 
alternatives, the following option has been agreed as the minimum required to 
ensure equality of arms for affected families. It would involve appointing an 
‘Independent Advocate’ or ‘Public Interest Advocate’ to represent the interests of 
families in the independent judicial mechanism.279 
 A pool of suitably qualified human rights lawyers should be created to take on this 
function. 
 The lawyers in this pool would be vetted to the required degree. 
 Families, in consultation with their lawyers, would then chose which lawyer or 
lawyers from the pool they would wish to represent their interests before the 
Independent Judicial Mechanism. 
                                       
279
 This option would be based, in part, on public interest immunity (PII) hearings, where public 
interest advocates are appointed by the court to assist with ex parte PII claims. The role of the public 
interest advocate is to represent the public interest in the disclosure of documents/information, 
providing a counterweight to the government counsel in PII hearings that represents the public 
interest in non-disclosure (usually on national security grounds). The public interest advocate is 
appointed by the court to represent ‘the public interest that the administration of justice shall not be 
frustrated by the withholding of documents which must be produced if justice is to be done’ (Conway v 
Rimmer [1968] AC 910 per Lord Reid at 940). This role must be distinguished from the role of Special 
Advocates. Special Advocates are used in closed proceedings in the UK including in appeals against 
immigration decisions and hearings on detention and control orders. In such settings, once a Special 
Advocate has seen the ‘closed material’, s/he is unable to have contact with the individual, or the 
individual’s solicitor, in whose interests they are acting. This system has been the subject of 
significant criticism including by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, a major Justice 
Report and Special Advocates themselves who have highlighted the ‘fundamental unfairness of the 
system within which they operate.’ See further Amnesty International (2012) Submission to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights Justice and Security Green Paper. London: Amnesty International. 
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 Once selected, these lawyers would have full access to all of the sensitive 
information that is seen by the judge or judges and the legal representatives of 
the HIU and the Secretary of State. They would be able to participate fully in the 
work of the independent judicial mechanism. 
 Appropriate protocols would be developed to ensure that the vetted lawyers 
appearing before the Independent Judicial Mechanism could provide a ‘gist’ of 
the discussions to unvetted lawyers representing families without disclosing 
sensitive information that might jeopardise the responsibilities to keep people 
safe and secure. 
 It would be necessary to ensure that the independent or public interest advocate 
lawyers are appropriately resourced both individually and collectively (e.g. in 
terms of administration, research, IT support etc.) to ensure that they are able to 
carry out their duties properly. 
 The sharing of experiences amongst this pool of advocates would be encouraged 
as an important counter-weight to the Secretary of State’s lawyers in these 
proceedings. 
Keeping People Safe and Secure: Draft Criteria for Restrictions on Disclosure 
from the HIU to Families 
Introduction 
There will be a general presumption of disclosure of all relevant information in the 
possession of the HIU to families, subject only to the duty not to prejudice the 
administration of justice and the criteria detailed below. In circumstances where the 
HIU have concerns regarding whether the disclosure of information could jeopardise 
the administration of justice (i.e. a possible prosecution or prosecution with a 
reasonable chance of success), the HIU shall seek the advice and guidance of the 
DPP as to whether particular information should be included in a family report or 
indeed whether any family report should be issued in advance of a pending or 
ongoing prosecution. 
Extent of Disclosure 
In cases where the information reveals evidence of human rights abuses, criminal 
activity and misconduct by act or omission by any person, the information disclosed 
to the families shall, in all circumstances where relevant information exists, be 
sufficient to establish in general what measures might reasonably be taken to 
prevent recurrence and, without prejudice to that generality, in particular to: 
a) Identify the organisation, group, or state agency involved; 
b) Describe the nature of the wrongdoing including: 
i. The nature of acts of commission or omission. 
ii. Whether any relevant action or omission by a public authority was lawful 
(including, in particular, whether any deliberate use of force was justified in 
the circumstances). 
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iii. Whether any action or omission of a perpetrator was carried out with the 
knowledge or encouragement of, or in collusion with, a public authority. 
iv. Whether the actions investigated had or may have been wholly or partly 
motivated by racial, religious, or other sectarian factors. 
c) Make clear the chains of command of the persons directly involved in the 
wrongdoing and, in the case of state involvement, the supervisory systems, or 
lack of them, that existed; 
d) Indicate whether the actions investigated were or may have been connected 
with other offences or actions (whether or not already investigated); and 
e) Detail the legislative, regulatory or policy gaps that allowed the wrongdoing to 
occur. 
The above elements represent a minimum level of disclosure. 
Redactions of Sensitive Information 
Article 2 The Duty to Protect Life 
No ‘sensitive information’ shall be provided in a HIU report to a family 
that might present a real and immediate threat to the life of an identified 
individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party. 
The first ground for restrictions on disclosure is the duty on the state to prevent harm 
to individuals deriving from Article 2 of the ECHR. The ‘floor’ of the Article 2 
substantive obligation on the state to protect life is the Osman test. The full test is 
that if 
the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the 
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified 
individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and ... 
they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, 
judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk 
they have failed to meet their Article 2 obligation.280 
The HIU Panel and the Independent Judicial Mechanism would have to determine, in 
the context of the presumption of full disclosure of information to families gathered in 
the course of a HIU investigation, whether the redaction of specified sensitive 
material was required in order to mitigate a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
individual or individuals. 
Article 3 The Duty to Prevent Harm to Individuals 
The state also has a positive duty to prevent harm to individuals under Article 3 of 
the ECHR. In relation to restrictions on disclosure, this duty should be interpreted in 
the following way: 
                                       
280
 See paragraph 116, Osman v UK (87/1997/871/1083), ECHR Judgment 28 October 1998 
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Duty is to individuals 
The risk of harm must be to an identified individual or individuals, not a class of 
persons. 
The harm to be prevented 
The harm to be prevented includes physical or specific psychological injury or 
harassment or intimidation likely to reach the threshold of inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 
The risk 
There must be a direct, foreseeable, and describable link between the proposed 
disclosure and the anticipated harm. That means that the risk must be imminent or in 
the foreseeable future and wholly created or materially enhanced by the proposed 
disclosure. 
The nature and source of the threat 
The threat must be to carry out harm as defined above through criminal acts. The 
source of the threat must be either an identified individual or individuals or a clearly 
definable group that in either case has demonstrated the willingness and capability 
to carry out threats as described to either the individual(s) concerned or to a defined 
class of persons to which the individual(s) arguably at risk belong. 
Protection of Operational Counter-Terrorist Methodologies and Effectiveness 
On the basis that under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR it may be considered necessary and 
proportionate, some information may be redacted from HIU reports to protect the 
effectiveness of operational methods of the police and other security services which 
are in current use and which are lawful - i.e. obsolete or ‘arguably illegitimate’281 
methods cannot be concealed by restrictions on disclosure. Information about 
contemporary, legitimate operational methods must not already be in the public 
domain to qualify for redaction. It must also be demonstrated that the proposed 
disclosure would, in fact, in the foreseeable future, damage the operational 
effectiveness of the method in question in such a way as to place a person or 
persons at a real and immediate risk of serious harm. In general, the reasons for 
restricting disclosure under this criterion must be ‘particularly convincing and 
weighty’.282 
The Redactions 
Any redaction of information must be the minimum that is necessary to materially 
reduce the risk of death or harm to the specified persons concerned and 
proportionate to the level of risk when balanced against the public interest in 
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 Dil and Others v Commissioner of Police [2014] EWHC 2184 (QB), para 42 
282
 Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (1999) 
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disclosure. As is the case with reports issued by the Office of the Police 
Ombudsman, such redactions should only relate to the narrative or ‘findings’ 
elements of HIU report and not to the Conclusions reached. Such redactions cannot 
be used to obscure or block the disclosure of information below the minimum 
necessary elements of information outlined above. 
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